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Abstract 
 
Canadians generally consider themselves forerunners of acceptance who deem diversity a 
core value, yet this identity coexists alongside fierce national debates over reasonable 
accommodation of minority religious practices in public spaces. In this context religious 
minorities use dress to communicate their needs and goals to the larger society, in the process 
expanding the parameters of human rights for all Canadians. This challenges the false narrative 
that Canada is a religiously neutral nation without its mainstream society’s own fervently held 
beliefs and practices, and of religious minorities as an inherently threatening force to these 
inviolable values. In order to understand how religious minorities engage dress in highly 
symbolic ways, this dissertation explores the ways everyday clothes become objects of sacred 
performance and sites of fierce public contestation in the process of identity creation, 
maintenance, and re-creation.  
This study uses three case studies of minorities and religious headcoverings in Canada 
over the course of a century to understand how dress functions as a means of communication 
within and between religious minority communities and the larger Canadian society. The first is 
the debate over Swiss Mennonite women’s headcoverings in Ontario during and immediately 
after World War I. The second is Baltej Singh Dhillon’s experiences as Canada’s first turban-
wearing Sikh RCMP officer in 1989-90. The third is Zunera Ishaq’s Supreme Court case to wear 
her Muslim niqab during a citizenship ceremony and its effects on the federal election of 2015. 
These case studies provide examples of potential outcomes for these groups. In the first, the 
group achieves its ultimate goal but the larger society largely misses its message. In the second, 
Dhillon achieves his goal while successfully communicating his message to the government. In 
the third, Ishaq achieves her goal, but the larger society does not fully understand her message 
and the matter remains hotly debated.  
This dissertation considers the discursive interactions of clothes, colonialism, human 
rights, and religion, bringing together a diverse collection of theories and methods from several 
disciplines, demonstrating that those who “cling” to these parochial ways are far from 
incompatible with Canadian ideals. 
 v 
Acknowledgments 
 
This dissertation is the culmination of over a decade of study, research, and experience. It has 
genuinely taken a community to get me to this point, and I cannot adequately express my deep 
gratitude to all who have been part of this journey. 
 
I would like to thank the Sisters of St. Joseph and the University of Waterloo’s Provost Doctoral 
Award for Women for their funding contributions to this project. I would also like to thank the 
Mennonite Archives of Ontario, particularly archivist Laureen Harder-Gissing for her extensive 
help through many stages of this project, and the Sikh National Archives of Canada for their 
assistance on my second case study. A special thanks to Rebecca Steinman for making sense of 
and editing my footnotes and bibliography. 
 
I must sincerely thank my dissertation supervisor, Jeff Wilson, who initially encouraged me to 
pursue this degree, whose selfless time and care ensured progress and quality, and whose endless 
support gave me the courage to keep going when it seemed impossible. Much has been written, 
and much has yet to be done, on ensuring graduate school is equally accessible for women with 
young children. I am extremely fortunate to have had a supervisor who embodies these values of 
gender equity. Without him, I would have left graduate school. 
 
Many thanks also to my internal committee members, David Seljak and Alicia Batten, whose 
conversation, direction, and insights offered immeasurable contributions to this project and my 
time in this program. You were both incredibly generous with your time, and I am truly grateful. 
I have been unbelievably fortunate to work with incredible faculty who showed me the 
difference between wisdom and knowledge, and who are both wonderful mentors and scholars at 
the top of their game: Jim Pankratz, Jeremy Bergen, Derek Suderman, Tom Yoder-Neufeld, Troy 
Osborne, Marianne Mellinger, James Walker, Doug Cowan, Doris Jakobsh, and Mavis Fenn. 
 
A special heartfelt thank you to three inspirational mentors, women who regularly went far 
above and beyond their role as faculty to support and encourage me in any way they could 
throughout graduate school: Marlene Epp, Heather MacDougall, and Susan Schultz Huxman.  
 
I would also like to thank the tremendous faculty assistants and librarians who did me more 
favours, answered more questions, and helped me in uncountable ways over the years (proving 
that wizards are real): Mandy Macfie, Ruth Steinman, Birgit Moscinski, and Fiona McAlister.  
 
Many thanks to those on this doctoral trip with me. To Brooke Brassard, my sister-wife in the 
program and in life. To Allison Murray, who created writing caves with me through two degrees 
and was my general go-to on writing “gooder” or gender theory. To Lizzie Rigotti, who taught 
me to make the world’s best guacamole in the midst of comps preparation. To Rachel Brown, 
who I knew long before the doctoral program, and who, being always two steps ahead of me, 
was an inspiration and a guide. To my other friends in grad school, Ryan Anningson, Zabeen 
Khamisa, Pam Andrews, Christopher Dennis, Sahir Dewji, Scott Wall, Samiksa Love, Christina 
Edmiston, Vincent Kong, Jared Both, and all the rest who are (or were) on this road. Thanks for 
sharing the pilgrimage. 
 
 vi 
I moved into residence as a first year and I left with lifelong friends. Sean, Melinda, Ryan, and 
Diana, you have been there through it all. You’ve supported me, loved me, and laughed with 
(at?) me the whole way. For my strong-mama-gurus, Emily Tell and Antoinette Duplessis. You 
both showed me how to do the whole single mom thing, fed me, and encouraged me.  
 
Thanks to so many friends, who showed me the importance of community in so many ways: Ed 
Janzen, Noha Abdul Ghaffar, Natalia Grichina, Gary Bruce, Becky Courtney, Cheong Ng, Noha 
Al Nadhi, Hilde Sproat, Amanda Brunk, Verena Enns, Manar Baksh, Hatem Sindi, Scotty 
Kipfer, Mark Weber, Sherri Wideman, Marcus and Lisa Shantz, Scott and Mary Brubacher-Zehr, 
Andy and Athena Hagen, Kathryn Loveday, Melinda Newell, Carolyn Allwright, and Cindy 
Brick. 
 
Much love and many thanks to my family, the many wonderful individuals who make up the 
circle of love and support that is the Crecelius clan. To my Fisher family, Pat, Barry, Katie, 
Laura, Kaidan, and Simon, for your ceaseless love. To my sister-in-law, Victoria, for your 
cuddles and conversation. To my brother, Douglas, who constantly flicks the lens through which 
I view the world to ensure I critically examine my beliefs (or just to torment his little sister, 
jury’s still out). For my mom, Erin, who models every day what a strong, wise, and loving 
woman looks like. For my dad, Phil, who taught me that I had a voice, and that I should use it. 
My family has always been the brick wall behind my back. 
 
For my beloved husband Michael, who found a single mom in the middle of grad school and 
thought, “Sure! This looks like fun!” You came into our ridiculous world, you rolled up your 
sleeves, and you said, “Let’s do this.” And I have. Thanks to you. I look forward to sharing a 
long (gainfully-employed) life with you. 
 
But most of all to my two daughters, Lily and Gwenyth. They have been there from the 
beginning, “attending” undergrad classes with me in utero, nursing in the halls between classes, 
playing with their toys on a blanket on the floor in a Master’s seminar (thank you Tom Yoder-
Neufeld!), napping in the faculty lounge, helping me study for my comprehensive exams reading 
their own stacks of books beside me, trying to explain to befuddled classmates what “PhD” 
means and why your mom is still in school, and always asking piercing questions. This 
dissertation is for you. 
Lily and Gwen, I look at you and I know why I study what I study.  
 vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                                     
 
Examining Committee  ................................................................................................  ii 
Author’s Declaration     ................................................................................................  iii 
Abstract                         ................................................................................................  iv 
Acknowledgments        ................................................................................................  v 
List of Figures          ................................................................................................  viii 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION —  
 What Makes Us Canadian? ........................................................................      1 
 
2.  CHAPTER TWO —                                                                                                                   
  Literature Review, Method, and Theory ....................................................  18 
   
3. CHAPTER THREE — 
  The Ontario Swiss Mennonite Bonnet Debate, 1910-1925 .......................  76 
 
4. CHAPTER FOUR —                                                                                                                   
  Baltej Singh Dhillon and Sikh Turbans in the RCMP, 1974-1990 ............  122 
   
5. CHAPTER FIVE —                                                                                                                 
  Zunera Ishaq and Muslim Niqabs in Citizenship Ceremonies,  
  2010-2015 ..................................................................................................  166 
   
6. CONCLUSION —  
  As Canadian As Possible ...........................................................................  220 
   
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................  240 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
                                                                                                                                       
 
FIG. 1:  Sharon Johnston; Prince Charles; Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall;  
 Sophie Gregoire; and Justin Trudeau. Parliament Hill, July 1, 2017 ......      17 
FIG. 2:  Stirling Avenue Mennonite Church, 1910 .................................................  118 
FIG. 3:  Left, Stateser Bonnet. Right, contemporary hat. 1916 ...............................  119 
FIG. 4:  Gordon Eby with his parents ......................................................................  120 
FIG. 5:  1910: Family of Judith Weber Krempien Shirk .........................................  121 
FIG. 6:  Arnold Friberg, 1953. Springtime in the North ..........................................  161 
FIG. 7:  Arnold Friberg, 1963. Untitled (Maintain the Right) ................................  162 
FIG. 8:  British Officers of the Indian Cavalry .......................................................  163 
FIG. 9:  Sikh Officers of the Indian Army ...............................................................  164 
FIG. 10:  Anti-Turban pin collection .........................................................................  165 
FIG. 11:  Zunera Ishaq takes the oath of citizenship, October 5, 2015. ....................  218 
FIG. 12:  Justin Trudeau, leader of the Liberal Party, Stephen Harper, leader of the  
  Conservative Party, and Tom Mulcair, leader of the New Democratic  
  Party at the National Leader’s Debate, August 6, 2015. ............................  219
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“To those fleeing persecution, terror & war,  
Canadians will welcome you, regardless of your faith. 
Diversity is our strength.” 
- PM Justin Trudeau  
 
On July 1, 2017, eager Canadians — many of whom had traveled long ways from across 
the country — stood in the pouring rain for hours in lines that stretched around several city 
blocks, waiting to join the 25, 000 people gathered on Parliament Hill to celebrate Canada’s 
150th birthday. Once they made it into the festivities, children jumped in puddles, crowds sang 
along with Leonard Cohen’s Hallelujah, and all ages ate beaver tails, a doughnut-like treat. The 
rains cleared in time for Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to take the stage at midday. He was 
joined on the podium by his wife Sophie Gregoire, Prince Charles, Camilla, Duchess of 
Cornwall, Governor General David Johnston, and Dr. Sharon Johnston, who each chose outfits 
appropriate for the occasion.  
Sophie Grégoire has been vocal and intentional in her support of Canadian designers. 
Always one to “buy local,” when her husband became Prime Minister, Gregoire decided, “I 
should be wearing Canadian!”1 For her first outfit of Canada Day she wore a solid white 
jumpsuit by Toronto designer Tanya Taylor with a simple red and white brooch (for the evening 
she changed into a complimentary red floor-length dress with Ottawa Indigenous designer 
Deliaestelle Designs earrings). Sharon Johnston echoed Grégoire’s patriotic colour palette with a 
knee length red and white large striped dress, accented with a red maple leaf brooch, an elaborate 
necklace with a cluster of maple leaves, red and white high heels, and an elegant red fascinator 
                                                   
1 Sophie Grégoire, quoted in Chloe Tejada, “Sophie Grégoire is on a Mission to Promote Canadian Fashion.” In  
Huffpost, June 28, 2017. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2017/06/28/sophie-gregoire-trudeau-
style_a_23006008/ 
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with white feathers. The men wore simple well-tailored suits, but Trudeau added a stylish red 
and white check kerchief in his breast pocket and a dark red tie (Fig. 1).  
 At noon, Trudeau offered this reflection on Canada’s sesquicentennial: 
In the 150 years since [Confederation] we have … enshrined our dearest 
values — equality, diversity, freedom of the individual, and two official 
languages — in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Ours is a land of 
Indigenous Peoples, settlers, and newcomers, and our diversity has always 
been at the core of our success. … We express ourselves in French, English, 
and hundreds of other languages. Today, as has been the case for centuries, 
we are strong not in spite of our differences, but because of them.2 
 
Before singing, world famous singer-songwriter Bono joked that he, as an Irishman, was 
responsible for all the rain, then made it clear why he and his band were there: “When others 
build walls, you open doors; when others divide, your arms are open wide; where you lead, 
others follow. That’s the real reason The Edge and myself are here today.”3 Prince Charles 
echoed these sentiments in his speech: “We should be clear and proud that we are celebrating a 
country that others look to for example. An example of fairness and inclusion … Around the 
world, Canada is recognized as a champion of human rights … and as a powerful and consistent 
example of diversity and the power of inclusion.”4 This sentiment was not merely an official 
talking point, but was reflected in the everyday people in the crowd. Senior citizen and military 
                                                   
2 “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada,” Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada. July 1, 2017.  
http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2017/07/01/statement-prime-minister-canada-day.  
3 Bono, quoted in Daniel Leblanc, “Trudeau, Bono, and a Crowd of Thousands Celebrate Canada 150 in Soggy  
Ottawa,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), July 1, 2017, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/rain-pelts-parliament-hill-as-crowds-gather-for-canada-
150-bash/article35529841/. 
4 Charles, Prince of Wales, quoted in Daniel Leblanc, “Trudeau, Bono, and a Crowd of Thousands Celebrate Canada  
150 in Soggy Ottawa,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON), July 1, 2017, 
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/rain-pelts-parliament-hill-as-crowds-gather-for-canada-
150-bash/article35529841/. 
  3 
veteran Ray Paquette told the Ottawa Citizen, “Canada, to me, is the greatest country in the 
world. With its diversity, everyone is welcome.”5  
Where did this identity come from? Why do so many Canadians consider themselves — 
and other countries consider them — harbingers of acceptance who deem diversity a core 
Canadian value? Furthermore, how did diversity – a statistical reality – come to be understood 
and utilized as a value? This progressive identity coexists alongside fierce national debates over 
reasonable accommodation of minority religious practices in public spaces, such as the male 
student at York University who triggered a fire storm when he stated a preference for a male-
only focus group in his online course.6 In this context religious minorities use dress to 
communicate their needs and goals to the larger Canadian society, in the process pushing the 
scope and advancing the parameters of human rights for all Canadians. So doing challenges the 
common but false narrative of Canada as a religiously neutral nation without many Canadians’ 
own equally fervently held belief systems and venerated practices, and of religious minorities as 
an inherently threatening force to inviolable Canadian values. Indeed, these individuals and 
communities root their endeavours in these very Canadian values they are accused of 
threatening.   
In order to understand how religious minorities engage and put to use clothes in highly 
symbolic and sacred ways, this dissertation explores the ways everyday items and simple swaths 
of fabric become objects of sacred performance and sites of fierce public contestation. They are 
display for God, for community, and for self in the process of identity creation, maintenance, and 
                                                   
5 Ray Paquette, quoted in Blair Crawford, “Canada 150: Partiers Don’t Let a Little (or a Lot) of Rain Ruin Their  
Day,” Ottawa Citizen (Ottawa, ON), July 1, 2017, http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/canada-150- 
partiers-dont-let-a-little-or-a-lot-of-rain-ruin-their-day. 
6 Laura Morlock, “Religion Is a Human Right: This Is a Matter of Reconciling Competing Rights,” University  
Affairs, January 22, 2014, http://www.universityaffairs.ca/opinion/in-my-opinion/religion-is-a-human-
right/. 
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re-creation. In the hands of determined individuals, these items of dress can then become 
vehicles for legislative and cultural revisioning. With dress as an embodied site of contestation, 
religious minorities are crucial actors in the evolution of many Canadians’ sense of self. 
This dissertation uses three case studies of minorities and religious headcoverings in 
Canada over the course of a century in order to understand how dress functions as a means of 
communication within and between religious minority communities and the larger Canadian 
society. The first is the story of Mennonite women and bonnets in Ontario during and 
immediately after World War I. In this case, as Mennonite women moved from farm to domestic 
and factory labour in cities they began trading their particular bonnets for simple hats (the prayer 
cap remained under the hat). Meanwhile, with the dawn of World War I Mennonite men were at 
risk of conscription, despite the church’s military exemption promised by the Canadian 
government in 1873 to attract Russian Mennonite farmers.7 As a right granted to a group, the 
exercise of that right depended on a strong Mennonite identity. While not directly affecting the 
matter of conscription, the bonnet was central to concurrent internal community debates over 
what it meant to be a member of the church. Due to the nature of rights in Canada in the early 
20th century, markers of membership became vitally important to an individuals’ access to the 
rights of the community. For young men, this centred around baptism, while women were asked 
to maintain the single most visible symbol of Mennonite identity boundaries with the traditional 
bonnet. Though given their communal approach to identity and agency they would not have 
viewed it in this way, Mennonite women resisted this focus on the bonnet as a test of 
                                                   
7 Regehr, Ted D. and Richard D. Thiessen. (October 2011). Canada. Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia  
Online. http://gameo.org/index.php?title=Canada&oldid=144048. 
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membership (particularly when the plain dress for men was not enforced), affirming their rights 
within their community itself to practice their religion to the best of their understanding. 
The second case is Baltej Singh Dhillon’s experiences applying to the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police as a turban-wearing Sikh Canadian in 1989 and 1990 British Columbia. 
Dhillon’s case quickly became a matter of fierce national debate. Many Canadians believed it 
represented “them” trying to change “us” in the most egregious manner by “messing with” the 
venerated Mountie uniform. While thousands became involved in overtly racist and xenophobic 
campaigns to stop Dhillon, the majority of opponents made reasonable sounding arguments 
about how it was not the presence of minorities that was the problem, it was simply that 
“Canadians cherished the uniform” and it should not be altered, revealing a venerated allegiance 
to a secular form of dress entrenched in Canadiana. 
In the third case study, Zunera Ishaq, a Muslim Pakistani immigrant, successfully argued 
to the Supreme Court that she should have the right to wear her niqab (a face veil) during her 
citizenship ceremony. The Conservative federal government, under Prime Minister Stephen 
Harper, had set the restriction in place and repeatedly appealed the courts’ decisions. The case 
became a bitter issue in the 2015 federal election, becoming a campaign issue for the 
Conservatives while ultimately costing the New Democratic Party, which supported Ishaq, a 
devastating number of seats in the province of Quebec. Conservatives, however, overplayed their 
“scary immigrant” hand, misjudging most Canadians’ sense of propriety, and in the end Liberal 
leader Justin Trudeau became Prime Minister. Trudeau also supported Ishaq, but did not 
experience the same fallout as the NDP leader Tom Mulcair.  
 
  6 
Clothing is a primary contact point between the self and the world. Fashion is a message, 
it communicates who you are and who you want to be (or alternatively, how you are seen, and 
how you want to be seen). It is an external performance of internal beliefs and values. Religion is 
rooted in the body and its sensual relations with the world.8 Outside of religious studies, many 
scholars are dismissive of the role of religion in shaping individuals and societies. However, 
while these fields minimize religion, many (particularly history and anthropology) recognize the 
importance of material culture studies in a way religious studies is only beginning to. Many 
scholars have been slow to appreciate the significance of materiality, notably dress, in the 
intersection of religiosity and secularity. Despite religion’s large role in dress choice (including 
in supposedly secular situations), scholars consistently overlook its significance, focusing instead 
on matters of race, ethnicity, and civil liberties. Dress does more than simply point to these 
“larger truths.” It provides insights into practice and belief that are inaccessible through other 
means. In these human rights cases it is itself the site of contestation. Minority bodies become 
the battleground for competing discourses and this analysis demonstrates that the concepts of 
acceptable dress are neither shared nor intuitive. 
Outsiders look at a community and can make assumptions about how that group 
functions or the roles of individuals within it. Conversely, insiders from that community do not 
always understand how outsiders view them, or how they receive the messages the group is 
sending. People on both sides critique “others” for situations that play out in their own 
community as well, such as male dominance and violence. Mennonites, for example, believed 
that headcoverings protected their women from sexual assault in “the world” (outside their 
community). Likewise, many Canadians focus on the niqab as representing inequality and 
                                                   
8 S. Brent Plate, A History of Religion in 5 1/2 Objects (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014), 7. 
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violence against women while not recognizing the widespread reality of gender-based 
discrimination and suffering in their own midst. 
In each of these case studies there are recurrent themes of the need to protect women and 
idealized masculinity. As a pacifist community, idealized masculinity looks different in the 
Mennonite world than in mainstream society, but it retains patterns of protector and provider. 
Men were expected to be gentle yet commanding.9 Meanwhile, Dhillon’s story is steeped in 
glorified concepts of masculinity as warrior, defender, and paragon of justice. This is true for 
both the culture surrounding the RCMP and within Sikhism. Meanwhile, Ishaq shows how 
niqabi women are generally pitied for being oppressed and overly submissive while 
simultaneously being criticized for being defiant and obstreperous. In all of these examples the 
actors were both subjected and playing to gendered scripts.  
Judith Butler wrote her groundbreaking work, Gender Trouble, in part because, “It 
seemed to me, and continues to seem, that feminism ought to be careful not to idealize certain 
expressions of gender that, in turn, produce new forms of hierarchy and exclusion.”10 While it is 
not the direction Butler is looking, this is what we see with culturally normative ideas of gender 
expression in these case studies. Butler, “… sought to undermine any and all efforts to wield a 
discourse of truth to delegitimate minority gendered and sexual practices.”11 While Butler is 
discussing gender spectrums and sexualities here, it is equally true of minority religious and 
dress practices. Like Butler I acknowledge that this does not mean, “… that all minority practices 
                                                   
9 It is somewhat difficult to discuss the Mennonite community in this context, as the case study is a historic one but  
the Mennonite church in Ontario is very much alive and active in the current context. As a result,  
community standards were naturally different a century ago. However, each of the tenets discussed in this  
dissertation, including the views on headcoverings and the roles for men and women, exist in vibrant 21st  
century Mennonite communities. Other than pacifism and adult baptism, though, they are not the views of 
the majority. This presents challenges for grammatical choice in writing about themes.  
10 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 2006), viii. 
11 Butler, viii. 
  8 
are to be condoned or celebrated,” but that, “… we ought to be able to think them before we 
come to any kind of conclusions about them.”12 She was concerned about, “… the ways that the 
panic in the face of such practices rendered them unthinkable.”13 Cultural hierarchies of religious 
expression and practice lead to similar alarm at non-normative minority dress in public spaces.  
Religious minorities have often strategically subsumed religion under “race/ethnicity” in 
order to participate in identity politics in a supposedly secular arena. Since the 1960s, academic 
and public policy concerns in Canada have given the majority of their attention to race and 
ethnicity, while religion has generally been understood as a private matter that does not belong in 
the public sphere.14 Therefore, when a religious minority community or individual seeks to 
participate in this arena with overt religious presentation it challenges this Canadian cultural 
norm of religion belonging in the private sphere. At times minorities, such as with the 
Mennonites in this study, use their religious dress to communicate their self-avowed differences. 
It is worth noting that despite their desire to be separate, and to utilize their dress to do so, of all 
these case studies it is the Mennonite dress with which Canadians are least concerned. This 
demonstrates that human rights and religious rights are often highly racialized; and such rights 
are rarely contested when the state, the public, and the minority share the same religious and 
racial identities.15  
More often than using their dress to separate themselves, however, individuals from 
religious minorities are focused on their immediate goal — serving the country as a police 
officer, or gaining Canadian citizenship — and consider their religious dress incidental and 
                                                   
12 Butler, Gender Trouble, viii. 
13 Butler, viii. 
14 David Seljak, “Post-secularism, Multiculturalism, Human Rights, and Religion in Ontario,” in Studies in Religion  
45 no. 4 (2016): 542-565. 
15 Marlene Epp, personal correspondence with the author. 13 March, 2018. 
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insignificant. It is the larger society that can focus on their embodied “otherness.” In reality, 
these minorities are not entering a religiously neutral site. Indeed, the very idea of secular and 
sacred is a direct derivative of Christian thought that does not translate to many other faith 
traditions. The United Church may have lost its historic influence in parliament, and Canada may 
no longer be a “Christian nation,” but institutional Christianity has left a significant wake, 
including the way most Canadians dress and what attire is generally considered appropriate in 
public.  
The late 1960s and early ‘70s saw an intentional shift in Canadian society toward a 
“religiously neutral” and “multiculturally inclusive” self-perception that played a significant role 
in a new national identity.16 Many Canadians continue to believe that “by redefining the social 
order according to … models of secularism, multiculturalism, and human rights,” Canadians 
have resolved the issue of religious freedom.17 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau promoted cultural 
retention in the belief that those who have confidence in their own identity form the base of a 
society centred around “fair play for all.”18 The Liberal government and its social partners 
intended for such neutrality and inclusiveness to create a welcoming space for religious 
minorities, and while this approach paved the way for Baltej Singh Dhillon to become a Mountie 
in a turban and beard, it also made faithfulness to overt religious practice in public — most 
notably in dress — socially uncomfortable.  
Conversely, the Mennonite debate occurs before this national narrative of religious 
neutrality and inclusivity. This case demonstrates the importance of not imposing a 21st century 
                                                   
16 See Gary Miedema, For Canada’s Sake: Public Religion, Centennial Celebrations, and the Re-Making of Canada  
in the 1960s (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2005). 
17 Seljak, “Post-secularism, Multiculturalism,” 542-565. 
18 Paul Bramadat in John Biles and Humera Ibrahim, “Religion and Public Policy: Immigration, Citizenship, and  
Multiculturalism -- Guess Who's Coming to Dinner,” in Religion and Ethnicity in Canada, Paul  
Bramadat and David Seljak eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 163.  
  10 
understanding of “human rights” on an era when that was not yet part of common parlance. 
Rooted in British Common Law, rights in Canada were guaranteed through court cases, 
precedence, and tradition, rather than from a declaration or an appeal to reason (as they are in the 
American system, and would be later in Canada). Over the past century rights discourse has 
shifted from an understanding of group rights to individual rights. The Mennonite case in chapter 
three demonstrates how significantly rights discourse in Canada has changed in the past century, 
as the nation stepped further away from a conservative British style of assured rights to a 
proclamatory declaration in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.19 
For the individuals in these case studies, religious dress functions as knowing how to do 
their religion in a way that puts their faith in conversation with their identities as Canadians. 
They actively and intentionally create an outward appearance that publicly declares their 
membership in a specific community, at times challenging that very community to modify its 
practices, as in the case of the Mennonite bonnet. Their participation in public life was a 
manifestation of their religious belief. Religion inspired and justified their desire to engage in 
Canadian society, and to advocate for their right to do so with their identities intact.20 This is true 
even of the Mennonites, who preferred not to engage in public life and to remain separate. When 
their conscientious objector status came into question it was their religious beliefs that motivated 
them to push to retain it and prompted them to step outside of their communities to petition 
                                                   
19 For more on the evolution of human rights in Canada’s history, see: James W. St. G. Walker, “Race,” Rights and  
the Law in the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,  
1997); Rosalind English and Philip Havers, eds. An Introduction to Human Rights and the Common Law  
(London: Bloomsbury Publ, 2000); Christopher P. M. Waters, ed. British and Canadian Perspectives on  
International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Michael Tugendat, Liberty Intact: Human Rights in English Law  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Dominique Clément, Human Rights in Canada: A History  
(Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2016); and Janet Miron, ed. A History of Human Rights  
in Canada: Essential Issues (Toronto: Canadian Scholars Press, 2009). 
20 Mary Kinnear, “Religion and the Shaping of ‘Public Woman’: A Post-Suffrage Case Study,” Religion and Public  
Life in Canada: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Marguerite Van Die (Toronto: University of  
Toronto Press, 2001), 196. 
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government. Mennonites are in a particular position on the margins of mainstream religion. 
Though they are Christian, their distinctive beliefs on non-violence, adult baptism, community 
boundaries, and plain dress have kept them (largely intentionally) on the outskirts of established 
Christianity. Though they benefit from some of the effects of Christian hegemony, they 
demonstrate the “limitations of categories that rely on the bifurcated schema of minority/majority 
religious group[s].”21 
Minorities both receive accommodations and are denied, but it is the way in which 
Canadians reach decisions that is most revealing.22 This research is not an attempt to arrive at 
some fabled “ultimate truth” about what constitutes the illusive Canadian identity (as though that 
is or could be a singular characteristic), or how religious minorities fashion a place for 
themselves in this larger question (as if “religious minorities” were ever one monolithic entity). 
Rather, it is the way certain Canadians take disparate pieces of belief and knowledge and create 
versions of the facts that is most significant for this dissertation. Focusing on the tensions within 
and between such narratives and their embodied selves reveals the inconsistencies and holes in 
their logic. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the discursive and material production, 
and its attendant opposition, when deliberating over religious freedom and its limitations.23 This 
research is not limited in its implications to these three case studies alone, but should foster 
conversation and debate over where Canadians deem it appropriate to curtail freedom of 
religious practice. How do Canadians enjoy constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion 
while balancing that right in a diverse society? Where is it appropriate to set the boundaries and, 
equally importantly, how is that decision reached?24 
                                                   
21 Lori G. Beaman, Defining Harm (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 11. 
22 Beaman, 2. 
23 Beaman, 2-3. 
24 Beaman, x. 
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In such discussions it is important to remember that minority bodies are sites of agency, 
not merely submissive or passive receptacles of social messaging. The people in these case 
studies sought to define themselves in the national narrative on their own terms. When Southern 
Ontario Mennonite women in the 1910s and ‘20s resisted their conference’s injunctions to 
maintain the traditional bonnet they were also, in part, resisting the practice of women bearing 
the brunt of visible non-conformity. The bonnets were impractical in their new economic roles as 
factory workers and domestics, and in their opinion theologically unnecessary. When the women 
refused to make the change on threat of church discipline it resulted in a schism and founding of 
a new congregation where their headcovering choices were supported. The success of these 
women in recreating standards of acceptable plain dress reveals them to be active agents of 
change.25  
This dissertation therefore uses agency as a crucial component in bringing narratives and 
materiality together. This allows for a deeper understanding of how minorities and mainstream 
cultures intersect and engage. Such intercommunicative encounters negate any simplistic 
binaries.26 These case studies are shaped by gendered discourses, national narratives, and human 
agency. By applying what we learn in these stories we can use this research to understand other 
minority/majority situations. Religious diversity in Canada and debates over reasonable 
accommodation are only on the rise and there is no shortage of circumstances to which this 
analysis is germane. Examing Baltej Singh Dhillon’s experiences joining the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police as a turban-wearing Sikh man, or Zunera Ishaq’s fight to wear her niqab during 
her citizenship ceremony, are prominent examples of this negotiation, but others include Multani 
                                                   
25 Bonnie Reilly Schmidt, “Women in Red Serge: Female Police Bodies and the Disruption to the Image of the  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,” (PhD diss., Simon Fraser University, 2013), 14. 
26 Reilly Schmidt, “Women in Red Serge,” 14. 
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v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys in 2006 (which allowed a Sikh boy to wear his 
kirpan [ceremonial dagger] to school), Syndicat Northcrest v. Anselm in 2004 (a dispute over 
Orthodox Jews erecting succahs [temporary huts] on their balconies in Montreal, a case that set 
the important precedence of sincerely held religious belief), and a male York University student’s 
request in 2014 to only work with male classmates for unspecified religious reasons.  
 The variety of societal responses to these realities of diversity reveal a great deal about 
how many Canadians feel about their own sense of self, which can be tenuous. Rooted in the 
work of Slavoj Zizek and Jacques Lacan, sociologist Kieran Keohane explores “Canada’s crises 
of identification and recognition” in the following way:27  
The social is constituted as an antagonistic forcefield of 
relationality between contingent articulations of identities around a 
basic paradox: that the integrity of identity is contingent upon the 
identification of elements which are not-the-identity; ie., a field of 
Otherness, outside of the identity, which stands in antithetical 
relation to the identity.28  
 
We create our identities through practice and symbols, but these are vulnerable to the 
differentness of others. There is constant dialogue in the encounter — the very interaction with 
difference alters identity. The one relies on the other for its coherence. Simultaneously, “old 
symbolic orders give way to new ones.”29 Keohane considers, “Mounties’ hats and uniforms, 
oaths of allegiance to the Queen, and official-language barriers as anachronisms — examples of 
a colonial symbolic order that is transmogrifying into a ‘sumptuously rich, lusciously fruitful 
pastiche’ that flourishes in an emergent ‘intercultural’ rather than merely multicultural 
context.”30 
                                                   
27 Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, 140. 
28 Kieran Keohane, quoted in Coombe, 140. 
29 Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, 140. 
30 Kieran Keohane quoted in Coombe, 140. 
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 The ways that the encounter of difference creates and recreates identity, and the way 
constructions of difference itself leads many to regard it as something to resolve — in the 
process entrenching power structures that these solutions may in fact be attempting to address — 
challenges, “… an imagined purity of identity that is embedded in solutions to the ‘problem’ of 
diversity.”31 Many celebrate the products of such exchange of cultural diversity (Rosemary J. 
Coombe points to “Thai tapas bars and Mennonite tortilla bakeries” as such examples). 
However, Keohane cautions that Canadians, “still lack sublime objects of identification to fill the 
cultural space of this new nation.”32 Therefore, debates over the national symbol of a Mountie’s 
hat become particularly divisive in a societal context where such symbols are in short supply. 
It is worth noting here that the concept of and discussions around “diversity” itself can 
serve to entrench the ideas of “us” and “them,” as though there were one, static, and clear 
mythical “Canada.” The members of which are, quite naturally, Caucasians who wear toques, 
play hockey religiously, say “aboot” instead of “about,” and spend every summer weekend 
canoeing at the cottage. The “minorities” are generally brown-skinned immigrants who speak 
with a non-English accent, eat “exotic” foods, and practice religions other than Christianity. 
While these caricatures may be extreme, they reflect representative discourses evident in social 
data ranging from corporate Human Resources handbooks to journalists’ phrasing to academic 
discussions of “difference,” “pluralism,” or “diversity.” In approaching these case studies with the 
diversity handle, I do not wish to perpetuate othering of minority communities and individuals, 
or to lack nuance in the intricately complicated lived realities for people in every corner of this 
                                                   
31 Beaman, Defining Harm 12. 
32 Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties, 140. 
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discussion. The Mennonite case, in fact, serves a valuable function in this matter, demonstrating 
the tenuous and situation-dependent nature of “insider” and “outsider.” It is, of course, impossible 
to account for every possible subtle distinction in matters of identity, particularly given the vast 
scope of diversity within Canada (from its geographic mass and regional differences to its 
demographic heterogeneity). Rather, this work seeks to contribute to a larger conversation 
around how Canadians choose to define themselves, what boundaries the majority maintains, and 
how they accomplish this.  
Even with data collection t is important to remember that the narrative relationship is 
being shaped from two directions in an interview or these cases — either by the interviewer and 
the narrator, or “the majority” and “the minority.” Oral historian Susan Geiger describes this as 
“sharing the authority.”33 Oral histories have the capacity to “redefine and redistribute 
intellectual authority.”34 This works to ensure that the people in the case studies are not reduced 
to mere subjects or sources in the final research.35 This provides a model for application with 
religious minorities in “real life” engagement. Considering the individuals in question as agentic 
bodies rather than passive subjects in a contentious matter fosters a relationship where power is 
shared, though admittedly not equally. 
Such discussion should not be limited to these three case studies, but rather initiate 
conversation and debate about the space between rhetoric and reality when it comes to religious 
minorities, human rights, and a “religiously neutral” Canada. It also opens up an exploration of 
the themes of appropriate gender roles, the Canadian diversity model, and agency in the 
                                                   
33 Susan Geiger, “What’s So Feminist About Women’s Oral History?” Journal of Women’s History, 2, no. 1, (1990),  
175-76. 
34 Geiger, 75-76. 
35 Reilly Schmidt, “Women in Red Serge,” 23. 
  16 
intersection of multiple discursive contexts.36 These cases act as mirrors that reflect majority 
Canadian values and attitudes back in on themselves. They act as a map for the convergence of 
discourses such as gender equity, freedom of religious practice, and Canadian identity. This 
dissertation is not about Mennonites, Sikhs, or Muslims per se; nor is it about the individuals at 
the centre of these case studies. Rather, these examples provide an entry point for an examination 
of grand Canadian narratives of religious neutrality and the presumption of tension between 
human rights and overt displays of religion in public spaces. In this environment, devotion to a 
Stetson is honourable, but commitment to a niqab is extreme. 
  
                                                   
36 Beaman, Defining Harm, 2. 
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Fig. 1. From left to right: Sharon Johnston; Prince Charles; Camilla, Duchess of Cornwall; 
Sophie Grégoire; and Justin Trudeau. Parliament Hill, July 1, 2017. 
http://theworldbulletin.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07d2e028dbcea04f6ee75976bee96656f589
8d19ae50a73995e534d923ab326d1a_3991132.jpg
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review, Method, and Theory 
 
Clothes, colonialism, human rights, and religion are intimately intertwined, though 
scholars often overlook this intersection. This dissertation brings together a wide and seemingly 
disparate collection of theories and methods from several different disciplines. While this 
research focuses on the Canadian context, these realities span both North and South America 
(indeed, globally) and across the centuries. In 1781, for example, Visitador  (inspector) General 
José Antonio de Areche, in targeting an Incan rebellion, decreed that, “Indians are prohibited 
from wearing the dress of their ancestors, especially that of the nobility … that which was used 
by the ancient Incas.”37 To ensure his message was clear, Areche added, “And so these Indians 
withdraw their hatred of Spaniards and dress according to the laws, they must dress according to 
Spanish customs …”38 Areche understood that cloth held sacred meaning for the Incas and that 
banning Indigenous forms of dress struck a direct blow to the resistance. Andean communities 
believed that clothing, “literally embodied the essence of a person or thing.”39 The Incas, for 
example, were unfazed when Spanish missionaries destroyed sacred statues because, “the 
essence of holiness resided in the cloth,” not in the statuary.40  
Though the Spanish colonial power was very successful in repressing and destroying 
much of Inca tradition and religion, the importance of dress persists today. In Abancay, Peru, 
ritual kin wash all the clothes of a deceased person the day after the funeral because they believe 
                                                   
37 D. José Antonio de Areche, “Sentencia pronunciada en el Cuzco por el visitador D. José Antonio de Areche,  
contra José Gabriel Tupac-Amaru, su muger, hijos, y demas reos principales de la sublevación,” 
Documentos para la historia de la sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac-Amaru, Cacique de la Provincia 
de Tinta, en el Perú, 1st Edition (Buenos-Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836 [1781]), 44-52, quoted in Lynn 
A. Meisch, “Christianity, Cloth and Dress in the Andes,” in Undressing Religion: Commitment and 
Conversion from a Cross-Cultural Perspective, ed. Linda B. Arthur (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 65-82. 
38 Areche quoted in Meisch, 73. 
39 Meisch, 68. 
40 Meisch, 70. 
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the clothing carries the alma (soul) or esparto (spirit) of the deceased and can contaminate the 
living. The best clothes are ceremonially arranged to reproduce the figure of the deceased and 
attendees embrace and speak to the clothes as though the person was present. When thousands of 
Peruvian civilians were “disappeared” during the civil war from 1980 to 1992, family members 
laid out clothing in lieu of a body. This was not simply a practical matter but a reflection of an 
ancient Inca belief transmuted through Roman Catholicism and Evangelical Protestantism. This 
sensibility is not limited to Latin Americans. The sadness we all feel when we encounter the 
clothes of a deceased loved one demonstrates the ways in which we experience clothes as what 
Joanne Entwistle calls alive and “fleshy.”41 
This dissertation reflects the hybridization to which the field of religious studies is so 
well suited, and it urges religious studies scholars to make better use of recently adopted theories 
and methods that historians and anthropologists have long utilized. In a reflection on the ways 
her seminal work Gender Trouble has been so far reaching, Judith Butler explains how only in 
America could, “… so many disparate theories [be] joined together as if they formed some kind 
of unity.”42 She goes on to say that, “… the intellectual promiscuity of the text marks it precisely 
as American …”43 Borrowing Butler’s fitting phrase, the “intellectual promiscuity” of this 
dissertation is decidedly rooted in the very Canadian multicultural context it studies and 
critiques. As a millennial Canadian scholar I feel comfortable building my theory on an 
amalgamation of disparate frameworks. The groundwork laid by these scholars allows me to 
delve into the answers I seek.  
                                                   
41 Joanne Entwistle, “Fashion and the Fleshy Body: Dress as Embodied  
Practice,” in Fashion Theory, (2000) 4:3, P. 326. 
42 Butler, Gender Trouble, x. 
43 Butler, x. 
  20 
Religious practice has the power to destabilize privilege masquerading as moral and 
universal truths. It also has the opposite power, to enforce supposed universal truths (and often 
does). However, here I am referring to the way religious minority practice by its very existence 
calls into question established boundaries. To challenge such norms can cause some Canadians 
to lose their sense of place. For instance, while “everyone knows” that knives should never be 
permitted in schools, a Sikh boy challenged this assumption with his ceremonial dagger 
(kirpan).44 I wish to understand the anxiety, anger, and downright terror some express at having 
perceived religious and secular norms challenged when non-normative practices of religious 
expression call into question assumed standards of public secularity.45 
Using the relationship between religious practice, social change, secularism, and gender 
narratives, this research examines how the individuals in these case studies negotiate dress and 
public space, revealing how these clothing practices and distinctive dress codes act as mediums 
of communication. Religious dress is intimately connected with concepts of self, the body, and 
community, as well as performance of privacy, space, and identity. As a discipline religious 
studies is only beginning to appreciate the depth which dress analysis can bring to its fields of 
inquiry. But where religious study lags behind in material culture studies, it leads in nuanced 
understandings of belief systems and what constitutes religion. This is what religious studies 
offers the field of material culture. The study of religion naturally rubs shoulders with human 
rights theory, and religion and dress are natural bedfellows, but if dress is, as historian Linda 
Baumgarten demonstrates, a language with which we communicate, and is, as Linda B. Arthur 
argues, an essential part of how humans encounter and engage with the world around them, does 
                                                   
44 “Ban on Sikh kirpan overturned by Supreme Court,” CBC News, March 2, 2006,  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ban-on-sikh-kirpan-overturned-by-supreme-court-1.618238. 
45 Butler, Gender Trouble, xii. See Chapter Five for further data on societal presumptions. 
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it not then naturally follow that religious dress is an axis point for human rights articulation and 
advocacy?46 This not only applies to the religious community a particular item represents, but for 
Canadians as a whole. In this chapter, I put the theories of human rights, reasonable 
accommodation, religion, and material culture through dress in conversation with each other.47   
Guiding this research, this dissertation asks the following questions: How do religious 
minorities (both consciously and unconsciously) use dress to communicate their needs and goals 
to the broader society? Does the dominant Canadian society receive these messages? How does 
the majority use the social location of dress to censure or accommodate minorities? Are there 
tensions between many Canadians’ self-understanding as a “multicultural” and “diverse” society 
at the fore of human rights, and visible displays of religion in public spaces? 
Like the topic itself this research utilizes a diverse and disparate set of methodologies. 
With my training in public history, oral histories and archives are my first language of research. 
The nature of this dissertation’s research requires working to “get at” various and disparate 
people’s views and feelings on matters that often operate at a subconsciouos level, and can vary 
within time and place, even for the same individuals. There are various polls from the last three 
decades that seek to answer what representative Canadians think about issues related to the 
reality of diversity (such as immigration, refugees, the niqab, etc.). I use several of these in the 
Zunera Ishaq case study, including surverys on attitudes toward religious minorities by the 
Quebec Human Rights Commission, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and the 
Association of Canadian Studies. While useful for giving an initial image of what the 
                                                   
46 Linda B. Arthur, Religion, Dress and the Body (Oxford: Berg, 1999). 
47 Gender roles and narratives are necessarily an important part of this study, and play an active role in each case  
study’s analysis. However, given the limited scope of this chapter, and that religious studies and feminism  
is now a well-established field of inquiry, I reserve the gender analysis for the case studies. 
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representative group thinks, there are several limitations of such surveys, such as their timing for 
historical research (there is no poll on Canadian attitudes toward Mennonites in 1915, for 
instance), how the questions are framed, how the interviewee understands the questions, who 
gets polled, etc. (though these limitations are themselves revealing for research purposes). As a 
result, it is necessary to employ methods refined by gender historians to access beliefs and ideas 
that rarely openly present on the surface.  
This includes analyzing primary sources such as diaries, letters, images, material culture, 
newspapers, and oral histories, in addition to using the way we think about a case and how we 
arrive at our findings (employing theory as method). The individuals involved in the Mennonite 
bonnet debate and the subsequent establishment of Kitchener’s Stirling Avenue Mennonite 
Church are all deceased, but the Mennonite Archives of Ontario hold a wealth of resources on 
the region and time period. The correspondence and diaries of ministers and women in the local 
churches provided personal perspectives and reflections on the tensions. Urias K. Weber, the 
minister at the centre of the conflict at First Mennonite in Kitchener (renamed from Berlin in the 
midst of this debate) wrote extensive letters and personal reflections, including on the topic of 
the Stateser bonnet controversy. He regularly wrote seeking advice on the issue from friends, 
colleagues, and mentors, many of whom were in the United States and involved in the American 
push to reinforce the prescribed cut of bonnet. Susannah Cressman was a member at First who 
kept detailed diaries for decades, documenting the goings-on in her congregation and family, 
regularly noting the status of the bonnet debate and her feelings on the matter. The Investigating 
Committee convened by the Conference to investigate the matter kept detailed meeting minutes 
and interviews with the people involved decades later show that the results were painful and 
long-lasting. The Committee’s handwritten notes are succinct and paraphrased, but reveal a great 
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deal about the ideological leanings of the Committee members, and of the individuals they 
interview. M.C. Cressman, a prominent figure in the controversy and a vocal opponent of U.K. 
Weber and his softer interpretation of women’s headcoverings, testifies at length in these notes. 
While providing little usable data, Mennonite women’s church organization meeting minutes 
supplied helpful reflections of the issues and activites with which the women at the heart of this 
dispute filled their time. In addition, the MAO includes several 20th century Swiss Mennonite 
bonnets and prayer caps, including a Stateser bonnet, and an example of a woman’s cape dress 
from c. 1910, presenting valuable material culture analysis. Newspapers of the era were not 
particularly concerned with events in the Mennonite community, and certainly not internal 
divisions over women’s dress, but there was some journalistic interest in the Parliamentary 
debate over who met the criteria of “Mennonite” during World War I, and the later immigration 
ban. Leading up to this ban, the MAO also includes letters veterans’ organizations wrote to the 
federal government seeking that they “address” the “issue” of pacifist Mennonites.   
Simultaneously to these events, the rise in the Christian fundamentalist movement in 
response to changing social mores produced ministerial tracts decrying the erosion of women’s 
morals in the loss or changing of their headcoverings. These tracts provide useful insights into 
the social temperature of North American Christian churches, including and especially amongst 
the Mennonites in Ontario, and their counterparts to the south who took an active interest in how 
their Canadian brothers and sisters practiced the faith. While the participants in these events were 
long deceased by the time I began my research, Stirling Avenue Mennonite Church collected 
extensive oral histories of their founding members, and their founding members’ children. These 
proved very useful in elaborating on the succinct individual notes and reflections in the early 
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diaries, notes, and minutes. Laureen Harder-Gissing’s history of the founding of Stirling Avenue, 
Risk and Endurance: A History of Stirling Avenue Mennonite Church also proved invaluable. 
In the case of Inspector Baltej Singh Dhillon, he was gracious and patient with my many 
questions and clarifications through two interviews and multiple email exchanges. He gave me 
more of his time than could reasonably be expected and interviewing him was both intriguing 
and a privilege. The staff at the Sikh Heritage Museum of Canada in Mississauga, Ontario, was 
likewise incredibly helpful. Their collection of anti-turban pins from 1990 complemented and 
augmented the ones I found on Ebay, and gave me the opportunity to carefully examine and 
analyze their make (which was of a surprisingly high quality, indicating that there was a 
substantial financial investment in their production). Archived newspapers provided the most 
comprehensive presentation of the debate of Dhillon’s turban in 1989-90, including the ways the 
narratives were framed, the questions many people had about what the turban represented, 
concerns over Sikhism and terrorism, how individuals articulated these concerns, and the ways 
politicians and political parties utilized this national conversation in relation to their regional 
base. Doris Jakobsh’s extensive work on Sikhism in Canada was crucial in understanding what 
of Dhillon’s experiences and actions were “Sikh,” and how that affected the ways other 
Canadians understood him. Likewise, newspaper articles, editorials, and letters to the editor 
provided essential primary sources on the debates, rhetoric, and mood in Canada in the late 
1980s. 
Despite repeated attempts to contact Zunera Ishaq and her lawyers, in the end it was not 
possible to speak with her directly. In the absence of a personal oral history, journalists’ 
interviews with Ishaq became critical resources in collecting her views, motives, and personal 
characteristics and history. The federal election that she unintentionally influenced played out in 
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the midst of this dissertation research. Like with Dhillon, newspapers supplied the necessary 
pulse(s) of the nation, revealing the ways various groups and individuals articulated questions, 
concerns, and advocacy around the niqab.  
 For this case study, like with the Mennonite case, I also employed textile analysis 
in examining several niqabs from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and the United States, and 
considering how the construction and feel of these items affect individuals’ sensorial responses to 
them. Muslim women’s personal memories and reflections, on both sides of the veil debate, 
likewise play an important role in this case study and understanding the lived gendered 
experience of North American Muslimahs, including those who veil and those who do not.48 
 It should be noted that the scholar occupies an unequal position of power over the 
narrative and interpretation, and it is entirely possible that a scholar (even this scholar) several 
decades removed from this federal niqab debate, or occupying a different location in history 
regarding the other two case studies, will have a different perspective than one researching in the 
midst my current events. The productive power inherent to methodology is at work in this very 
chapter; as I write this I am making choices about how to most clearly and persuasively articulate 
my understanding of these cases and their significance for reasonable accommodation, freedom 
of religious practice, and Canadian identity.49 
 
Human Rights  
Religion and human rights are often side by side at or near the centre of social and legal 
issues. Even (indeed, especially) well educated Canadians consider the two at variance with one 
                                                   
48 Including, for example. Raheel Raza, Homa Hoodfar, Maliha Masood, Zunera Ishaq, etc. 
49 Personal conversation with University of Toronto PhD candidate, Melanie Kampen, July 20, 2017. 
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another, overlooking that freedom of religion is itself a human right.50 The right to religious 
freedom is part of both the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (s. 2[a]) and the UN 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. When religious minorities agitate for changes that 
advance human rights laws and policies, the changes benefit and apply to all Canadians, not only 
those in their faith communities. This is not to dismiss the potential for religion to work against 
such goals, but rather to counter the prevailing narrative that accommodating religious minorities 
somehow inherently endangers the rights and freedoms of the rest of Canada. The case studies in 
this dissertation are three such examples, but there are many more. In fact, most Canadian human 
rights laws come from religious minorities pushing for change to the status quo. According to 
prominent Canadian human rights historian James W. St. G. Walker, no other organization can 
compare to the positive effect the Jewish Labour Committee has had on Canadian human rights 
laws.51 The Fair Employment Practices Act of 1951 and the Fair Accommodation Practices Act 
of 1954, for example — watershed laws that essentially banned ethnic, racial, or religious 
discrimination in employment and accommodation — were direct results of the work of the 
JLC.52 
Many scholars of religion and human rights, such as John Witte, Jr. And Christian Green, 
focus on the ways human rights are embedded within a given religion’s belief systems, or how 
such systems are well suited to each other. Witte and Green also take a somewhat confessional 
approach in arguing that, “… religion and human rights need each other. Human rights norms 
need the norms, narratives, and practices of the world’s religions.”53 I will discuss Witte and 
                                                   
50 Morlock, “Religion Is a Human Right.” 
51 Personal conversation with James W. St. G. Walker, June 28, 2017. 
52 Dominique Clément, Will Silver, and Daniel Trottier, The Evolution of Human Rights in Canada, (Ottawa:  
Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2012), 10. 
53 John Witte Jr. and Christian Green, eds., Religion & Human Rights: An Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2012), xiii-xiv. 
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Green’s scholarship in greater detail, but first it is important to understand the context of their 
arguments. 
Within human rights theory there are ongoing debates over when “human rights” became 
a popular and accepted regime (commonly called the “human rights regime”) and whether they 
should be based on group or individual rights (central to the question of religion and human 
rights). In 2010, Harvard historian Samuel Moyn wrote a landmark book: The Last Utopia: 
Human Rights in History, in which he argues that contemporary human rights really only 
emerged in the 1970s, and are not rooted in events and ideas of the past the way the conventional 
narrative describes it. His intellectual history of human rights challenges the temptation to think 
about human rights along a church history model. In other words, historians once believed 
Christianity was the one true belief, which emerged and succeeded because it was valid and true. 
Moyn argues that this is how most people think about the history of human rights. Paralleling it 
with the story of Jesus, disciples, saints, and apostles, Moyn believes human rights historians tell 
the story in a similar way. Someone has the idea, early followers persevere against enormous 
opposition, and the idea itself is destined to succeed. The narrative is a teleological one. Human 
rights leads people, is triumphalistic, and is good news to the world.54 
Moyn argues against the commonly held idea that human rights came to fruition after 
World War II, growing out of horror at the Holocaust and as a result of the formation of the 
United Nations. Perhaps most controversially, he asserts that the early human rights conventions, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR of 1948) and the Genocide 
Convention (1951), were “stillborn.”55 Instead of arising in the late 1940s/early 1950s, human 
rights emerged as the last global political utopia after all the others — especially nationalism and 
                                                   
54 Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 10.  
55 Moyn, The Last Utopia, 11. 
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socialism — died away. He argues that coincidental occurrences coalesced in 1977, when 
Amnesty International won the Nobel Peace Prize, opponents of the Warsaw Pact and Latin 
American dissidents chose moral — rather than political — responses to repression, while 
American President Jimmy Carter’s personal values conveniently fit well with these 
developments. Soon after, international lawyers started employing existent but otherwise empty 
legal principles with the new inspiration of human rights opposed to state power.56 Moyn’s 
arguments are not simplistic and demonstrate the ways human rights struggled to emerge, and 
how developments of the 2000s makes the certainty of their position less secure than in previous 
decades. Moyn pays particular attention to how post-9/11 appeals to “national security” 
challenge cherished principles including opposition to torture and freedom of belief. As a 
historian, he emphasizes that no part of history is inevitable, unfolding instead amongst 
conflicting visions. At best its outcomes are commonly unpredictable, and scholars should 
remember this as they write it down.57 
While Moyn’s arguments are provocative and provide an important critique of how the 
history of human rights is told, he is not a human rights scholar and those who are have 
succinctly and effectively demonstrated the holes in his work.58 While the specifics of that debate 
are beyond the scope of this theory chapter, Moyn’s work highlights the importance of not taking 
the narrative around human rights at face value. This is an important reminder for the research in 
this dissertation which, in part, challenges the grand narrative of Canada as a country that is a 
champion of human rights and is comfortable with religious diversity so long as it is 
“reasonable.” 
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The human rights regime has direct effects on the lives of religious communities and 
individuals, both enabling and restricting practices. T. Jeremy Gunn is professor of Political 
Science and Law at the Université Internationale de Rabat in Morocco, specializing in the study 
of human rights and the separation of church and state. He explains the difference between the 
two within international law as granting clauses, “… which identify scope and breadth of the 
right [to freedom of religion and belief],” and limitations clauses, “… that identify the 
circumstances under which a state or a government legitimately may restrict the exercise of the 
right.”59 He points out that human rights advocates and religious practitioners are,  
… likely to focus on the freedoms that they wish to exercise … [while] 
states and public authorities are more likely to be concerned with what they 
see as potential harms to the public order that are caused by religious actors, 
particularly when those actors engage in what may be seen as extreme or 
excessive manifestations of religion.60  
 
States often focus on the perceived potential for harm to those whom they deem “vulnerable,” 
even when there are no legitimate dangers of violence or political extremism.61 This is especially 
evident in the case of Zunera Ishaq and her niqab, where there was a clear and articulated general 
concern that she was a victim of oppression. Or if she herself was not, then her niqab represented 
the oppression of vulnerable women.  
Both the American and Canadian Supreme Courts have rules that, “… there should be an 
absolute protection for the freedom of belief, but only a qualified protection for the free exercise 
of religion …”62 In Canada, the case Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of 
Teachers set this precedent. In the ruling, the justices declared that, “Neither freedom of religion 
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nor the guarantee against discrimination based on sexual orientation is absolute. The proper place 
to draw the line is generally between belief and conduct. The freedom to hold beliefs is broader 
than the freedom to act on them.”63 Gunn explains that therefore any limitations clause which 
intends to restrict belief is “necessarily illegitimate.”64 If, however, it only limits manifestation 
then it is subject to a three-step analysis which determines if international human rights laws and 
policies sanction the restriction. Two of the most influential human rights conventions — the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) — specifically identify this three part analysis. Both require that a state 
satisfy all three of the requirements for the limitation to be legitimate. If only one or two are met, 
the restriction is impermissible.65  
These standards are that first, the limitation must be “prescribed by law;” second, the 
limitation must further one of five legitimate state interests — public safety, public order, health, 
morals, or the protection of the rights of others; and third, the limitation must be “necessary” (or 
“proportional”) in a democratic society.66 To the first, state authorities cannot restrict practice 
based on their own discretion. It must be rooted in a law that is established, public, and 
accessible to the individual or community it affects. In other words, the law containing the 
restriction must be published and readily available to the public. To the second (and very 
importantly), “national security” and “protecting previously established religions,” do not satisfy 
the condition.67 Finally, “‘necessary’ is a strong term suggesting that no other option is possible 
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or that the consequences will be dire if the restriction is not imposed.”68 While the first two have 
been known to interrupt states’ attempts to curtail religious practice, “… it is the third that is 
taken most seriously and is the condition that states are most likely to fail.”69 As we examine the 
three case studies in this dissertation it is important to keep these three standards in mind. As a 
self-proclaimed promoter of human rights, Canada considers itself to be an exemplar of this 
model. Yet when the government has moved to restrict religious expression it has certainly not 
always met these international conditions, to which it is bound. 
While not addressing religious accommodation, David Goutor and Stephen Heathorn’s 
work Taking Liberties: A History of Human Rights in Canada is a series of essays from human 
rights thinkers revising the rosy version of how Canada historically adopted and currently 
engages with the human rights regime. Goutor and Heathorn pointedly address the great 
reluctance with which the Canadian government adopted the international human rights 
movement in the 1940s, ‘50s, and ‘60s. This era is often considered the “golden age” of 
Canadian foreign policy, when Canadian diplomats played an influential part in creating many of 
the post-war global governance institutions. This did not, however, extend to rights. Modern 
Canadians often tout legal scholar John Humphrey’s role in drafting the UNDHR, but overlook 
that Humphrey was a member of the UN secretariat and was not representing his government. In 
fact, Humphrey was very critical of the Canadian government’s position on human rights, which 
he described as “skeptical,” and bordering on antagonistic.70 
This reticence was rooted in liberalism and laissez-faire ideas of government, which 
shaped Canada’s political and diplomatic landscape until the mid-twentieth century. While 
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committed to British ideas of liberty, justice, and fairness, they considered developing an 
international framework of legally binding human rights problematic and ill-advised. These men 
believed that such social arrangements would entail an unacceptable degree of government 
involvement in the lives of Canadians. They were not wrong that there was a sharp increase in 
this. Taking Liberties demonstrates how the most significant new rights acquired through mid-
century grass roots activism gave the government unprecedented intervention in the private 
sphere. For instance, most of Canada’s early human rights laws (such as the Jewish Labour 
Committee led Fair Employment and Fair Accommodation acts previously discussed) had to do 
with labour and housing, which affected the manner in which employers and landlords ran their 
businesses.  
The laissez-faire principle was deeply entrenched in Canadian society and required a 
massive mental shift to adopt the more intrusive rights model. In his contribution to Goutor and 
Heathorn, James W. St.G. Walker explains how, when African Canadian Fred Christie sued a 
Montreal bar for refusing to serve him in 1936, the Supreme Court ruled in the tavern’s favour, 
focusing on the right of the owner to do business (or not) at his discretion. Aside from the 
Court’s dismissal of overt racism, its staunch support of the private rights of the business owner 
demonstrates how entrenched the value placed on state non-interference was in mid-century 
Canada.71  
Goutor, Heathorn, and their contributors astutely challenge any tendency to dismiss these 
as antiquated mentalities, reminding readers that the current concept of rights and freedoms are 
very new, and in many ways a departure from earlier conceptualizations of liberty and justice. 
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They do not support Moyn in seeing this as a distinct and sharp departure, and in fact historicize 
human rights in Canada charting the challenges and opposition the concept faced without writing 
a teleological narrative.72  
If Canada was so reluctant to adopt the mid-century human rights regime, from where did 
the modern self-identity of a nation rooted in human rights arise? In his book, For Canada’s 
Sake: Public Religion, Centennial Celebrations, and the Re-Making of Canada in the 1960s, 
Historian Gary Miedema describes how the Liberal government intentionally and deliberately re-
wrote the Canadian self-identity to be one of multiculturalism and inclusion of diversity.  
Driven by a desire for reform and enabled by the affluence of the post-1945 
period, the Pearson Liberals moved to bind together their fragmenting 
country by offering Canadians a different understanding of themselves and 
their nation. They presented to Canadians a vision of a developing Canadian 
personality — a decidedly more inclusive, pluralistic country that would be 
united in its diversity.73  
 
Packaged as a “religiously neutral” nation, religion was nonetheless at the heart of these 
transformations. “Both the turmoil of the 1960s and the debate about national identity explicitly 
involved religion and indicated a profound transformation in how Canadians were understanding 
— and being asked to understand — their country, their institutions, and themselves.”74  
Using the Centennial celebrations to demonstrate the prominent role of religion, 
Miedema argues that public religion was not waning in 1960s Canada, but rather was shifting 
from a Christian hegemony to an intentionally interfaith model. “Canada was predominantly 
Christian, to be sure, but it was also making new room in national public life for other religious 
persuasions.”75 The momentousness of this readjustment cannot be overstated.  
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In the 1960s … many of the demarcations of Christian privilege in Canadian 
public life either dramatically disappeared or were transformed into 
declarations of a new Canadian ‘religious neutrality’ that attempted, at least 
visually, to give equal status to all faith groups in Canada. Though still very 
much in progress, that shift was arguably one of the most significant 
adjustments in understandings of Canada in the history of the nation.76   
 
Recognizing religious pluralism was a noteworthy change from the days of the United Church of 
Canada — established through an act of Parliament in 1924 — having significant access to the 
halls of power.77 While the conservative evangelical movement was growing and entrenching, 
the mainline denominations supported ecumenical and interreligious movements.78 “… The 
shared reformist mindset of leaders of key churches and the state enabled the relatively smooth 
reimaginging of the official religious understanding of Canada.”79  
When he took office the following year (1968), Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau 
followed the precedent set by Pearson and brought a Canadian identity rooted in diversity to 
fruition. In 1969 he brought in the Official Languages Act, making Canada officially bilingual, 
and, on 8 October 1971, Trudeau announced that multiculturalism was now an official 
government policy. The government committed to supporting multiculturalism in four ways: 
assisting multicultural groups in their development and growth, assistance to these groups in 
overcoming barriers to full participation in society, promoting exchanges between diverse 
cultural groups, and assisting immigrants in learning French or English.80 Trudeau’s most lasting 
legacy is perhaps the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982, enshrining the rights of 
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individuals — with certain limitations — in the highest law of the land. The Charter is the 
cornerstone of human rights law in Canada.81  
Goutor and Heathorn’s book goes beyond historical events to make the important point 
that, despite the reforms of the 1960s and ‘70s, human rights remain a highly contested idea in 
Canada. This is, in part, a significant focus of this dissertation. These case studies build on these 
earlier works and demonstrate how religious accommodation in particular reveals the skeletons 
in the Canadian closet. While opposition to accommodating religious minorities is often couched 
in human rights rhetoric (especially appeals to gender equity) one does not need to dig far 
beneath the surface to find that such resistance is often, in fact a direct contravention of domestic 
and international human rights standards. The minority may be portrayed as a threat to the 
venerated Canadian value of human rights, but these case studies reveal that it is often the 
minority who is in fact advancing human rights in Canada, and the so-called sacrosanct value is 
anything but when other more pressing narratives come into play — such as misinformed 
preconceptions, prejudice, and hostility to overt “other” religious practice. Moreover, when the 
supposedly threatening “other” advances rights claims, they do so for all Canadians, not in some 
utopian ideal or optimistic “for the good of all,” but because human rights laws in Canada 
usually apply to all.82 So while vocal opposition seeks to limit religious manifestation in the 
name of human rights, the “backward” religious adherent is in fact advancing actual rights for all 
Canadians. 
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José Casanova made a related argument in his seminal work Public Religions in the 
Modern World, in which he argues that the marginalization of religion is not a necessary outcome 
of the differentiation of secular spheres from religious institutions because public religions in 
modern societies do not necessarily threaten the foundations of liberal democracies. He sees 
“legitimate” public religions as those that do not threaten individual freedoms or differentiated 
structures, considering how a religion can be both public and modern.83 Casanova’s work arose 
in the wake of several religious traditions – from liberation theology Catholicism to political 
Islam – forcefully engaging in the public arena, controverting the established wisdom that 
markets and nations were value neutral and that religions’ role was exclusively individually 
pastoral. 
Drawing on these human rights theories, this dissertation presents a scholarly human 
rights based approach (HRBA or RBA) as the theoretical lens to these case studies. This includes 
a commitment to integrate human rights’ concerns into the research questions we, as scholars, 
bring to a topic.84 This framework modifies and is rooted in prior human rights theories, applying 
established scholars’ ideas of personhood and human dignity to the cases at hand.85 This research 
takes legal rights and gender narratives (both in practice and presumption) as its paradigm to 
human rights in general, beginning with a conceptual analysis of the meaning of women’s place 
and agency in terms of gender within the Ontario Mennonite community in the first chapter. This 
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is set within the context of fundamental and developing Canadian legal conceptions of group 
specific rights, identifying the groundwork of how the nation evolved to an individual human 
rights based model. This structural analysis reflects both a top down and bottom up approach to 
human rights, using both sorts of reasoning (though the emphasis and analysis are more 
concerned with the latter). 
I approach the Mennonite case study, for instance, with the intention of illuminating the 
often overlooked lived experiences and views of early 19th century Mennonite women within a 
deeply patriarchal community and nation as a primary research goal. In fact, as we will discuss 
shortly, dress analysis itself functions as an equitable and equalizing vehicle for research, 
allowing subaltern voices to emerge whose written records either never existed or were not 
valued and preserved. In addition, looking at cases such as this that are not “overtly” matters of 
national human rights importance contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how human 
rights ideals, policies, and laws develop. 
It is then, however, important as scholars to avoid the temptation to tell a teleological 
version of human rights history. John Witte discusses abuses in Afghanistan in the light of the 
state of human rights in “fledgling” and “volatile” nations. Scholars often reference the ways 
Western society/Christianity went through “these stages” (ie. the Spanish Inquisition, Salem with 
trials, etc.) but “we” have moved “beyond” them.86 Such an approach — aside from ignoring the 
quantifiable evidence that twenty-first century Westerners and Christians are every bit as capable 
of human rights abuses as any other people — presents a picture where a religious minority 
seeking a rights accommodation in Canada is tied to these “backward” practices, such as the 
niqab, which therefore makes the individual and the community they represent backward and 
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unenlightened in the public imagination. This plays directly into how our society constructs 
identity, who we consider insiders and outsiders, how we maintain our boundaries, and who gets 
to be considered truly Canadian. 
 
Reasonable Accommodation 
Accommodating these religious minorities in Canada is a hotly debated issue. The push 
in the 1960s for a religiously neutral nation created space at the table for religions beyond 
Christianity. But five decades later, the belief in a secular and religiously neutral public sphere 
has had the unintended result of pushing religious minorities, for whom privatization of practice 
is not feasible, to the margins. Religion and law scholar Lori Beaman provides thorough analyses 
of these challenges in her edited volume, Reasonable Accommodation: Managing Religious 
Diversity. In her contribution to this work, legal scholar Natasha Bakht argues that, “A normative 
project of multiculturalism wherein people from many different walks of life with diverse and 
deep commitments try to live peacefully together will always entail negotiation and 
renegotiation.”87 This reality is often denied when “we” feel that “they” are trying to change 
“us.” When the majority feel their entrenched hegemony threatened they can react swiftly and 
viscerally, as in the overtly protectionist propaganda several Albertans produced in response to 
Baltej Singh Dhillon’s request to wear a uniform turban as an RCMP officer.  
Beaman nods to “… broader international trends of which Canada is a part,”88 noting 
that, “In Western culture, diversity has generated a number of patterns of response,” which 
include, “… the separation of church and state; the recognition of a state church with provisions 
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for ‘Other’ religions; and the de facto establishment of a religious hegemony with some 
protection for religious minorities.”89 Each of these responses affect the everyday lives of 
religious adherents and how they construct their identities.90 In Canada, though there is a policy 
of religious neutrality, there is no legal separation of church and state in the American manner, 
though many assume there is. Like most other Canadian human rights legislation, reasonable 
accommodation practice began in labour law (such as an employee’s request to the employer for 
flexibility regarding their religious practice) and was limited to this sphere until the 2006 Multani 
Supreme Court Case, over whether a Sikh child could wear a kirpan (ceremonial dagger) to 
school. When the court ruled in his favour, “Reaction was swift, much of it negative, and much 
of it focused on the idea that there was simply ‘too much’ accommodation happening.”91  
It is important to remember that these matters are not clear cut with well defined 
opposing sides. Beaman points out that, “hegemony is often far less unified than it may 
appear.”92 For example, while the Supreme Court has recognized Canada as a Christian majority 
nation, and while a simple “binary of majority/minority” may be a helpful place to start, the 
reality is far more complicated.93 The case study in the next chapter on Mennonite headcoverings 
in the early twentieth century shows that within hegemonic Christianity (especially when Canada 
was an overtly Christian nation) there were (and are) Christian minorities within the larger group. 
Furthermore, within the hegemony, how many consider themselves engaged Christians? Beaman 
goes on to ask, “… how do we measure the Christian-ness of social institutions and ideologies? 
How is it possible to disentangle liberalism and its emphasis on individualism and free choice 
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and protestant Christianity and its basis in individual choice and relationship to God?”94 Within 
Christian groups there are those who are strong proponents of the human rights regime, and those 
who actively oppose it. Within those same groups there are individuals who do not align with 
their community’s position. In the words of Beaman, “These are the subtle and sometimes not so 
subtle strands that run through the matrix of reasonable accommodation.”95  
The current conversation around reasonable accommodation and religious minorities 
exists in a context where many Canadians — as a direct result of the human rights and 
multicultural re-imagining already discussed — see themselves as a nation that champions 
human rights and diversity. This ideology alongside and entwined with ideals of secularism and 
religious neutrality, “… often result[s] in contested definitions of diversity …”96 This is a 
significant part of the tension in the Dhillon and Ishaq case studies. Multiculturalism as a 
framework, “… influence[s] the determination of what is reasonable and what is to be 
accommodated.”97 This framework is also a source in and of itself for the opposition expressed 
in these cases, where certain groups feel that the principle itself is at best problematic and at 
worst a direct threat to what they hold sacred. Despite and in response to this, “reasonable 
accommodation has emerged as one of the ways in which negotiation is framed within the 
Canadian multicultural framework.”98 The content and process of this model are highly 
contested, but nowhere so fiercely as with regard to identity. 
Identity is naturally tied into group and community, which points to a debate at the heart 
of the human rights regime: individual versus group rights. It is beyond the scope of this 
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dissertation to engage the full debate, which is largely centred in the European courts, but it is 
necessary to note that both international and Canadian human rights law has landed on the side 
of individual rights trumping group rights (in large part to ensure that any individual has the right 
to act in ways their group may not approve). Furthermore, in Canada the sincerity of one’s belief 
in a court of law is not determined by the standards of the group to which the individual belongs 
(ie. whether a woman needs to wear a niqab is not determined by whether an imam or Islamic 
scholar testifies to the religion’s tenets). However, Beaman argues for the importance of keeping 
the group in one’s field of vision when it comes to reasonable accommodation.  
What the group or individual discussion often seems to miss is that although 
claims may be advanced by individuals, they inevitably invoke an 
attachment to a group. … Most claims, whether in formal legal processes, 
other public discussions and negotiations, or day-to-day interactions, invoke 
this recollection of group identity … Reasonable accommodation calls for 
some articulation of group identity, even in the face of human rights regimes 
that are predicated on individual claims.99 
 
This tends to heighten public anxiety over religious accommodation. “Embedded in 
discussions of accommodation are notions of the slippery slope — if ‘we’ allow this, then what 
next?”100 Canadian culture views choice positively, “… as long as it is not a choice to submit to 
religious authority.”101 In another one of her works, Defining Harm: Religious Freedom and the 
Limits of the Law, Lori Beaman addresses this directly. Intersecting religion, law, and culture, 
she examines how these strands connect to create views of what constitutes “harm.” She asks her 
reader to consider when religious practices shift from acceptable expressions of cultural diversity 
to intolerable acts that society and state may justifiably curtail. And what is the scope of religious 
multiculturalism within Canadian cultural normativity?  
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Using the Supreme Court case of Bethany Hughes, a Jehovah’s Witness teenager with 
cancer who wished to refuse blood transfusions in her treatment, Beaman demonstrates how 
Hughes’ body became a battleground for competing discourses. “The binary split between body 
and soul … creates a space for the governance of the body while disconnecting it from the 
soul.”102 This is certainly evident in all three case studies in this dissertation. Likewise, both 
Hughes’ case and these examples reveal how the body can also become a means of dissent 
against a dominant discourse. Beaman argues that this dissent, and the legal opposition to it, 
demonstrates that the way law judges practices is a belief system unto itself. This is a central 
argument of my dissertation. The idea that religious minorities enter some sort of blank slate of 
religious neutrality in the secular public sphere, and that it is they who bring an intractable 
attachment to a belief system, is simply untrue. This is far from limited to the legal profession. In 
her preface to Defining Harm, Beaman notes that she was, “… amazed at the unwillingness of 
my colleagues to engage in a serious discussion of religion and society without indulging in a 
dismissiveness that does little to expand knowledge about the ways that religion intersects with 
our culture.”103  
Intersectionality and identity are cornerstones to this dissertation’s discussion of agency. 
Scholars, such as Barbara Applebaum, Maria Lugones, Alison Jones, Fiona Webster, and Seyla 
Benhabib are paying increasing attention to the social location of the moral agent. Agency (the 
"ability to do") is often discussed within a framework of autonomous and abstract individualism. 
Immanuel Kant’s work presents an impartial and unembodied vision of personhood with no 
                                                   
102 Beaman, 151. 
103 Beaman, Defining Harm, ix. 
  43 
consideration for a person’s multiple sources of social identity.104  These scholars encourage 
other scholars to take situatedness seriously. At the same time, it is important not to become so 
fixated on a person’s location “that agency becomes an incoherent and futile idea.”105 Rather, 
scholars need "a notion of situatedness that elucidates the complex and mutually sustaining 
relationship between the individual and social structure."106 All individuals live within 
behaviour-directing and meaning-defining environments. Being involved with a group, any 
group, necessarily involves some pressure to exercise practices that are rewarded. Group 
members are rarely conscious of the expectations they enact and embody, perceiving such 
behaviours and moral codes as what is "normal."107 This is true in both dominant and minority 
groups (though the forms and results look very different).108  
Agency affects the agency of others, and the situated agency of a dominant group may 
require its members to decenter their “ability to do.”109 Applebaum explains that “although 
‘agency’ traditionally refers to a ‘taking action,’ situated moral agency may require a ‘not doing’ 
or more specifically a ‘not deciding on one’s own what needs to be done.’”110 In terms of 
accommodation and a visible religious minority's choice, this means that an individual's action 
invariably exists within a larger group framework that necessarily limits practices of agency in 
some ways, and socializes them into values, ideas, practices, and forms of belonging over which 
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they do not have complete (or at times even partial) control. This reality is far from limited to 
religious minorities and is in operation for all people at all times. “We all limit our practice of 
agency in some ways.”111 The agency of dominant group members curtails the agency of other 
members, and the agency of dominant groups impinges on the agentic control of minorities. 
Therefore, in terms of Canada's laws and policies around accommodation, it can be necessary for 
those in power (whether in an official or social capacity) to “not do,” acknowledging individuals’ 
ability to “do” as they deem appropriate to their own religious practice. It is necessary, then, to 
understand that agency is connected to structure. Ignoring this can perpetuate power 
imbalances.112 Seyla Benhabib argues that agency is “... that point at which we are ‘free’ from our 
situatedness to delibrate and decide.”113 Sabah Mahood argues for the importance of keeping 
definitions of agency open, allowing them to emerge from within the institutional and social 
networks from which they arise. She maintains that this requires untethering agency from “the 
goals of progressive politics,” which has “led to the incarceration of the notion of agency within 
the trope of resistance against oppressive and dominating operations of power.”114 
Many Canadians believe that they live in a post-religious society (whether they see this as 
a positive or a negative is a separate discussion), but this belief ignores the situatedness of such a 
claim, as well as those it curtails. Furthermore, the demographic reality of Canada belies such a 
claim. As Beaman articulates, “… the religious landscape of Canada is shifting through 
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immigration and changing patterns of practice …” in increasing and significant ways.115 
Therefore, “… thinking about the ways in which spiritual beliefs are expressed in day-to-day life 
and the ways in which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects and limits 
religious freedom has never been more important.”116 Despite this, “… scholars and society alike 
are ill-equipped to deal with the challenges of religious diversity, in part because we have for so 
long assumed that the religious landscape is static, and additionally because religion has not been 
taken particularly seriously at an analytical or policy level.”117  
Like the Mennonites and conscription, Baltej and his turban, and Ishaq and her niqab, 
Hughes’ experiences provide an important lens into the, “dynamic intersections of discourses in 
the governance of the religious citizen.”118 These cases provide an entry point for examining 
religious minorities and powerful public belief systems in, “a social climate of risk and fear.”119 
Though her study focuses on a Jehovah’s Witness, Beaman gives attention to the way this 
climate focuses on the threat of terrorism. “… As a specific manifestation of the fear of ‘the 
other,’ and though terrorism exists as a real threat, it in part plays on fears that the social fabric of 
the nation is being dramatically altered by ‘minorities,’ a broad category of otherness that shifts 
through the playing out of power relations.”120 This social anxiety certainly played heavily into 
both the Dhillon and Ishaq cases. This all exists alongside moral panics rooted in this culture of 
fear where many within the majority feels the threat of losing morality, nationhood, and 
hegemonies. “Religion is a key player in this intersection, and here the residue of Christian 
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hegemony is particularly insidious, in part because of the pervasiveness of the notion that we live 
in a secular society.”121 This fear turns into specific panics over the perceived dissolution of 
cherished Canadian ways of being. “Frequently, religious minorities inadvertently press these 
panic buttons, especially when their beliefs and activities threaten a Christian hegemony that is 
itself in flux and under revision.”122 For this reason Beaman emphasizes the importance of 
carefully considering, “…  Christian hegemony in the process of sorting through the 
interpretation of religious freedom in Canada … In this social climate, fear of the other is 
pervasive, especially the religious other (which often combines with the immigrant other [)] 
…”123  
Beaman pushes her readers to think beyond common narratives and perceived wisdom. 
She asks, “If religious freedom is interpreted only in the context of mainstream religion, and as 
necessitating some variation of mainstream religion in order to be protected, is this religious 
freedom at all?”124 She wants her readers to consider the implications of the phrase “religious 
accommodation” itself and its inherent power imbalance (someone must have the authority to 
grant the accommodation to the “other”). This is an interesting argument in the midst of a 
country where human rights theory is itself challenged. It is important to keep power 
(im)balances in view, while in practical terms of social cohesion and institutional function it is 
first necessary for individuals to become aware of and comfortable with the realities of religious 
diversity and international human rights law. From there it is worth asking Canadians to consider, 
“…why some behaviours and beliefs are constructed as the result of brainwashing rather than 
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agency.”125 Why is it reasonable for an Anglican woman to always remain fully clothed on hot 
days, despite laws that guarantee her right to go topless (and why would the fact that she is an 
Anglican never come to bear), whereas a Pakistani Muslim woman’s choice to retain her face 
veil must be evidence of oppression and extremist indoctrination? As a result, her body (like 
Bethany Hughes’) becomes, “… a symbolic manifestation of a religious minority that is the 
focus of regulation.”126  
Beaman points to renowned religious studies scholar Robert Orsi’s assertion that 
Christianity is considered, “… the highest realization of global religious culture.”127 This leads to 
the impulse to dichotomize “good Islam” from “bad Islam” in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 
September 11th. In this framework, “good Islam” most closely resembles a privileged 
Christianity.128 This is likewise true of other religious minorities, though perhaps without the 
same degree of panic attached to Islam. Beaman takes Orsi’s point further to illustrate, “that 
some Christianities are more privileged than others,” such as in the case of Mennonites during 
World War I.129 “Indeed, the moral donning of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ labels extends across 
religious boundaries, picking up on fears, threats to nation-states … and embedding those fears 
in the production of a narrative of harm.”130 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
125 Beaman, Defining Harm, 152. 
126 Beaman, 152. 
127 Robert Orsi, 2003, 171, quoted in Beaman, Defining Harm, 153. 
128 Beaman, discussing Orsi, Defining Harm, 153. 
129 Beaman, Defining Harm, 153. 
130 Beaman, 153. 
  48 
Materiality 
Though her study focuses on jurisprudence, Beaman also points out in Defining Harm 
that, “… religious symbols come to act as signifiers of membership, … [reproducing] the 
constructive markers of difference. This is so both for the hegemonic voices of religion, 
symbolized by the Christian cross, as well as for those on the margins, as symbolized, for 
example, by the hijab or the kirpan.”131 This is a useful window into the role material culture 
plays in this dissertation. While material culture studies have been well established in several 
disciplines for decades, such as history and anthropology, religious studies has been slow to 
appreciate its full scope for enriching our work. Religious Studies scholar, editor, and co-founder 
of Material Religion: The Journal of Objects, Art, and Belief, S. Brent Plate sees this gap and its 
potential. In his book, A History of Religion in 5 1/2 Objects: Bringing the Spiritual to Its Senses, 
Plate writes passionately for the crucial role materiality plays in people’s lives and practices, and 
in a scholar’s understanding of religion. “To learn about religion we have to come to our senses. 
Literally. We have to begin to discover … that we cannot know the worlds of any other culture, 
let alone our own, unless we get inside the sensational operations of human bodies.”132 He notes 
that, “philosophers and historians” have, “recast their eyes on overlooked objects, writing stories 
of such mundane things as salt … cod … potatoes, tulips … and how these have altered the 
history of civilization.”133 But where are the religious studies scholars?  
Religious studies, like our liberal democracy, grew out of a Protestant hegemony and has 
therefore privileged written accounts and ideas. Plate calls this, “… The linguistic and cognitive 
biases on which our idea of ‘knowledge’ relies.”134 There are racial and colonial undertones to 
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this privileging, which also affect how scholars perceive and understand religion, that will be 
discussed shortly. “In short, knowledge is believed to be about rational thoughts, communicated 
in verbal language, at the expense of the body and its perceptions.”135 Plate argues that religious 
history is inherently incomplete, “… if it ignores the sensing body” and the evidently banal items 
it encounters.136 “Human history is not just a story of big ideas and bloody battles that erupted 
across the earth for eons. It is also a history of the objects that humans have forged out of natural 
materials, how we have used them and how they have simultaneously used us.”137  
Plate focuses how, through religious experience, “… the most ordinary things can 
become extraordinary.”138 Indeed, this goes beyond overt religious experience. A Stetson is 
simply a broad-brimmed hat designed for functional usage by its cowboy wearers. The Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police adopted it for practical and budgetary reasons. Likewise the red serge 
jacket. The armoury had a surplus of red serge so that is what they used for the uniforms. And 
yet, combine the red serge and the Stetson, add a pair of riding boots, and you have a Mountie — 
an iconic representative of revered Canadiana. The Stetson becomes a sacred item, and when an 
iconoclast seeks to change it, many Canadians have a visceral response. Objects become part of 
culture and belief through symbolic and ritualistic interactions with bodies.139 “Ultimately, it is 
physical objects … and our … encounters with them, that give rise to our religious language and 
make sacred utterances meaningful.”140  
                                                   
135 Plate, 9. 
136 Plate, 14. 
137 Plate, 14. 
138 Plate, 4. 
139 Plate, A History of Religion, 11. 
140 Plate, 21. 
  50 
Experience is therefore inherently a “two-way process.”141 “It takes two to tango, and 
meanings are created from the dance — the interactions, relationships, and exchanging of 
information.”142 Beyond the encounter between the believer and the object, or even the believers 
within a community, religious individuals wearing sacred items — a Sikh in a turban, a Muslim 
in a niqab — and members of mainline Canadian society create new meanings around these 
items in their give and take over what they mean in the Canadian cultural context. This 
reimagines traditional understandings of the objects, and creates new narratives for the objects 
and their use in Canadian understanding. Whether this is a favourable or negative understanding 
is immaterial. The exchange between actors on both sides of the fabric are producing a new 
narrative. A third way beyond a traditional religious understanding and a preconceived 
“Western” view. In some cases, such as the RCMP and the turban, the minority successfully 
encourages the majority to adopt a new understanding that creates a completely novel way of 
understanding for all parties — a turban on a Mountie as a symbol of sacred Canadian 
multiculturalism. In others, the minority may be successful in achieving their goal, but the larger 
society is largely uninterested in co-creation, so their narrative — while exchanging new 
information with the other side — remains largely unchanged, such as in the case of Zunera 
Ishaq and her niqab. This new understanding then, of the niqab in Canada, retains much of its 
negative association though it has been undeniably complicated by Ishaq’s insertion of a new 
narrative. In others, the minority achieves one goal (such as Mennonites retaining conscientious 
objector status) but their communication is unclear and the wider society largely misses their 
intended message (as in the case of the bonnets).  
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Plate explains, “We rely on the known to understand what is unknown. One thing 
suggests another: the familiar, already experienced, carries us to the strange, as yet 
unexperienced other shore.”143 This is at the heart of misunderstandings in these case studies. 
Mennonite women in the 1950s pushed back against male headship through the headcovering, so 
one naturally assumes it was the same in the 1920s. Christian women’s headcoverings are rooted 
in Corinthians and Ephesians so a Muslim woman’s hijab is read through the lens of male 
headship. Members of extremist Islamic organizations insist on women being fully veiled so any 
woman wearing a niqab elicits an association that she is either oppressed by the men in her life 
or is connected with ISIS or Al-Qaeda or both. It is through the mutual exchange of object and 
experience that such associations are rewritten. It is therefore imperative that religious studies, as 
a discipline, develops a greater understanding of the role of materiality in practice. Plate 
explains, “My research … has convinced me that religion must be understood as deriving from 
rudimentary human experiences, from lived, embodied practices. This is not to disregard the 
intellectual writings — far from it — but to resituate them in actual space and time and to write 
many histories beginning with the indefinite article.”144 
For Plate, focusing on the intellectual side of religion puts the proverbial cart before the 
horse. “Religion, being a prime human activity throughout history, is rooted in the body and in 
its sensual relations with the world. … We make sense out of the senses. This is the first true 
thing we can say about religion, because it is also the first true thing we can say about being 
human. We are sentient beings, and religion is sensuous.”145 He logically articulates that talking 
about senses requires objects to sense. One cannot smell without something to smell, or touch 
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without something to feel.146 “The human body feels the world, engages the sights and sounds, 
tastes and smells of one’s setting, incorporating (literally, ‘bringing into the body’) the 
environment around.”147 This should not be a radical thought, but it has taken academia — and 
religious studies in particular — a long time to reach this point.  
This sensorial understanding of the world is not neutral, however, and is connected to 
cultural understandings. In their book Sensible Objects: Colonialism, Museums and Material 
Culture, Elizabeth Edwards, Chris Gosden, and Ruth B. Phillips directly challenge, “… the 
pervasive colonial legacies which have privileged the Western sensorium.”148 They seek to 
“problematize the colonial and modernist empowerment of visual inspection … as [the] primary 
[mode] of understanding …”  — what they call, “Western ocularcentricism.”149 They explore 
different sensory ratios and registers non-Western societies use to understand material culture, 
highlighting Western assumptions about how “we” understand cultural objects and the 
associated, “cross-cultural instability of sensory categories.”150 They focus on how museums 
have institutionalized these hierarchies of perception, but I would argue the academy is equally 
culpable of maintaining power imbalances in these, “… clashes of sensory systems within the 
colonial encounter …”151 Simply put, “different cultures … create their own material orders 
…”152 The five sense model so taken for granted is a Western construct. Other cultures have 
developed other sensory models, but in presenting material culture from these societies scholars 
and museums use a five sense model of interpretation with a heavy reliance on visual 
                                                   
146 Plate, 10. 
147 Plate, 5. 
148 Elizabeth Edwards, Chris Gosden, Ruth Phillips, eds., Sensible Objects: Colonialism, Museums and Material  
Culture, (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 1. 
149 Edwards et al., 2-3. 
150 Edwards et al., 3, 8. 
151 Edwards et al., 3. 
152 Edwards et al., Sensible Objects, 5. 
  53 
understanding. We are missing most of the information these objects offer. “A broader view of 
the senses … not only brings with it a more holistic view of the role of material culture in human 
relations, but also extends our understanding of the integrated field of the material as 
phenomenologically experienced.”153 This provides invaluable insights into how people actually 
live and behave.  
In terms of religion, Plate notes that, “People who practice religion do not necessarily 
know about the … doctrinal elements of that religion, but they know how to do that religion.”154 
This embedded hierarchy of understanding limits the field of inquiry. Edwards, Gosden, and 
Phillips argue that;  
… the over-determined concentration on visualism in contemporary cultural 
theory poses something of a stumbling block for understanding the full 
range of interactions with material culture. … The concern … is not so 
much with the suppression or denial of the visual but with the importance of 
acknowledging its sensory embeddedness. … What needs emphasis … is 
the way in which … one particular hierarchy of the senses has been used to 
legitimate certain forms of authority. … The Western valuation of seeing 
and hearing as primary senses for the production of rational knowledge and 
the keying of touch, smell, and taste as lower and ‘irrational’ is fundamental 
to the Western sensory schema.155  
 
As scholars, taking a more multicultural-multisensory approach allows visual interpretation to 
integrate into a more holistic, richer, and “ethnographically adequate” approach to understanding 
the material culture of many communities.156 “Cross-cultural approaches can, thus, put vision in 
its place, as only one way of apprehending the world even if central and variously privileged.”157 
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To understand diverse objects it is necessary to understand such privilege and reject ideas 
of material items as undiluted symbols of a culture. Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips argue that it 
is not even possible to consider “pure forms” of societies or objects.158 This relates to the earlier 
discussion of how Canadians are creating new narratives around objects that are already 
themselves quite complicated. “… [We] need to think in terms of circulations, sequences, 
transfers, translations, displacements [and] crystallisations.”159 They use the phrase “social 
biography” to present an approach that;  
… posits a fundamentally dynamic understanding of objects that both is 
linked to and foreshadows the notion of agency … In a biographical model, 
objects cannot be understood in terms of a single, unchanging identity … 
but rather by tracing the succession of meanings attached to them as they 
move across space and time … This model … address[es] the inherent 
instability of the meanings attached to objects … 
 
Here, objects like dress must be embodied in order to achieve a sensorially full analysis. 
“Visualism has imposed a linearity on the biographical model that limits its productivity.”160 
They argue that, “While the senses are the means by which the human body perceives and 
responds to the material world, the critical nexus they form around material culture has yet to be 
adequately described …”161  
As an anthropologist, an archaeologist, and an art historian, Edwards, Gosden, and 
Phillips come from fields where material culture has been a central method of inquiry since the 
1960s.162 Sensible Objects, almost a decade before Plate’s A History of Religion in 5 1/2 Objects, 
considers it an assumed truth that bodies and objects need each other. “… A deep mutuality 
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exists between our sensory apparatus and material things … the sensory and the material call 
each other into existence …”163 Speaking to colleagues in their fields, Edwards, Gosden, and 
Phillips are able to push for a far more nuanced understanding of the lenses Western academics 
bring to the study of material culture. Their focus is on museums as the primary institution for 
material collection, interpretation, and presentation, but once again their remarks can equally 
apply to academic inquiry. They not only rebuke museums for their colonial tendencies, but point 
to the ways the same institutions have the potential to be sites of new and more appropriate 
approaches.  
As key modern institutions that order and control world cultures, [museums] 
have imposed Western classifications of knowledge and hierarchies of the 
senses on the objects within their walls. As sites of resistance and self-
expression, however, they also embody the two countervailing tendencies 
within modernity … Out of this inherent contradiction could come a 
movement, as yet unformed, that might restore to museum objects sensory 
dimensions that were suppressed through colonial encounters.164  
 
This may seem like overreaching, but Sensible Objects thoroughly and convincingly 
substantiates their claims that the, “… privileging and reproduction of Western hierarchies of the 
senses …” played a fundamental role in the construction of colonialism and its lasting 
legacies.165 “Colonialism was profoundly material …”166 They argue that;  
… colonialism was experienced through multiple forms of sensory 
perception. Distinctions of hierarchy, class, and caste were created and 
represented not only through clothing, buildings, representational forms, and 
the organization of the landscape, but also through the formation of new 
conventions and distinctions around food, odors, sounds, and the bodily 
contacts in which material objects were, and continue to be, entangled. 
Indeed, both colonial and indigenous categories were often generated 
viscerally, out of responses of desire or disgust that could mutate in different 
kinds of social relations.167  
                                                   
163 Edwards et al., 5. 
164 Edwards et al.,17-18. 
165 Edwards et al., 18. 
166 Edwards et al., 3. 
167 Edwards et al., Sensible Objects, 3. 
  56 
 
 It is not difficult to see the straight line from these legacies to the categories Canadians  
generated viscerally in response to religious dress in public. While religious studies and human 
rights scholars may be more attuned to colonial repercussions than the average Canadian, neither 
academic nor private citizen has much understanding of the connection between this and the 
relationships between body, sensory awareness, and cultural praxis. “It is precisely the denial of 
this kind of embodied engagement with the world that emerges as problematic …”168 Strong and 
at times oppositional reactions of aversion and acceptance to embodied religious practices 
constitute demarcators of identity.169 Our instinctual reactions to smells, clothes, and practices 
are shaped by colonial hierarchies of the senses going back centuries. “The senses are political. 
… The politics deriving from the senses are especially obvious to all parties in colonial situations 
where different constructions of the world through the senses clash or mingle.”170 
Once again, this is a mutual (though not equal) exchange. In the nineteenth century, the 
Sikh turban came to represent a favourable relationship between Punjabi Sikhs and the British 
Empire in South Asia. Twentieth century Sikhs carried this history with them to Canada, 
expecting fellow citizens of the Commonwealth to recognize their narrative. Canadians, 
however, carried a different colonial story and many viewed the turban with disdain. This legacy 
was rooted in the superiority of European civilization and a general mistrust of “brown men.” 
The mistrust of these men in turn informs how many Westerners view veiled Muslim 
women. The differences between Islam and Sikhism are immaterial in the purported treatment of 
their women. The lasting legacy of Rudyard Kipling’s The White Man’s Burden continues to 
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inform what literary theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak called, “white men saving brown 
women from brown men.”171 This is evident in the case of a Muslim Pakistani woman asserting 
her agency to wear a niqab.172  In the words of Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips, “An 
understanding of the senses and their continual reordering helps throw extra light on the 
complicated histories of colonial relations in modernity.”173 This all informs how we construct 
identities, personally and collectively.  
The senses are fundamental to personhood. Who we are and how we 
construct ourselves in varying social situations depends upon the 
comportment of our bodies and their actions of production and 
consumption. … Large-scale units, such as the state, are constructed in the 
image of personhood. Although the state exists at a larger level than the 
senses, the body and its senses are still materialized through the state.174  
 
In her book Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America, historian 
and religious studies scholar Colleen McDannell provides an important corrective to the general 
assumption that the state we now live in is increasingly secular and non-material.  
By looking at material Christianity, we … see little evidence that American 
Christians experience a radical separation of the sacred from the profane. If 
we look at what Christians do rather than at what they think, we cannot help 
but notice the continual scrambling of the sacred and the profane. Likewise, 
by focusing on material Christianity we can no longer uncritically accept the 
secularization model.175  
 
The hierarchy of the senses to which our society ascribes — privileging ideas and what we can 
“know” through seeing — makes it difficult to interpret its very self (let alone other societies and 
cultures in its midst). This is certainly the case with religious dress. Canadians may consider 
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themselves unattached to dress or materiality, but when the RCMP uniform was “challenged” the 
reaction strongly suggested otherwise. Joanne Entwistle explains that codes of dress that may 
seem invisible are exposed when they are violated.176 McDannell takes issue with the way, “… 
the material dimension of American religious life is not taken seriously …”177 She points to the 
established dichotomy between the sacred and the profane, and between spirit and matter. Such a 
view, “… constrains our ability to understand how religion works in the real world. In spite of 
the difficulty of defining ‘religion,’ scholars and theologians frequently accept a simple division 
between the sacred and the profane. They also see an evolutionary, modernizing trend that has 
caused Western societies to become increasingly secular.”178 Focusing on the material culture 
that shapes American Christianity she challenges this polarity where she,  
… [sees] complicated and interactive relationships between what has been 
called the sacred and the profane. To focus exclusively on the binary 
opposition between sacred and profane prevents us from understanding, 
rather than enabling us to understand, how Christianity works. … The 
material dimension of Christianity shuttles back and forth so frequently 
between what scholars call the sacred and the profane that the usefulness of 
the categories is disputed.179  
 
Echoing Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips, McDannell argues that, “Buying Bibles … wearing 
religious clothing, and owning religious bookstores have been ignored because scholars deem 
these practices less spiritual or authentic.”180 Yet it is through such practices that we gain greater 
insights into many minority communities in North America. McDannell uses Mormons to 
demonstrate how their religious garments embody their dual identities.  
Mormons believe they are different and non-Mormons usually agree. At the 
same time, Mormons act in ways indistinguishable from other middle-class 
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Americans. They … [value] education, family life, hard work, economic 
independence, and authority as all good Americans should. … Garments 
represent a specific theology and history … Saying that garments are like 
Roman collars or yarmulkes is like saying that a Mormon is like a Catholic 
or a Jew. Some Mormons want to be simultaneously inside and outside the 
religious mainstream. They treasure their unique set of beliefs and practices 
but they also want to blend into middle-class America.181  
 
This is certainly true of the three case studies in this dissertation. Sikh, Muslim, and Mennonite 
Canadians tend to be communities that exemplify “good Canadian values” — focus on family, 
education, hard work, and service to the local community.182 At the same time, each community 
has practices and beliefs that set them apart from the mainstream which they do not wish to shed. 
 
Dress 
What objects could be more directly tied to beliefs, social behaviours, and cultural values 
than the clothes and accessories people wear? Clothing speaks of a host of meanings, both subtle 
and overt, and is layered with such insights. Scholars need only ask the questions. Dress provides 
an important picture of the daily lives of individuals and their communities.183 It is such a fruitful 
area of research simply because it has so many meanings related to identity, status, power, and 
protest, while its very nature is malleable.184 There is, however, a lasting scholarly bias against 
its study given that it is a predominantly female genre related to a holdover prejudice against 
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“women’s work.” Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips explain this as “the impact of the disembodied 
rationalism of Western discourse [because it] constitutes a masculine theory of knowledge in 
opposition to a more embodied and multisensory ‘female’ approach to the world.”185 While 
material culture as a field of inquiry is largely overlooked, its subgenre dress has a particularly 
low position. Scholars often consider “fashion” to be a frivolous topic and not worthy of serious 
intellectual enquiry.  
This has not stopped the field from greatly expanding in the last few decades. Joanne 
Entwistle is renowned for arguing that phenomenology enables studying dress as material culture 
that is a situated bodily practice. She bridges the gap between theories of the body (which tend to 
overlook dress) and theories of dress (which tend to ignore the body). She argues that this gap 
results in a complete oversight of the “dressed body” as a phenomenological field. “Either the 
body is thought to be self-evidently dressed (and therefore beyond discussion) or the clothes are 
assumed to stand up on their own, possibly even speaking for themselves without the aid of the 
body. And yet the importance of the body to dress is such that encounters with dress divorced 
from the body are strangely alienating.”186  
This is, in part, because dress as materiality has an inherently symbiotic relationship with 
the body that gives it meaning. Daniel Miller emphasizes dress as an active force that constitutes 
and imagines states of being while drawing connections between people.187 Jennifer Craik draws 
on Entwistle, explaining that wearing clothes activates them, “just as bodies are actualized by the 
clothes they wear.”188 The dressed body then encounters space, and both shapes and is shaped by 
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it. This is why it is so important to study dress as a situated bodily practice. Elizabeth Wilson and 
Entwistle examine how the body and dress interact dialectically. Dress gives the body social 
meaning, while the body gives life to dress.189 “Understanding dress in everyday life requires 
understanding … how the body is experienced and lived and the role dress plays in the 
presentation of the body/self.”190 
Our clothes do not simply shield our concepts of modesty, or protect us from the 
elements, nor do they just reflect the physical body. Dress embellishes, adding a host of 
meanings to our physical presentation that would otherwise be absent.191 Dress is “the key link 
between individual identity and the body.”192 The dressed body mediates between the inner self 
and the surrounding society.193 This situated bodily practice is embedded within social spaces 
and identities, and any study of it requires acknowledging “the ways in which both the 
experience of the body and the various practices of dress are socially structured.”194 Dress 
establishes identities in a world where these are uncertain, and in everyday life acts as the 
symbol through which we are read and read others, however inconclusive and subjective these 
readings are.195 It acts as the visible embodiment of our intentions.  
This study requires balancing the representational aspects of dress, the ways dress and the 
body are enmeshed in power relationships, and how individuals use dress to situate themselves 
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within a social world, since dress is a crucial part of articulating personal identity.196 If we only 
view dress as a one-way process where a person reacts to external influences then we miss a 
significant part of the practice. Lifestyle, social location, and conventions certainly influence 
what people consider to be their own. These processes of simultaneous internal and external 
creative tensions result in vibrant articulations of dress performance.197 
To understand dress practices it is necessary to understand that it is the result of both 
social influences and individual preferences. Regionally changing interactions within and 
between cultures interact to create new understandings and performance of dress.198 To outsiders, 
many people in immigrant communities (particularly women) are not integrating into Canadian 
culture because they continue to wear their “traditional” dress. While many ethnic and religious 
minorities do work to keep their culture and traditions alive through dress, studying these 
examples reveals a much more complex situation.199 Zunera Ishaq practices a form of hijab that 
leaves everything but her eyes veiled. While this manner of dress is closely linked in many 
Western imaginations with her native region, her family’s practices and social location within 
Pakistan are far removed from it. Baltej Singh Dhillon was willing to let the opportunity to be an 
RCMP officer go before he was willing to remove his turban. While he was (and remains) a 
practicing Sikh, his determination came from a promise to his dying father. Mennonite women 
simultaneously occupied positions as Canadian insiders and outsiders, and their community used 
their dress to maintain the latter. 
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Jennifer Craik explains that clothes are a means by which “individuals and groups learn to 
be visually at home with themselves in their culture.”200 Dress standards make bodies decent, 
appropriate, and acceptable while turning them into recognizable and meaningful forms for a 
particular context.201 Naturally, what is appropriate varies widely according to a culture, or even 
a situation within one culture. A person generally knows to dress differently attending a wedding 
than shopping for groceries. Scholars such as Entwistle have thoroughly charted the censure 
individuals experience who do not dress according to what is considered appropriate within their 
context. This, of course, extends to “others” who live within a new or different cultural context. 
“Bodies that do not conform, bodies that flout the conventions of their culture and go without the 
appropriate clothes are subversive of the most basic social codes, and risk exclusion, scorn or 
ridicule.”202 At the same time, breaking these codes of conduct draws attention to these often 
invisible or unstated protocols. “Everybody knows,” and so it does not need to be said, that it is 
inappropriate to wear a swimsuit to a funeral. That is, until someone shows up in swim trunks 
and the group responds. Most people adhere to this social pressure and are embarrassed to make 
mistakes, such as realizing one’s fly is undone in public. Religious minorities frequently draw 
attention to these conventions in the act of breaking them, such as those surrounding women and 
modesty.  
Canadian society generally pays attention to how much flesh one may appropriately 
expose in a given situation, particularly for women. Entwistle uses the example of how the small 
amount of fabric a bikini includes makes a female body appropriately “decent” on a North 
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American beach, while the same item in a boardroom (or on a man) would be deemed 
completely inappropriate. Entwistle charts how exposing naked flesh is disruptive to the social 
order.203 Religious minority dress often challenges these norms in the opposite direction by 
wearing “too much” fabric, as in the case of the niqab or turban. Reina Lewis argues that 
“modesty double standards” reinforce hierarchies of status, ethnicity, and gender.204 Entwistle 
contends that bodies that do not conform to cultural conventions of how much flesh one must not 
(and I argue must) show, especially those conventions that include gender, “are potentially 
subversive and are treated with horror and derision.”205 Since then, the boundaries of the body’s 
presentation are dangerous, it becomes necessary to manage dress through social regulation and 
moral pronouncements. Mary Douglas examines how this creates “two bodies” within the 
relationship between an individual’s body and the social forces that press in on it.206 The dressed 
body, then, becomes a symbol of its cultural location, and functions symbolically to articulate the 
values and anxieties of particular groups.207 
This social locatedness shifts for men and women, even within the same context. Ways of 
walking, moving, sitting, and so on, are embedded as different for men and women as cultures 
inscribe male and female bodies with inherently gendered narratives.208 Social pressures 
encourage us to remain within the boundaries of what those around us consider “normal” and 
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“appropriate” presentation, thereby managing identity through dress.209 Making dress “mistakes” 
are not simply the embarrassment of a social faux pas, “but the shame of failing to meet the 
standards required of one by the moral order of the social space.”210 Thus, our embodied dress 
practices are not so much individualistic as they are “the aggregate of individual behaviour.”211 
Because dress both touches our bodies and faces outward toward others, it encapsulates and 
enables both individual and collective identities. Yet, when these two collide, dress quickly 
becomes a flashpoint for conflicting values.212 
Dress, then, has strong social and moral dimensions that constrain the clothing choices 
people make.213 Elizabeth Wilson critiques the discourses of choice around women’s dress 
practices — particularly regarding hijabistas — arguing that “choice” is a foundational myth of 
consumer culture, affecting everyone regardless of their personal beliefs.214 An overemphasis on 
free expression misses the structural constraints of gender and social location that serve as 
parameters around dress choice.215 Individuals develop a “feel” for what to do, interpreting (both 
consciously and unconsciously) the rules, at times improvising around them.216 Therefore, while 
dress is socially located, it is important to remember that individuals are also active in their 
engagement with it. While many times we dress automatically, at other times we dress with great 
attention and intention.217 While dress choice is always defined within a particular context, we 
                                                   
209 Entwistle, 338. 
210 Entwistle, 338. 
211 Entwistle, 339. 
212 Karen Tranberg and D. Soyini Madison, African Dress, 2. 
213 Entwistle, Fashion and the Fleshy Body, 338. 
214 Elizabeth Wilson in Reina Lewis, ed. Modest Fashion, 9. A hijabista is a hijab wearing fashionista.  
215 Entwistle, Fashion and the Fleshy Body, 341. 
216 Entwistle, 340. 
217 Entwistle, Fashion and the Fleshy Body, 338. 
  66 
adapt it to our lived experiences. It is not pre-determinative because it is not possible to know in 
advance what form dress in everyday life will take. This is precisely because the complex 
interactions of these various experiences and locations enable individuals to create and adapt to 
particular circumstances. Therefore, in the words of Entwistle, “dress as lived practice is the 
[sole] outcome of neither oppressive social forces on the one hand, nor agency on the other.”218 
 
Religious Dress 
Ethnic minorities, religious minorities, and women all experience greater scrutiny of their 
agentic capacity, however, than their counterparts, and nowhere is this more evident than in 
matters of religious dress. First, though, it is necessary to understand the specific research 
subgenre of religious dress. While not studying religion, Quentin Bell uses religious terms to 
describe the importance of clothes: “our clothes are [so deeply] a part of us … [it’s] as though the 
fabric were indeed a natural extension of the body, or even of the soul.”219 Linda Woodhead 
argues that while scholars (and I would say specifically scholars of religion) have ignored 
fashion, the evidence leaves little doubt that “fashion choices are central to the religious lives of 
many people.”220 However, she also notes that dress in our society is coded as trivial, “in contrast 
to ‘real’ religion which has to do with the extraordinary, sublime, transcendental and other-
worldly … the spiritual rather than the bodily …”221 McDannell emphasizes the way, “Those 
who use non-literary means of expressing ideas about the supernatural and its relationship to the 
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everyday world have not been considered fully ‘adult’ Christians. … These ‘weak’ Christians 
who require physical ‘aids’ are separated from ‘strong’ Christians who grasp spiritual truths 
directly.”222 Due to its low status, however, fashion and dress (particularly within religious 
systems) has become a predominantly female sphere, but this also means that they have become 
sites of female autonomy and creativity, where women can act as leaders.223 It is an area where it 
is easy to find women acting on religion and in religious ways. This does not, however, mean 
that men are not also part of this system, as the case of Baltej Singh Dhillon and his turban 
demonstrate. 
When scholars do address fashion (often in fields such as textile studies, women’s 
studies, fine arts, or anthropology) there is rarely sufficient acknowledgement of the centrality of 
religion in these individuals’ lives beyond boundary control. This project differs from many 
others in its goal: to understand the ways religious minorities use dress to communicate their 
goals, beliefs, and values in a secular arena. Doing so upsets two conventions: the first is 
generally accepted as outmoded, that of what religion “is,” where it is located, and who its 
influential actors are. The second is a widespread secular conviction that “women who dress 
modestly for religious reasons are passive victims of patriarchal religious traditions,” rather than 
“liberated agents of their own self-determined pathways of fulfilment.”224 Yet religious minority 
dress is an ideal location to examine the reproduction and negotiation of normative gender 
scripts, and creative navigation of public spaces. A religious minority’s dressed body reveals 
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“how gender materializes onto bodies,” actions that help construct notions of idealized femininity 
and masculinity (in both the religious and secular spheres).225 
People use clothing to communicate, but it is “inherently polysemic and open to 
interpretation by different wearers and observers.”226 This is particularly evident in ongoing 
public debate over what religious dress is publicly “acceptable.” Exploring these case studies 
provides insights into how these communities and individuals navigate through and around social 
and moral codes. The goal of this project is to put these overtly religious clothes and accessories 
into the context of self-advocacy, identity creation, and performance. While codes of dress 
undeniably include elements of control and pressure, both conscious and unconscious (and this is 
in no way limited to religious dress), much is already written on this, especially on religion’s role 
in such systems.227 Indeed, the public imagination most often associates overtly religious dress 
with oppressive structures and restriction, particularly of women’s bodies. External observers 
lack the cultural familiarity or knowledge necessary to distinguish between various forms of 
religious dress, particularly when outsiders read them as similar (ie. the differences between a 
Sikh turban and the Muslim kalansuwa).228 
That method of inquiry is already amply addressed, and this is not an expository work on 
all the aspects of a particular manner of dress. Rather, it adds a corrective to the field, arguing 
that the modes of religious dress have an often overlooked yet substantial and profound effect on 
                                                   
225 Joanne Entwistle, “Gender on Display: Performativity in Fashion Modelling” in Cultural Sociology 7, no. 3,  
(2012), 321. 
226 Reina Lewis, ed. Modest Fashion, 3. 
227 See for example, Malcolm Barnard, Fashion Theory: An Introduction, (Abingdon: Rutledge, 2013); Diana Crane,  
Fashion and its Social Agendas: Class, Gender, and Identity in Clothing, (Chicago: University of Chicago  
Press, 2000); Joanne B. Eicher, ed. Dress and Ethnicity: Change Across Space and Time, (Oxford: Berg 
Publishers, 1999); and Susan B. Kaiser, Fashion and Cultural Studies, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2013).  
228 Lewis, Modest Fashion, 4. 
  69 
Canadian society. Adherence to and promotion of human rights is now a sacrosanct social 
Canadian value. Religious minorities, such as Mennonites, Sikhs, and Muslims, both tap into this 
value and challenge it further. This has important repercussions for policy makers, politicians, 
legal professionals, religious communities, and private citizens. Religious dress is a language 
that communicates cultural and social messages. Likewise, it is a topic that is at the heart of 
current debates over what it means to be Canadian. As much as these clothes are material 
objects, they are also concepts. 
In their book Clothing as Material Culture, anthropologists Daniel Miller and Susan 
Küchler explain that, “The sensual and aesthetic — what cloth feels and looks like — is the 
source of its capacity to objectify myth, cosmology and also morality, power, and value.”229 
Though they use non-religious language, they affirm McDannell’s position that, “… we see 
integrity in the complex interweaving of what can rarely be separated out into distinct material 
and social domains. [Our] underlying claim is that such transcendence represents a certain 
maturity of perspective, one that recognizes the various disciplines and forms of expertise and 
seeks to bring these together within the larger project of academic understanding.”230 They 
critique studies that reduce dress, “… to its ability to signify something that seems more real — 
society or social relations — as though these things exist above or prior to their own 
materiality.”231 In other words, “… There is no simple boundary or distinction between persons 
and their environment.”232 A hijab, for instance, can be tied a certain way to represent the 
wearer’s aesthetic preferences, or to keep her hair out of her eyes. It protects its wearer from the 
sun, or a cold Canadian winter breeze. A child can play with her mother’s hijab, or hide behind 
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its ends in the safety of her mother if she is feeling shy. Speaking of a sari, Miller and Küchler 
explain its own agency: “We see the [item] not simply as the cover of the individual but as the 
mediation between the individual and that which lies outside them, their child, their kitchen, their 
office workers.”233 This approach is, “… often closer to the way peoples in many parts of the 
world understand themselves and struggle with the relationship between what they regard as the 
spiritual and material aspects of their lives.”234 Like Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips, Miller and 
Küchler argue that, “… We simply cannot assume that the way Western philosophy and 
conversation uses these concepts will necessarily apply to any other society.”235 How people 
understand themselves and their dress, “… has an impact on how individuals relate to 
themselves, to others, and to wider issues such as the nature of rationality or modernity.”236  
While she too affirms nuance and transcendence, religious dress scholar Linda B. Arthur 
takes a different approach. In her book, Religion, Dress, and the Body, she argues that, “Dress 
provides distinction between the sacred and the profane, particularly in the symbolic separation 
of an ethno-religious subculture from the dominant society.”237 Her emphasis is more on borders 
and boundaries, and how dress marks and enforces these distinctions.  
Symbols, such as dress, help delineate the social unit and visually define its 
boundaries because they give non-verbal information about the individual. 
Unique dress attached to specific cultural groups, then, can function to 
insulate group members from outsiders, while bonding the members to each 
other. Normative behavior [sic.] within the culture re-affirms loyalty to the 
group and can be evidenced by the wearing of a uniform type of attire.238   
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While Arthur is discussing conservative religious groups, I argue this is what the broader, 
“secular” Canadian society does. It attempts to exert social control of minorities through dress — 
what is normative and what is acceptable. “Through symbolic devices, the physical body exhibits 
the normative values of the social body.”239 As discussed earlier in reference to dress as an agent 
of control, Arthur examines how “sacred dress of religious groups is used in a social hierarchy of 
religiosity to facilitate social and ideological agendas,” and while this is certainly evident in the 
religious groups in these case studies, this is also true of dress that is not overtly “religious” 
(such as the Mountie Stetson, or an uncovered woman’s face).240  
As Entwistle explained earlier, “respectability” plays a role in the practices of the social 
body. We read dress to determine whether a person is worthy of our respect. The uncodified rules 
that determine what is appropriate for individuals to wear in a given place, “… are almost as 
rigid as grammatical rules.”241 Through their wearing apparel, people can say subtle but 
important things that they would not or could not utter directly; indeed, they may not be 
consciously aware of the message themselves.”242 Costume historian Linda Baumgarten, curator 
of textiles and costumes at Colonial Williamsburg, uses the example of a well tailored eighteenth 
century man in silk and bright white linen. Such a man, “… probably would not say aloud, ‘I’m 
richer than you are and I don’t have to perform dirty physical labor’; his clothes reveal his wealth 
and leisure in a much more socially acceptable way.”243  
This is not limited to a colonial gentleman and is certainly as clearly communicated in the 
modern day with workers’ overalls or Wall Street power suits. There is a scene in the film The 
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Pursuit of Happyness, based on the real-life experiences of Chris Gardner, where Chris (played 
by Will Smith) arrives for his interview for a competitive and prestigious stockbroker internship 
wearing paint-splattered work clothes. The situation was unavoidable for him, but he is painfully 
aware of how inappropriately he is dressed. The viewer intuitively shares his intense discomfort 
without any explanation necessary from the script. We all know, without being told, that those 
around him consider his outfit inappropriate and disrespectful, and that he will not receive the 
same respect as the men in suits.244 Workers’ clothes, however, (in the proper setting) imbue their 
wearer with another form of respect. This is an individual who works, and ours is a society that 
values hard work. The clothes of people living on the street gives others permission to see past 
them; the majority are not expected to respect them. The “appropriateness” of dress is inherently 
contextual. 
When religious minorities bring their sensibilities around what is proper into the public 
discussion it challenges these norms, even if most people do not recognize them as unarticulated 
standards. Indeed, dress in part has such power because it goes beyond what language can 
communicate. “Humans may use clothing to carry messages that go beyond the communicative 
capabilities of spoken language. When, in 1993, Sikh veterans were denied entry into a Surrey, 
British Columbia Royal Canadian Legion hall because they would not remove their “hats,” 
discussions of respect were at the heart of the dispute. The western veterans felt that the Sikhs 
were being deeply disrespectful to the honoured dead, because in Canadian society men remove 
their hats as a sign of respect. The Sikhs felt that the Legion was disrespecting them and not 
honouring their sacrifices as veterans.245 
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Dress may be commonplace, but it is far from vacuous or insignificant. Baumgarten 
describes clothing as, “… the most intimately human …” of material cultures.246 Dress’ 
messages can be “subtle and unclear,” and “shift with time and place.”247 But, in line with 
Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips, Baumgarten points out that, “… spoken and written 
communications can be misunderstood, too, because words have meanings only insofar as 
human beings assign them and agree on the linguistic rules.”248 Baumgarten explains that the 
task of reading dress, “… becomes more difficult when looking back in time.”249 I would argue 
that it is equally difficult looking across cultures and religions. A woman’s hijab is an overt 
message, but with complicated and overlapping multiple meanings. Even its most overt: “this is a 
Muslim woman” is often misread. Despite these challenges, as Arthur articulates, “… Dress 
functions as an effective means of non-verbal communication during social interaction; it 
influences the establishment and projection of identity.”250 
Arthur has a firmer delineation than the other scholars in this chapter, but she also works 
with the complexity and intersectionality of dress. She considers how religious groups use, “the 
metaphor of appearance … to simultaneously express religiosity, ethnicity and gender norms,” 
and her work “… draws attention to the complexity of meanings surrounding dress and to the 
ways that bodies can be read as communicating social and religious values.”251 She focuses on 
the way dress visually exhibits the acculturation and assimilation of indigenous people and 
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immigrants, and how much dress embodies identity.252 She draws, “… connections between the 
ways in which identity, visually manifest in dress, expresses values — religious on the one hand 
and cultural on the other.”253 Studying dress opens a window into the social world of 
communities. “… Dress can visually manifest the salient ideas and concepts fundamental to a 
culture; what dress does is to make tangible the basic categories a culture uses to define its 
particular conception of reality.”254 In another book, Undressing Religion: Commitment and 
Conversion from a Cross-Cultural Perspective, Arthur makes a point crucial to this dissertation; 
like Entwistle she articulates that dress represents, “… sometimes concurrently, both agency and 
control.”255 Too often Canadians see religious dress and interpret it through the lens of control. 
Once again, this is certainly part of the narrative, but it too often becomes the whole narrative, 
and for this reason I leave its discussion to the works I previously listed. Taking a page from 
Edwards, Gosden, and Phillips, I would argue that the dress is not merely “representative.” 
However, Arthur clearly demonstrates that, “… dress provides evidence of both adaptation to 
cultural change and expression of religious identity.”256  
Human rights theory and material culture studies may not immediately come to mind as 
obvious partners, but the one informs and affects the other to a greater degree than even the 
disciplines’ scholars seem to have noted. If religious practice hierarchies produce and 
consolidate secularity, and if religious practice hierarchies presuppose any operative notions of 
religion in public space, then by necessity the idea of a religiously neutral nation is a myth. It 
then becomes necessary to understand the ways the antagonism religious dress provokes is 
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intertwined with how Canada understands itself in relation to diversity and human rights. Such is 
this dissertation’s objective.  
  76 
CHAPTER THREE  
The Ontario Swiss Mennonite Bonnet Debate, 1910-1925 
 
In the early 1920s, Helen Shantz was a young woman attending Wanner Mennonite 
Church in Cambridge, Ontario. In a 1984 interview she recalled, “Well, we were having trouble 
at Wanner’s … the last year you see [because] our girls down there were not wearing 
bonnets.”257 When Bishop Gingerich — a man at the centre of the tension — came to Wanner to 
administer communion Helen and her friends were sitting on a bench second to the front, and 
they were not wearing bonnets. Helen was at the end of the row. She remembers her father 
looking over at her. “I could just tell [he was thinking] ‘What’s she going to do now?’ … I stood 
up and as soon as I did that the whole group of girls - Edna Snyder, Emma Snyder, the whole 
row … they all got up in a body. [Bishop Gingerich] couldn’t turn us down. It was too many.”258 
She knew she was making a conscious decision to publicly challenge what Bishop Gingerich had 
just declared from the pulpit — that those who wore hats instead of the traditional Mennonite 
bonnets could not take communion.  Helen, however, was unfazed. “… Our hats were plain and 
another thing … it wasn’t his to give. This is the Lord’s supper.”259 Helen and her friends used 
their hats and the communion ritual to perform a public statement of faith, and resistance to the 
church’s established wisdom.  
This chapter examines how, during World War I and after, Mennonite groups used the 
metaphor of appearance (particularly the prayer bonnet) to express conformity to their church, 
unity, boundary maintenance, and gender norms while simultaneously communicating non-
conformity to the larger society, causing disunity, pushing boundaries, and challenging gendered 
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expectations. These factors all help to define a person’s social location, and became visible 
markers of the group’s enforcement of a particular manner of dress representing community 
membership. In the case of the Swiss Mennonites in Ontario the prayer bonnet reinforced 
cultural and religious systems in order to communicate their separateness from the world around 
them, demonstrating how some minority groups actively seek for other Canadians to see them as 
“different.” The male church leadership primarily, though not exclusively, used women’s bodies 
as the site of this non-conformist identity.260 These particularities amongst a pacifist German 
group in the midst of the then-largest war effort ever undertaken caused Mennonite non-
conformity to come to the fore in non-militarism. This ensured they were, indeed, unpopular 
outsiders, though the church had ongoing challenges throughout the First World War 
demonstrating that they were “other” enough to warrant exemption from the draft. Since the 
exercise of the group right to be exempt from military service depended solely on belonging to 
the Mennonite community, strong identity markers, boundary markers, and conformity took on 
greater significance. 
Symbols such as the bonnet help to outline a social group, visually defining the 
community boundaries by giving non-verbal information about the individual.261 Dress scholar 
Linda B. Arthur explains that, “symbols operate beneath the conscious level and often cannot be 
verbally articulated.”262 As a result, people often engage in symbolic behaviour, particularly with 
regard to dress, without consciously understanding why. Members of subcultures may perform 
symbolic work by deploying cultural artifacts, including dress, to mark their groups’ boundaries 
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while registering their internal belonging.263 “Fossilized fashion” is when a group “freezes” a 
style, wearing it long after it is outmoded in the general population.264 Conservative religious 
sectarian groups most often employ this, using fossilized fashion as a visual symbol of separation 
and/or traditional gender roles for women. It occurs among groups that find change threatening, 
such as among Mennonites in the midst of massive societal upheaval in early 20th century North 
America. It is an example of what Pamela Klassen observes as, “… the lines of worldliness … 
often arbitrarily but meticulously drawn in the contours of women’s bodies.”265 Since dress, 
though, is a reflection of both the internal and the external, it is a mistake to assume these women 
were passive victims of patriarchy without any social assertiveness. 
Dress provides distinction between the sacred and the profane, particularly in the 
symbolic separation of an ethno-religious subculture from the dominant society, often tied to 
patriarchy and social control of women.266 While this is a significant part of the Mennonite head 
covering debate of the early 1900s, the Canadian Mennonites are not simply an interesting 
example of a quite common phenomenon wherein men control the powers and privileges of 
women by forcing them to wear costumes that interfere with their ability to carry out certain 
tasks or inhabit certain roles. The situation was more complex, with the internal debate over the 
bonnet reflecting larger community concerns around boundary maintenance.267 
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This chapter is a case study of the debates over Swiss Mennonite head coverings in 
Ontario in the 1910s and 1920s, examining the role the head covering played as a vehicle for 
communicating separateness, and the internal divisions this created. Men were not trying to 
regulate women’s appearance solely to control their bodies (although this element was certainly 
present), but to enforce group-specific separation through their women’s particular dress. Put 
differently, this chapter is less concerned with men’s intention to keep women in their place, and 
is more focused on the male leadership’s desire to keep their whole community — men and 
women — separate from the encroaching mores of a dominant society through control of 
women’s appearance. As Sherry Ortner argues in The Virgin and the State, “male-defined 
structures represent themselves and conceptualize their unity and status through the purity of 
their women.”268 
 
Mennonite Identity 
In order to understand the dynamics of the head covering debates of the 1910s and ‘20s it 
is necessary to contextualize it within Mennonite ethnic and ideological history, church structure, 
and the importance of pacifism to Mennonite beliefs. In an effort to maintain their conscientious 
objector status, and women’s roles within the community, church leaders appealed to traditional 
values, non-conformity to the surrounding militant and “immoral” world, and unity with and 
conformity to their Mennonite community. 
The Mennonite Church began in Switzerland in 1525, growing out of Anabaptist 
reformers — a minority part of the Protestant Reformation.269 Unpopular with both Catholics and 
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Protestants, Mennonite identity quickly developed as a martyred people separate and apart from 
the rest of society. After several decades of fierce debates, Menno Simons emerged as the leader 
of the movement (hence the name Mennonites), and pacifism became a key tenet of Anabaptism. 
Simons argued that, with Christ at the centre of biblical hermeneutics, believers had to consider 
what he had taught about warfare, violence, and vengeance. As Anabaptist historian Arnold 
Snyder explains, “Christ left us an example, that we should follow, said Menno; He was minded 
to suffer, and so must all Christians be minded, overcoming their foes with the spiritual sword of 
the Word of God. The literal words and the concrete example of Jesus’ life became the central 
ethical measures …”270  
Article 18 of the Mennonite Confession of Faith (which all Mennonites must affirm in 
order to become members of the church) spells this out directly: 
We believe that it is the will of God for His children to follow Christian love 
in all human relationships. Such a life of love excludes retaliation and 
revenge. God pours His love into the hearts of Christians so that they desire 
the welfare of all men. The supreme example of nonresistance is the Lord 
Jesus Himself. The teaching of Jesus not to resist him who is evil requires 
the renunciation by His disciples of all violence in human relations. Only 
love must be shown to all men. We believe that this applies to every area of 
life: to personal injustice, to situations in which people commonly resort to 
litigation, to industrial strife, and to international tensions and wars. As 
nonresistant Christians we cannot serve in any office which employs the use 
of force. Nor can we participate in military service, or in military training, 
or in the voluntary financial support of war. But we must aggressively, at 
the risk of life itself, do whatever we can for the alleviation of human 
distress and suffering.271 
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It is also important to note here that, in keeping with Anabaptist tradition, Mennonites do not 
become members of the church until they are adults. They must choose to join, affirm the 
confession of faith, and be baptized into the community of believers. Their lives after baptism is 
expected to reflect their commitment to Christ and their community. These are all direct factors 
in the head covering debate of the early 20th century. 
Due to decentralized power, persecution, and migration, Mennonites are a very diverse 
group. Swiss Mennonites and Russian Mennonites are the two main groups in North America 
today. The Swiss came first, to William Penn’s “holy experiments,” the religiously tolerant 
Colony of Penn (later Pennsylvania) in 1683. After the American Revolutionary War (when their 
pacifist stance put them at odds with the larger population), many moved to what is now 
Southern Ontario, seeking less expensive land and preferring British rule.272 The first Russian 
Mennonites arrived in the 1880s when Russia began revoking minority rights. These c. 8000 
immigrants included people from the Bergthal, Old Colony, and Kleine Gemeinde 
communities.273 A second and larger group arrived in the 1920s in the wake of the Russian 
revolution. Each community, or ordnung, decides matters of faith for itself with no overarching 
central authority, although each church belongs to a Conference, and the Conference relates to 
the larger church body. Each Mennonite community has its own particular history and cultural 
markers, which in turn become traditions of religious significance. This became particularly true 
of the Swiss Mennonite bonnet.   
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History is very close to the surface for Mennonites, and ethnic heritage plays a very large 
role in Mennonite communal- and self-identity.274 The head covering controversy of the 1910s 
and ‘20s was the contemporary platform to argue recurrent ideologies and tensions. Mennonite 
identity as a group separate and distinct from “the world,” rooted in their pacifism and fiercely 
gripping their ethnic heritage — while simultaneously trying to downplay their “Germanness” 
during World War I — shaped the contours of this debate. As Pamela Klassen states, “Debates 
about the ethnically marked categories of dress, language (e.g. German or English), and social 
activities (e.g. dancing, card-playing, movie-going) were central to definitions of separation from 
the world for both Swiss and Russian Mennonites.”275  
 
Mennonite Headcoverings 
Whether or not Mennonite women have always worn a particular religious head covering 
is itself a matter of debate. Pictures of Anabaptist women in the Martyr’s Mirror show them both 
with and without head coverings.276 All of the women in Sorgh’s picture of Dutch Mennonite 
Jacob Bierens and family (1633) are wearing white caps. Rembrandt’s 1641 painting, The 
Mennonite Minister Cornelis Claesz Anslo includes his wife wearing a white cap. Jacob 
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Eicholtz’s 1815 painting, A Lancaster Mennonite Woman depicts a similar head covering. In fact, 
all women in Eicholtz’s paintings from Lancaster County wear such caps, including his Lutheran 
mother. The only difference is the lace with which non-Mennonite women edge their caps. This 
is not particularly surprising, however, as women in North America and Europe did not generally 
appear in public with uncovered heads until the 20th century. Under Henry VIII the law forbade 
unmarried women from wearing caps and instead instructed them to don a kerchief.277 While this 
law relates most directly to the difference between married and unmarried women’s head 
coverings (a practice that ebbed and flowed throughout the centuries), it indicates the general 
assumption of covered female heads. Obviously the practice was not unique to Mennonites, who 
often adapted the practice to simpler standards. This is characteristic of Anabaptist styles 
generally. They were usually against extremes of fashion and advocated for simplicity of dress. 
Mennonite styles were usually “the world’s fashions minus the superfluities,” and often 
expressed a ten- to fifteen-year time lag.278 This was both related to the ideal of simple attire and 
the reality that most Mennonites were farmers — a group that for practical and economic reasons 
would not adopt more fashionable clothes. However, what it meant to “dress simply” was 
generally a matter of individual preference within community norms.279  
The Swiss Mennonite church in the early 20th century insisted on wearing a prayer bonnet 
on top of the traditional white mesh prayer cap. This practice was markedly and intentionally 
particular to the Swiss Mennonite community. Church authorities were unconcerned that this 
covering was not biblically based. Traditionally, Mennonites viewed intellectuals and biblical 
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interpretation with suspicion and believed that, through the priesthood of all believers, scripture 
was readily accessible to all Christians. Linked to this belief is a reliance on the community to 
interpret and discern spiritual matters as a collective. While each member has a say in the group’s 
understanding, this practice results in a church authority where the individual surrenders her 
beliefs to those of the community when they do not align. Until the 1960s Mennonites also 
elected bishops. Intended as an egalitarian practice where church elders selected bishops in the 
biblical manner of drawing lots, bishops wielded a great deal of power and were at the centre of 
the head covering debate in the 1early 1900s. Not surprisingly, after the initial radical fervour of 
the 16th century and its corresponding female preachers, women could not hold such positions of 
authority. 
 
Non-Conformity and Boundaries 
Non-conformity and separation from the world were central tenets of Mennonite 
theology, and their religious dress identified them as “other.” In addition to visibly demonstrating 
a community’s particularity, controlling dress effectively regulates a community. Unique dress 
associated with a  specific cultural group insulates the members from outsiders, while reinforcing 
the bond amongst them.280 As historian Marlene Epp explains, “The plain bonnet … was not 
only ‘the most consistent and appropriate protection’ to wear with the covering, and most 
adhered to biblical principals of modesty and nonconformity, but the surrender of the bonnet 
invariably was ‘the opening wedge’ for the loss of Mennonite separation in general.281 When 
Mennonites could no longer rely on geographic isolation to ensure their community boundaries, 
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and as language no longer acted as a barrier to wider society, the leadership emphasized the third 
device of separation: plain dress — particularly the bonnet. By the early 1920s, clothing symbols 
were a crucial part of non-conformity. Separation became metaphorical as it manifested through 
women’s bodies. Since almost every Mennonite attended church activities it was difficult to 
objectively evaluate a person’s faith and commitment to the community in this way, so symbolic 
measures served as a substitute. Since a Mennonite woman’s primary task was to live a godly life 
as a devoted Christian, the community considered appearance as an external manifestation of 
internal attitudes. The church leadership therefore looked for signs and symbols of a woman’s 
spirituality and commitment to her community. They used appearance — particularly the 
distinctive Mennonite bonnet — as a visual cue to analyze a woman’s non-conformity, and 
thereby her spiritual state.282 Dress (then and now) marks distinction between insiders and 
outsiders. 
During World War I, separation from the militaristic world around them took on 
heightened importance.This carried into and expanded in the 1920s, when dress was a way not 
only to distinguish from broader North American society, but also other Christian denominations 
that were attractive to young Mennonites. The rise of fundamentalism within North American 
Christianity turned the emphasis toward inner conversion that showed itself through a pure life, 
rather than what one wore on the outside. Rather than adapting to these trends and 
acknowledging, as other Christian denominations did, that women could be “good Christian 
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girls” while wearing hats, the Mennonite church doubled-down on its message of non-conformity 
to the world (and thereby alignment with God) through women’s dress.283 
Mennonites’ foundational belief structures were based on community, simplicity, 
humility, isolation, and conformity to community standards, and their dress reflected this. Since 
community life was valued above the needs of the individual, individual pride was unacceptable. 
Individualism would disturb the tranquility of an orderly community, and fancy decoration on the 
person would be a direct indication of pride. Mennonite women believed in this ideal as strongly 
as their male brethren, which in part explains why the bonnet debate never took the form of 
women’s autonomy. While women in similar demographics who were likewise moving to factory 
and domestic work developed strong senses of self-determination, Mennonite women rejected 
what Linda Woodhead calls autonomization, or considering the self to be the most reliable source 
of decision-making authority.284 In fact, when women spoke out against the church leadership’s 
emphasis on the bonnet they often framed their opposition in terms of the church leader (such as 
Bishop Gingerich in Helen Shantz’s anecdote) putting his own interpretation above the group 
understanding of God or ritual. In this way, these Mennonite women demonstrate a situation 
common throughout these case studies: the marriage between self agency (ie. publicly speaking 
out against unequal application of dress standards) and the social control that shapes both the 
form of this agency (adhering to a patriarchal church model) and the embodiment of the dress 
practice (no one opposed headcoverings outright). Mennonite women’s dress made them stand 
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out as visibly and culturally different from everyone else around them, emphasizing their 
particularity. Communicating this intentional separateness, Mennonite women adhered to the 
tradition’s practice of shunning materialism and embracing practical action that was of benefit to 
the larger community rather than the needs or desires of the individual.285 
This community control goes beyond attire itself to restraining women’s thoughts. 
Klassen argues that, “The dogged efforts to control women’s experiments with dress — their 
donning of fashionable hats or fancy wedding dresses, their refusal to wear the covering — were 
attempts to repress imaginative fantasy among Mennonite women about what the ‘world’ might 
offer.”286 She continues, “Hence separation from the world … often fed a stereotyping of women 
outside the community … as sexually lascivious, impure, and immoral in their ‘worldliness.’”287 
Klassen analyzes Epp’s work, discussing how she demonstrates dress rules as “directly related to 
the potential corruption of the church as threatened by emancipated and fashionable women.”288 
Mennonites may have been a separate community, but they were fully aware of the 
shifting roles of other women around them. And like the larger society, their opinions varied. In 
her January 14, 1915 diary entry First Mennonite Church member Susannah Cressman wrote, 
“Went out to Sim Brubaker’s to Young Peoples Literary, a large meeting. Debate on Women’s 
Suffrage … S.F. Coffman critic.”289 Other entries make similar passing references. While it does 
not take up a great deal of space in her diaries, women’s suffrage had Susannah Cressman’s 
attention, and she seems to have been in favour of it. Coffman’s critique of the movement fits in 
well with his stance on the bonnet. 
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Dress and Gender Roles 
Like most of their Christian contemporaries, Mennonites at the turn of the 20th century 
believed that male power was divinely ordained. This patriarchy was rooted in their biblical 
hermeneutics, and the divinely ordered hierarchy included general acceptance of male authority. 
While externally communicating a woman’s loyalty to her community, internally the head 
covering served to symbolize a woman’s submission to God, to men in general, and to her 
husband in particular. It was a visible token of gender performance — a woman who accepted 
the community’s dress signified acceptance of female submission and appropriate female 
behaviour.290 In a treatise on the topic from the early 20th century, Paul Miller wrote, “Now God 
says that refusing to take the symbol of subjection is as shameful as abandoning virtue.”291 The 
head covering served as a marker of a woman’s femaleness. For a woman to remove her head 
covering was a symbol of a subversive sexuality.292 The bonnet, then, was repetitious production 
of gender, since gender requires “doing” and not passive being.293 This reproduction of normative 
gender scripts requires active embodiment of individuals, as opposed to passive inscriptions of 
power onto the body.294 The women in this case study were not seeking to remove their 
headcovering. They simply set aside the particular and cumbersome Conference bonnet in favour 
of more conventional hats. Those opposing them saw no difference. Hats were vainglorious, of 
the world, and a threat to non-conformity. 
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Similar dress practices exist in modern Holdeman Mennonite communities where, “the 
uniform attire of Holdeman women attests not only to separation from the external society, but 
separation of the sexes. This important distinction is rooted in the perception of natural gender 
differences that underly their patriarchal social system.”295 In both cases dress was more 
restrictive for women than for men, placing the onus on women to maintain tradition. In this 
case, the pressure was not only for the continuation of customs, but to ensure that the larger 
Canadian society understood Mennonites were different. The bonnet was an indirect and highly 
visible marker of the community’s separation. In the words of textile scholar Lynda Boynton 
Arthur, “The minute details of a woman’s appearance include a hierarchy of symbols.”296 For 
early 20th century Mennonites some symbols were negotiable and some were not to be altered. 
Through personal control (both formal and informal) women were constrained by each other, by 
men in general, and by church leaders in particular.297 
Mennonite historian Lorna Bergey reflects on this dynamic: 
Early in life I became aware that the women in my Mennonite church family 
were expected to symbolize non-conformity to the world by our dress. … 
[T]he period from 1925 to 1950 was the most conservative period of 
uniform dress in [the] group. This would also apply to Ontario. However in 
Ontario it would apply mainly to women’s apparel.298 
 
Clara Bechtel Shantz of Cambridge, Ontario agreed. “They [the men] could wear the ordinary 
things and we had to wear the plain things.”299 Lillian Snyder spoke for many Mennonite women 
when she expressed the resentment this unequal application of plain dress created: “I always 
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thought there was a differentiation that wasn’t quite fair. The men … could have the best kind of 
cloth in their suits and be very well dressed. But the women were supposed to abide by a pattern, 
a very plain pattern of dress. And of course a headdress that matched. A Mennonite woman was 
very easily recognized as a Mennonite.”300 
It was not, however, that men did not have their own dress distinctions. Men’s clothes 
(like women’s) were a combination of tradition, Conference regulations, and contemporary 
fashions. Mennonite dress, for both men and women, was often simplified or outdated styles. For 
instance, when S.F. Coffman arrived in Ontario in 1895 to assume a pastorate he was surprised to 
find many older women of the church still wearing beaver hats. Beaver as a millinery material 
had almost entirely disappeared by 1840 (sparking a massive economic and social shift in what 
soon became Canada). This time lag was not limited to women’s styles. Mennonites had never 
condoned the button down fly on men’s pants since its emergence in the early 18th century, 
preferring broad falls. Broad falls are essentially pants with a horizontally hinged flap held 
closed by three buttons on the waistband, with a fall that extends from hip to hip. Broadfalls 
were almost entirely replaced with front flies by World War I, except among Mennonites and 
other plain dress churches who considered front closure flies immodest and too easily accessible. 
Coffman wore broadfalls until his death in 1954. The style was unpopular among young 
Mennonite men, however, who preferred the button fly and later the zipper fly when it became 
fashionable in the mainstream during and immediately after World War I.301  
Likewise, there was an informal distinction between clergy and laymen’s dress 
(particularly young laymen). A sack coat with a turn down lapelless collar came into general 
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fashion in the late 18th century. Mennonite ministers and deacons continued to wear this style 
well into the 20th century, while the Conference strongly encouraged its laymen to do the 
same.302 The coat that buttoned to the chin without lapels came to be known as a “plain coat” or 
“regulation coat” in Mennonite circles. It was to male Mennonite identity what the bonnet was to 
women’s. However, the church leadership was far less interested in enforcing this dress standard. 
There were certainly no investigative committees looking into the matter of young men who did 
not wear the plain coat, nor any church schisms over the matter as there were for women’s 
bonnets. This unequal enforcement did not represent indifference, however. As Mennonite dress 
historian Melvin Gingerich explains, 
In the period from about 1914 to around 1950 many efforts were made to persuade 
Mennonite men … to adopt this style of coat and it was made mandatory for ministers in 
most districts … In 1914 the Indiana-Michigan Mennonite conference advised its 
brethren to wear the “regulation clothing,” and two years later declared that the ministry 
should wear the “regulation coat.” Mennonite General Conference in 1917 agreed that 
“all who occupy positions of influence in the church should wear the plain garb which for 
the men was the ‘plain suit.’” In the following year the Ontario conference favored the 
wearing of “the regulation coat by the brethren.” … During the next two decades the 
Lancaster, Franconia, Southwestern-Pennsylvania, … the Alberta-Saskatchewan and the 
Pacific Coast conference likewise demanded that the ministers wear them and 
encouraged the laity to wear them.303 
 
These conferences now felt it necessary to enact these regulations because the weight of 
tradition, which had previously maintained the custom of wearing the lapelless coat, no longer 
carried the same influence. The requirement was successful among ministers, but only among a 
very few laymen. Gingerich states, “There thus came to be a double standard with the ‘plain 
coat’ thought of as a preacher’s coat. The presence of this double standard of dress caused 
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[problems] because in Mennonite circles the clergy and laity are not to be thought of as two 
classes but rather the congregation is to be regarded as a brotherhood where all are on the same 
level.”304 This difference led ministers to largely abandon the plain coat by the mid-20th century. 
The plain coat was not the only piece of male dress to cause tension. In 1902 the Virginia 
Conference cautioned its men against “flashy neckties.”305 In 1920 they restricted any church 
official from wearing a tie, and in 1941 they sought to extend this to all men of the conference 
(although it was not an official ban, just a general discouragement). Similar restrictions occurred 
in several mid-western, western, and Canadian conferences.306 Photos of ministers in those 
decades, including those of S.F. Coffman, show men in lapelless coats and bow ties. The new 
necktie regulations were a result of some young Mennonites who traveled to churches around 
North America arguing for precise dress codes, “in order to stop the drift toward conformity to 
the world’s fashions.”307 Dress remained a primary concern for worldly non-conformity, 
althought not all Mennonites agreed with this approach. John F. Funk, editor of the prominent 
Mennonite publication Herald of Truth wrote a vociferous opinion piece on the matter in which 
he argued: 
We read of some people who got greatly blessed of the Lord by taking off their neckties. 
We can readily see the origin of the necktie consecration. Some dude whose diminutive 
soul was wrapped up in his necktie must of course give up his idol in coming to God. 
Then he takes out a patent on the leadings incidental to his peculiar infirmities and starts 
out with his patent gospel. He makes an issue upon his necktie, gets up a fight, and when 
the party surrenders that point he is in harmony with the spirit of the leader and is 
endorsed as saved and feels greatly blessed. This kind of religious teaching is on the same 
ground the Dr. made a success of in his practice. He knew what would cure fits, and so 
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gave everybody he was called to see something to throw them into fits, and then cured 
the fits and of course he was a great doctor.308 
 
The necktie was undesirable in two ways: 1) it was an unnecessary and potentially ostentatious 
article of clothing that demonstrated an internal drift toward conformity to the world, and 2) it 
was a lewd and immodest item, acting as a visual arrow toward a man’s genitalia and potential 
for fornication. The tie and front fly are noteworthy as two unusual cases where men’s clothing 
concerns were overtly related to male sexuality and modesty. For women, however, these 
concerns regularly steered the discussion concerning their dress.  
While the Mennonite church focused so heavily on women’s bonnets, there was not the 
same biblical foundation for men to cover their hair, nor a New Testament enjoiner to cover one’s 
head while praying. This did not mean that the brethren’s heads were entirely ignored, however. 
In 1915 the Missouri-Iowa Conference discouraged men from wearing crimped hats or derby 
hats. In 1919, and later again in 1928, the Virginia Conference warned against “fashionable 
caps.”309 Some conferences did not adopt specific regulations but strongly encouraged its men 
not to “conform” or adopt “worldly fashions.” In other words, Mennonite leadership was 
interested in what hats its men wore, but out of concerns over non-conformity and simplicity — 
not sexual modesty, submission, or group status. This is not surprising as there was neither the 
biblical nor cultural framework for such a foundation, as there was with women. Likewise, while 
men and women are (obviously) both embodied, cultural associations do not see men embodied 
in the same way as women. “Male bodies are taken for granted or rendered invisible … [and 
thus] men are embodied, but the experience of embodiment is often left out of accounts of 
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masculinity.”310 That is, unless the male body refuses to conform, whether by wearing a zippered 
fly or a turban with a Mountie uniform. 
Textile scholars note that when gender roles are stable for long periods of time they can 
be marked with a particular form of dress. Expect a change in dress styles when gender roles 
change suddenly within these groups.311 Similarly, limited gender roles are reflected in women’s 
dress restrictions, either in dress codes or physically hindering clothing.312 During World War I, 
women throughout North American society adopted roles and careers previously unavailable to 
them. After the war, “many resented the return to ‘womanly’ duties which limited their activities 
to the home and related social functions … Their rebellious feelings were to be reflected in the 
manner in which they dressed …”313 Mennonite and other Christian leaders saw these changes as 
a direct affront to what they considered God’s law. For many church leaders the common 
understanding of “God — Christ — Man — Woman” made the prayer cap indispensable: “God 
has chosen to employ visible means to preserve awareness of this divinely conceived 
arrangement …”314 Cutting one’s hair into the stylish new bob, or simply leaving it uncovered, 
signified a woman’s subversion of her divinely ordained place in creation. “Christians need to 
constantly beware lest the request to limit [the head covering’s] observance might be tainted with 
the contemporary ‘suffraget’ [sic] mentality which resents God’s plan for man’s headship …”315 
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Not only were these ideas blasphemous, they were dangerous to the survival of the community as 
a group visibly separate from the rest of Canada. 
 
Dress and Morality 
The Mennonite church expected women to bear the brunt of visual symbols of non-
conformity, in part due to her “weaker” nature. A man did not require such strict control because 
he was not as easily led astray.316 And yet, it was necessary for women to wear headcoverings to 
protect men from their own propensity toward lustful glances. While a bonnet does not conceal 
any part of a woman but portions of her hair (which is often associated with a woman’s 
sensuality), it (along with plain dress) signaled to the brethren that they were virtuous sisters — 
which in theory would stop any lustful thoughts before they started.317 It certainly conveyed that 
this woman was a suitable choice as wife. 
While modest dress works to cover a woman’s body and reduce its sexual associations, it 
can never entirely succeed because women constantly carry “the baggage of sexual meanings that 
are entrenched within the culturally established definitions of ‘femininity.’”318 Church leaders 
understood this, and did not entirely deny that women themselves were capable of lust. Rather, 
they agreed that the degeneracy of immodest clothing — and of removing the religious head 
covering in particular — was an invitation to adopt a sinful lifestyle. In his 1900 tract, Worldly 
Conformity in Dress, A. Sims warns that, “Every woman that suffers herself to follow the 
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fashions may rely upon it she is helping Satan to tempt her to pride and sin. She thus creates and 
fosters a flame of lust, leading to the worst crimes. In this way many women have been 
damned.”319 As Sims indicates, any unsanctioned sexual encounter was the fault of the woman 
whose dress was immodest. William McGrath states this unequivocally in Christian Woman’s 
Veiling: “… women’s uncovered hanging hair are [sic] a major stimulus to male sexuality. No 
wonder rape and immorality rise as the veils disappear!”320 Clearly the myth that rape occurs in 
response to women’s supposed immodesty is not a new phenomenon. For Mennonites, the head 
covering protected men from themselves, women from men, the worst of themselves, and the 
devil. It simultaneously protected this small minority community from losing itself within a 
broader cultural framework. 
Linked with increased crime rates, divorce, dancing, “dirty magazines,” and movies, “A 
decline in the modesty of women shows itself first in the apparel … [This] decline … is one of 
the most serious indications of moral — let alone spiritual — degeneracy.”321 These concerns 
were not limited to the Mennonite community. The New York City Federation of Women’s Clubs 
expressed these anxieties in a 1920 open letter: “There was a time when the bad woman could be 
told from the good woman by her dress. For the last few years this distinction has been made 
impossible because sweet, pure girls have thoughtlessly adopted the same dress as the woman of 
the streets.”322 J.H. Kellogg echoed this sentiment when he suggested, “wealthy women could do 
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more to our social evil by adopting plain attire than all the civil authorities by passing license 
laws or regulating ordinances.”323 
 
Pacifism in World War I 
Dress was not, however, Mennonites’ only means of overt non-conformity. Pacifism was 
(and remains) one of the most important and distinct ways for Mennonites to separate themselves 
from the surrounding society. Canadian Mennonites were caught off guard when World War I 
was declared in August 1914. Their national organization was weak, their young men were 
poorly educated on their community’s pacifist stance, and although the Canadian government 
granted them military exemption, conscription made their legal position tenuous throughout the 
war.324 In both organization and structure the Mennonites were not prepared to handle “the 
onslaught of federal legislation, administrative regulations and adverse public opinion which was 
about to burst upon them.”325 In Ontario, church leaders Noah Bearinger and Samuel Frederick 
(S.F.) Coffman were ill prepared to leverage their meetings with government to their best 
advantage.326 Many Canadians resented Mennonite men staying home while their family 
members went to fight overseas. A general suspicion of the Mennonite German heritage and 
language exacerbated the situation. As J.F.C. Wright explains, “Compulsory military service 
channeled a mounting resentment toward Mennonite sectarians who, before the turn of the 
century, had been exempted from military service by a government anxious to settle Canada’s 
prairie west with hard-working agriculturalists whether of pacifist persuasion or not.327 
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Mennonites were acutely aware of societal suspicion of them. In 1917, the Ontario 
Mennonite Conference, along with the Brethren in Christ and Old Order Mennonites, created the 
Non-Resistance Relief Organization (NRRO), which raised $80 000 to help alleviate war 
suffering. In addition, church sewing circles made quilts and bandages for the Red Cross.328 They 
intended to demonstrate Mennonite loyalty to Canada while not directly supporting the war, and 
simultaneously acting on a theologically based commitment to alleviate suffering. 
Many young Mennonite men were in a difficult position. They held to their community’s 
non-militarist ideals, but shared their compatriots’ desire to act on behalf of their country and its 
cause. At the end of the war, Jacob Meyer, a young man from Kitchener, Ontario, wrote his 
feelings on the matter to a close friend in an alternate service camp in North Carolina: 
I can readily see that you men who have been in camp realize very keenly 
the position of the Mennonite Church and are anxious that the church should 
do its full duty. And even if it doesn’t you fellows propose to discharge what 
you consider to be your own particular obligations. … To discharge in a 
measure its obligations our church (throughout Ontario) is raising what is 
called a War Memorial Fund which is to be presented to the government. 
Then the government will have tangible evidence of our appreciation and 
continued loyalty. Now this is all very nice and yet I feel that as far as I 
myself am concerned the giving of a certain sum of money is not enough. 
And yet what am I to do? Unlike you there was no attempt made to coerce 
me. So if I would go on reconstruction work now it would look as if, having 
had an easy time at home during the war, I now go to France when the 
danger is over. In other words it would look as if I were hunting for nothing 
but the easy things in life. With you it is different as you applied and were 
anxious to go long ago. But altho [sic] I [thought] of it I didn’t apply. Taking 
into consideration also the fact that the Canadian church is not contributing 
to the reconstruction cause I can scarcely apply now. I often wish that I had 
gone a year ago last June when I wanted to and yet I would have 
disregarded the wishes of the folks if I had done so. And so here I am.329 
 
However, not all Mennonite men stood with their community’s pacifism. For example, 
the city of Kitchener took great pride in the battlefield death of their founder’s great-great-
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grandson Alexander Ralph Eby on March 20, 1915 — a direct descendant of Bishop Benjamin 
Eby.330 Herman Fast, a Saskatchewan missionary and teacher, came to Canada in 1901 to remove 
his sons from Eastern Europe’s increasing militarism. But when World War I broke out his sons 
voluntarily enlisted. Nicholas Fast died at the battle of Vimy Ridge, and Ernest Fast contracted 
fatal tuberculosis in the trenches. While the majority of Mennonites remained pacifist, there was 
no church discipline against those who joined the war effort. At the Toronto Mennonite Brethren 
in Christ Church two young men and a minister enlisted but continued to attend and participate 
in Sunday service, even in uniform.331 This, of course, is in sharp contrast to young women who 
wore hats instead of Conference-approved bonnets, and as a result were denied communion 
while their membership was called into question. 
Confusion over who was a Mennonite exacerbated tensions with the public. In 1918, the 
Ottawa Citizen reported, “Fred Ivay struck a popular chord when he cried: ‘Who are the 
Mennonites exempted under the original arrangement? … We have nothing but the word of the 
several Mennonites, and there are exactly 16 branches. So who will undertake to solve the puzzle 
the problem presents?’”332 
The Military Service Act exemption clause required a religious claim under a 
denomination that, as of July 6, 1917, included opposition to war as an essential tenet. Some 
tribunals applied this date not to the denomination as a whole (as the law intended), but to the 
individual in question and his membership status. As previously discussed, only those who were 
baptized and made a confession of faith were actually members of a Mennonite church. No 
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religious leader would have wished to expand that definition. However, there was a problem. As 
an Anabaptist church, Mennonite men did not typically get baptized until they were around 21. 
As a result many men were eligible for conscription before they were bona-fide members of a 
church.333 S.F. Coffman made an appeal to common sense, telling government officials, “No one 
ever intimated to me, nor tried to make me believe, that a young man whose father was a 
Mennonite all his life and belonged to the Mennonite church was not also considered a 
Mennonite.”334 Several Manitoba bishops released a statement challenging the public confusion: 
“Every one knew at the time of the last Dominion elections who were Mennonites and who were 
not. Neither the registrar nor the tribunal nor the public seem to know it now.”335  
The church dealt with this challenge in two subtle ways: some congregations lowered 
their baptismal ages, while others quietly certified their young men whether they were baptized 
or not. This second practice became public and caused an outcry from other Canadians claiming 
bishops were, “turning many good-for-nothings into Mennonites.”336 Mennonite leaders 
attempted to calm the hostilities, explaining that they were in no way attempting to harbour 
traitors, and that they were fiercely loyal to Canada, but that rather their position was based on 
religion and not cowardice or sympathy for Germans. Rev. J.N. Kitching of the Toronto 
Mennonite Brethren in Christ stated that, “In the event of conscription, Mennonites might 
consent to dig trenches or drive teams but they would not kill. We would sooner die — sooner 
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give our life blood — than take the life of a fellow man.”337 Neither were Mennonites interested 
in having others die on their behalf. The Manitoba bishops declared,  
We do not depend for our living on the sustenance or efforts of others 
excepting as we give and take. We do not require any one to shed his blood 
for us. We would rather die ourselves or languish in prison or leave our 
home and again settle in some wilderness, the same as our forefathers have 
done, than to require a sacrifice of any kind by any one on our behalf.338  
 
  The Manitoba government, who felt that unbaptized young men did not qualify for 
exemption, called the bishops to Winnipeg to address the matter. To prove that unbaptized 
teenagers were not really committed pacifists, the authorities had Abraham Dyck of Lowe Farm 
taken into the barracks to demonstrate that he could be turned into a soldier. They demanded the 
bishops draw up a declaration — to be delivered in the presence of a lawyer — explaining the 
rules and regulations around the relationship of the church and its young people. Bishops 
Abraham Doerksen (Sommerfelder church) and Jacob Hoeppner (Bergthaler church) made a 
strong theological argument for nonresistance, referenced earlier agreements with the 
government, and explained the ecclesiastical organization of their community. They explained 
that children’s names entered the church registry the day of their birth; that they received pacifist 
education from their parents, their teachers, and their church; that baptism came after a young 
adult requested it around age 21, had made a public confession of faith, and after an intense 
period of instruction; and that in their theology God could also save unbaptized individuals.339 
The bishops concluded, 
Our Gemeinschaft has always considered its children and young people its 
own as much as the baptized members and petitions for exemptions from 
military service have always intended to include young people of military 
age whether they were baptized or not. Any assurances which provided for 
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less than that would never have persuaded us to accept the invitation of the 
Canadian government to settle in this country.340 
 
The government accepted the statement and immediately released Abraham Dyck. After that all 
Mennonites in Western Canada were exempt with simple proof of identity.341 However, as late as 
September 25, 1918 district registrars in Ontario continued to insist Eastern Mennonites were not 
included in the exception, “and will be exempt only from combatant service.”342 Moreover, on 
October 15, less than four weeks before the end of the war, the Governor-General-in-Council 
ruled that immigrant Mennonites and their descendants were not covered by the original 1873 
Order-in-Council, and therefore, “shall not be deemed to be exempted from military service 
…”343  
 This question of “who qualifies” in matters of identity and immigration appears 
repeatedly in the experiences of minority groups in Canada, including the sense that some people 
are “natural Canadians” while others are suspicious, inauthentic, or unassimilable. By World War 
I Swiss Mennonites had lived in Ontario for almost a century, so while other Canadians viewed 
them as “peculiar,” they considered them Canadian enough to be eligible for conscription. If 
some branches of Canadian government accepted the Mennonites’ legal defense of being exempt 
under the original 1873 agreement, then the Governor-General-in-Council was going to ensure 
that it did not apply to later arrivals, or their descendants born on Canadian soil.    
 One might think that the end of the war assuaged such tensions, but in fact the aftermath 
brought a hardening of opinion against Mennonite military exemption and immigration. In 1918, 
The Great War Veterans’ Association sent the following letter to Premier Borden: 
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“Sir R.L. Borden, Premier, 
 
The following resolution was passed at a General Meeting of this Association on 
the 17th instant: 
‘This Association strongly protests against the action of the Dominion 
Government in permitting Mennonites and others whose religious belief is against 
Military Service to settle in Canada. At the present time when suitable land for returned 
soldiers is wanted, this Association considers it a gross breach of faith to returned men in 
allowing these valuable selected lands to be sold to this class of settlers. 
It is actions such as this that are exasperating the returned men, and the officials of 
this Association will not be held responsible for the future conduct of returned soldiers if 
such actions as this are continued by the Federal and Provincial Governments.’ 
We earnestly request that your Government will take action accordingly.” - J.W. 
Law, Secretary Treasurer344 
 
This unease between Mennonites and the general Canadian population became manifest 
in an immigration ban on Mennonites from 1919 to 1922. At the end of the war over one 
thousand Mennonites and Hutterites migrated from the United States to Canada, in part due to 
the hostilities they had experienced from Americans (similar to, but more exacerbated than the 
Canadian experience, including imprisonment and some Hutterite deaths). The Ottawa Citizen 
called them “draft-dodgers on a wholesale scale,” and the Calgary Eye-Opener fed into fears of a 
Mennonite immigration tide, warning that two million more Mennonites had bought blocks of 
land and were coming to settle.345 In a Parliamentary debate on amending the Immigration Act, 
Conservative MP John W. Edwards, from the Frontenac riding in eastern Ontario, called 
Mennonites and Hutterites “cattle.” The next day, May 1, 1919, the federal government issued an 
Order-in-Council banning Mennonites, Hutterites, and Doukhobors from entering Canada as they 
were: 
                                                   
344 Mennonite Archives of Ontario, The Great War Veterans’ Association, London Block, Sept. 16, 1918. 
345 Sam Steiner, “It Can Happen in Canada – Immigration by Mennonites Prohibited,” in Ontario Mennonite  
History. Feb 6, 2017. https://ontariomennonitehistory.org/2017/02/06/it-can-happen-in-canada-mennonite-
immigration-prohibited/  
  104 
… undesirable, owing to their peculiar customs, habits, modes of living, and 
methods of holding property, and because of their probable inability to 
become readily assimilated to assume the duties and responsibilities of 
Canadian citizenship within a reasonable time after entry.346 
 
The ban lasted only three years, when the new Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King 
agreed to officially lift the ban on June 22, 1922 after meetings with S.F. Coffman. 
 In the early 1920s there were significant shifts within the larger society as people 
grappled with the turmoil and tragedy left by the Great War. Seeking separation from the 
mainstream did not protect Mennonites from being deeply affected. They struggled with the 
upheaval and distress within their own community the war brought, especially regarding 
questions of identity. Maintaining non-conformity rested heavily on the women and their 
personal appearance. However, this coincided with a general trend of young Mennonite women 
resisting the traditional bonnet as they found it impractical to wear with contemporary hats.347 
While not overtly stated in their letters or diaries, it is also likely that these young women 
preferred the significantly more stylish secular hats. The church leadership appealed to 
traditional values, non-conformity to the world, and unity within the community, but the women 
maintained their position. This came to a head in the battle over women’s bonnets at First 
Mennonite Church in Kitchener in the early 1920s. 
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Bonnet as a Test of Membership — The Kitchener Case 
The battleground for the first debate over the bonnet in Ontario arose in Kitchener. The 
formation of Stirling Avenue Mennonite Church (Kitchener) is a landmark incident in this 
history. The congregation grew out of the schism within First Mennonite Church over the bonnet 
issue.348 Essentially the dispute was what form Mennonite women’s head covering must take, 
and if this applied to life beyond the church building. In June of 1924, the minister at First 
Mennonite — Urias K. Weber — wrote to his friend and colleague J.E. Hartzler (president of 
Bethel College in Kansas) looking for advice about the rising tension between First Mennonite 
and the Conference: 
For a number of years there has always been more or less friction between 
the Kitchener congregation and the “Ministers Meeting” of Waterloo Co., 
and at our last meeting (Thursday) a resolution was passed to the effect that 
all the women who will not wear the bonnet everywhere, are outside the 
church … Now you are well aware of our situation here as a city church, 
that we cannot put our girls under such a ruling for the reason that most of 
them are working in factories, etc. … My own personal attitude is this, that I 
cannot come under such a ruling and make the bonnet the sole test of church 
fellowship, no matter what the life of the girls may be otherwise. … I know 
from personal observation that most of these are good Christian girls and are 
striving to live the life the Master would have them live … The 
congregation is I think about sixty-five per cent with them, and if nothing 
can be done, will have to go elsewhere to find a church home …349 
 
As Weber referenced in his letter, Mennonite women flocked to Canada’s cities during 
World War I. Many took jobs in factories left vacant by men at war. Others found work as 
domestics, seamstresses, or similar occupations. Factory working women found the traditional 
Mennonite bonnet impractical and largely switched to hats. In a 1922 special session with the 
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Conference Investigating Committee looking into the “bonnet issue,” Suzie Shantz argued that 
“sisters working in factories were given [the] privilege of wearing hats.”350 In these Investigating 
Committee notes there is a general comment that, “permission granted to wear hats to work.”351 
There is a later note that, “concessions were abused. People who did not work wore hats.”352 
Many others, however, felt that the “constant city environment [was an] excuse for wearing 
hats.”353 When Mary Snider spoke before the committee she argued that, “some sisters were 
given permission twenty years ago. [The] same conditions existed thirty years ago and were not 
commented upon.”354 She believed that the, “Bishops may have to compromise in order to 
improve conditions,”355 and ends her testimony by stating that there “[is] too great [a] distinction 
between men and women.”356 In his June 28 testimony, “Bro. Bowman stated that [minister at 
First] U.K. Weber claimed that the regulation coat for men is as important as bonnets for 
women.”357 Mrs. MB Shantz agreed with Mary Snider, explaining that she was, “received into 
church 18 years ago,” and that Ben Shoemaker and A.D. Wenger gave her and Sophia Weber 
permission with the “understanding to wear hats to work and bonnets to church.”358 
The resolution from the Ministers’ Meeting Weber mentioned in his letter came shortly 
before the traditional spring communion service. Within the Mennonite church communion is 
somewhat similar to other Christian denominations, but it has different significance and plays a 
different role within the community. It is limited to baptized adults and is a ritual embodiment of 
the community itself. Most Protestants believe that communion is symbolic and done in 
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remembrance of Christ at the Last Supper. Most Catholics believe that Christ is present in the 
Eucharist bread and wine. Mennonites fall somewhere in between, believing that Christ is 
physically present, but in the assembled body of believers. In the early 20th century churches held 
communion twice a year and it was a significant ceremony of commitment and unity, including 
group consensus. The church usually set aside a day preceding communion to ensure that all 
members of the congregation were in harmony with one another and with God. At the end of 
such a service the church took a vote to decide if the congregation was ready to proceed with 
communion. If the answer was no, or if there seemed to be lingering animosity, the communion 
service was delayed until matters were resolved.359 In the spring of 1921, the church leaders 
decided the situation was too contentious to proceed. When it became time for the autumn 
communion, U.K. Weber again consulted with the congregation about their readiness for the 
sacrament. When Bishop Hallman arrived to perform the communion, Weber informed him that, 
“at least 80% of our people … voted to stand together on this thing [women not wearing 
bonnets].” He went on to say that, “making a certain cut of headgear the test of discipleship was 
also not bored [sic] out by the teachings of Jesus.”360 Hallman proceeded with the service, but 
less than a third of the congregation participated. In a tradition that emphasizes community 
harmony and unity this incident was both significant and painful. The Investigating Committee 
noted that, “Bro. Weber explained his part in not having communion in spring of 1921 and 
having it in fall. … Bro Weber did not feel to ask bishops to come because he did not think 
circumstances favourable.”361 Bishop Hallman continued from there, explaining, “… that he did 
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not feel free to go to Kitchener with communion under conditions existing there in regard to 
efforts made to bring about uniformity in the matter of dress.”362 A year later matters were no 
more resolved. In her April 16, 1922 diary entry Susannah Betzner Cressman (the same woman 
who commented on women’s suffrage) wrote, “Easter Sunday. Church trouble not settled yet. 
Only 75 out of 300 took communion.”363 In her testimony to the Committee Suzie Shantz 
lamented, “We do not feel towards each other as we used to. Nearly all seems [sic] anxious to 
have communion restored.”364 Reflecting on the main concerns surrounding the debate, the 
Investigating Committee asserted,  
The hat question should be solved. Kitchener formerly had communion 
under same conditions of attire. The Conference is Authority if based on the 
Bible. Bro. U.K. Weber has largely been cause of difficulty. At present large 
percentage of members are against Conference. Many are not willing to 
compromise with worldliness. Congregations should stand by decisions of 
Conference.365 
 
There is a secondary nod to the majority of the congregation: “Some do not consider the bonnet a 
matter of Gospel principle.”366 Oscar Burkholder challenged this in his statement: “Some claim 
Bonnet is unscriptural. Imposed by man. United ministry is needed to correct abuses in attire.”367 
The Conference agreed with Burkholder. People may not agree but it is up to the ministers, like 
U.K. Weber, to firmly correct this creeping worldliness and immorality. 
The Committee noted that there was, “a lot of feeling among parishioners that the whole 
situation [was] unfair. U.K. Weber [was] blamed unfairly … People [were] not properly 
consulted, approached, etc. … [And there were] inconsistencies in [the] Conference’s handling 
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of different congregations.”368 As some of the women’s earlier testimonies indicate, the issue did 
not appear suddenly in the early 1920s. In her diary entry for August 1, 1915, Susannah 
Cressman records, “Went to Church. Jacob Schmidt preached sermon on bonnet question, took 
vote on same.”369 Her next reference to the issue was three years later, on March 26, 1918: 
“Meeting at Betzner’s on bonnet question.”370 A month later she observes, “Meeting at our 
church to consider bonnet question and some other minor troubles.”371 Four years later she notes, 
“Meeting at Waterloo of ministers and bishops re U.K. Weber re his stand on bonnet 
question.”372 
The Conference refused to retract their resolution, and in the words of the Investigating 
Committee, “Bro. U.K. Weber declines to submit to Annual Conference. There is a feeling that 
something must be done. Bro. U.K. Weber should adhere to Con. resolutions and disregard 
opposing influences.”373 Strong and articulate female leadership was crucial to those who 
opposed the bonnet resolution. When these congregants chose twenty-two people to represent 
their beliefs to the Investigating Committee, half were women.374 This group presented a petition 
to Conference with 139 names, protesting the lack of dissenting voices on the committee itself, 
and the overall nature of the group. In 1924, the Conference added a deadline to its resolution: 
female members were to conform to the bonnet resolution before the next communion in 
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September. When nothing changed, the Conference moved against the congregation’s minister, 
U.K. Weber. He, along with ministers David Wismer and Jacob S. Woolner (for supporting 
Weber) were “put to silence” on Sunday, August 3 (Mennonite church discipline to ban a minister 
from preaching).375 On that day Susannah Cressman wrote one of her longest diary entries: “This 
is one of the most memorable Sundays in the history of first Mennonite church at Kitchener, 
there being three ordained ministers excommunicated, among them U.K. Weber our resident 
minister and David Wismer and Jacob Woolner. … God grant that these things may work 
together for the good of the church!”376 
Within a stack of oral histories of the founding members of Stirling stored in the 
Mennonite Archives of Ontario is a loose slip of paper with the following anonymous memories 
from that day: 
The story has come from a couple of older women who were there at the 
time concerning the day that UK Weber was defrocked. I was told that UK 
Weber had invited a special speaker that day — a visitor in the area. Weber 
had no idea that anyone was coming from the conference. He introduced the 
special speaker and they heard him preach. After the visitor had finished 
speaking bishops Snider and Mannaseh Hallman got up and, as it was 
expressed to me, “did their dirty work.” They announced that UK Weber 
was being put to silence by the conference until further consideration had 
been given to the problems about the women’s dress code. Later, as a guest 
Allen Shantz the visiting minister said that he had never heard anything like 
it before. 
But when the two bishops finished with their announcement Mrs MC 
Cressman got up and told them off. I was told that MC Cressman got lower 
and lower in his seat in the pew and the two bishops looked as though they 
felt like two cents. It appears that women could on occasion express 
themselves back in 1924 too.377 
 
Mrs. Cressman had apparently expressed her opinion on the topic previous to this historic 
day. Her husband, Menno Cressman, held a personal grudge against Weber and actively sought 
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his dismissal. Weber’s son Howard remembered, “… Mrs. MC Cressman used to call up my Dad 
and cry about the things Menno was doing. … You see Menno wanted to be a preacher and Dad 
wasn’t that anxious to be a preacher but they were after him — on the very day that Dad become 
[sic] minister Menno worked against him.”378 As was customary for Mennonites, the 
congregation drew lots to choose its minister. According to several of his contemporaries, Menno 
hoped to be minister and was sorely disappointed when he was not selected. In the end, his 
daughter Grace chose to follow Weber to the new church on Stirling Avenue. 
Apparently, Bishop Jonas Snider did not particularly enjoy his task either. He later 
advised Weber, “I am an old man and cannot go it alone so will stay with the church … Stay with 
your group. Stay together and God bless you.”379 Howard Weber agrees that Bishop Snider’s role 
did not sit well with him: 
It was Jonas Snyder’s [sic.][and Oscar Burkholder’s] task to oust Dad … 
and it didn’t take Jonas that long to call him up and ask him to come up 
there. Jonas and his wife were both crying when Dad got there. “Not again 
for anything would I do that for the conference. It was wrong,” he said. You 
could see it was wrong because the church just fell apart. It took Burkholder 
much longer. It took him till he was on his death bed. … He asked Dad to 
come over and he asked forgiveness. So you see the little burdens they 
carried. I don’t see how the church [Stirling] could prosper in those years 
because my dad was unhappy with the situation. But I guess it did prosper. 
… Even on his death bed he still had a little bit of aggravation towards those 
people.380 
 
Although Bishop Snider had advised Weber to “stay with your group,” Howard Weber 
recalled, “My father was sick and tired of it and had to be coaxed into starting the new 
church.”381 One hundred fifteen members left First Mennonite to form Stirling Avenue 
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Mennonite Church in August 1924 (one block away from First Mennonite). Until the building 
was ready, the soon-to-be Stirling congregation still used First’s building, but in the afternoon.382 
When asked why they did not choose to join another denomination or start an independent 
church, Howard Weber declared, “If we had left the Mennonite Church we would have lost our 
identity as a non-resistant people.”383 Approximately half of Kitchener’s oldest Mennonite 
church — in one of the few geographic strongholds for a small Christian minority denomination 
in Canada — left in order to form a new church where headcoverings would not be a test of 
membership or considered a symbol for a woman’s dedication to God. And yet it was still 
essential to these people that they retain their identity as non-conformist pacifists. 
The closeness of the Mennonite community extends beyond the immediate congregation, 
and its neighbours closely watched the split between Stirling and First. Florence Shantz Becker 
reflected on this: 
I remember that there was a lot of people from the city that were interested 
— from other churches — that they were interested in us and the church 
was packed [at] the dedication … It was surprising how many people — 
some would say well we’ll buy them collection plates, another one came 
and they were going to buy the Bible for the church and we had a light over 
so they could read and they bought that and there were a number of small 
gifts by people that really were interested and felt for us.384 
 
This interest was not always positive. Opinions varied within families and between friends, 
causing further friction. Founding Stirling member Beulah Moss remembered, “Stirling’s 
dedication service was a happy occasion and still kind of sad. We lost a lot of friends at First 
Mennonite. They weren’t hardly speaking to us.”385 When Stella Schweitzer Brubacher returned 
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to Kitchener from working in St. Catherine’s, “[I] heard a lot about the differences of opinion. A 
lot of people were actually sick over that.”386 Stella’s parents had made the move to Stirling. 
While some young adults, like Grace Cressman, left their parents at First to attend Stirling, many 
sought their parents’ counsel. Alice Bachert had recently joined the church and, “could not 
understand why the split should take place. [My] father encouraged [me] to study. He told [me] 
not to worry about things at the church. When [I] went to Toronto [I] worked in the home of a 
wealthy family and went to Toronto Bible College. The family treated [me] with respect. After 
going to Toronto [I] no longer wore a covering. [I] went to various churches in Toronto.”387 
Helen Shantz was engaged to a man who was attending Stirling. Uncertain what to do, Helen 
spoke with her father.  
I was a member at Wanner’s [Mennonite Church in Cambridge]. And I 
talked this over with father before I married, I said they are having trouble 
over there and he said “You go with your husband of course.” I asked father 
what he would do if he came up there and he said, “We will go right past 
East End Church [First] and come up to Stirling.” Which is what he did. We 
were married in 1923.388 
 
Once they were married, Helen recalled how she and her husband chose to push the differences 
between First (which she refers to as “East End” — another colloquial name for it) and Stirling. 
At East End Church the women sat on the left and the men on the right. I 
remember one of the first times we went to [Stirling] and before we left for 
church my husband said, “Now I want you to sit with me tonight.” I 
wondered what was going on because this was not usual. I expected to hear 
about that, which I did. Then I said to the people who needled me about it, 
“My husband asked me to sit with him.” … [The change] was gradual. As 
each man said [to his wife], “Why don’t you sit with me,” …389 
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In both of these examples, Helen demonstrates how women could use the presumption that they 
would submit to their husbands to their advantage. Although as this chapter’s opening anecdote 
indicates, Helen was perfectly capable of thinking for herself and did not wait for marriage or 
Stirling to push expectations. 
People often engage in symbolic behaviour, particularly with regard to dress, without 
consciously understanding why. Given the intimate associations between dress and identity, the 
bonnet acquired multiple layers of symbolic meanings in the 1910s and ‘20s. Understanding this 
reality, we can see how covering the Mennonite woman’s head turned her into a walking 
representation of the community’s non-conformity. Thus, we must appreciate the bonnet in the 
complex social atmosphere of World War I and the immediate post-war era. When the women of 
First Mennonite Church persisted in wearing hats instead of the Conference mandated bonnets it 
was more than a case of personal attachment. As they well knew it was a denial of Conference’s 
final authority. By keeping their hats — despite having their heads covered — they used their 
own group consensus, supported by many in their community, in a setting where they should 
have been meek and submissive. Conference was fully aware of this and reacted decisively, 
resulting in the division of a congregation. Their insistence on unity through dress, while 
simultaneously blatantly employing a double standard of enforcement between men and women, 
provoked schism and animosity. This irony did not seem to occur to the church leadership, 
however. 
Most material messaging is subtle and subconscious, and as such it can be difficult to 
quantify. Yet, non-conformity and separation from the world were central tenets of Mennonite 
theology, and their religious dress consciously identified them as “other.” While many minorities 
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seek to prove the ways they fit into Canadian mainstream society, Mennonites sought to prove 
that they were different, in part through resisting militarism, and in part through distinctive dress.  
Unlike the later case studies of Baltej Singh Dhillon and Zunera Ishaq, the public was 
completely unconcerned with Mennonite women’s bonnets. Their dress did not directly provoke 
public debate. After extensively studying archival sources, previous historical work, and 
consulting with Mennonite historians, I could not find any references from non-Mennonites to 
the bonnet whatsoever. The rest of society was focused on a war and its after-effects. While they 
resented Mennonites for not fighting, and were suspicious of them for their German ethnicity, 
their hostility was not directed at Mennonite headcoverings the way public aversion later focused 
on Dhillon’s turban or Ishaq’s niqab. However, the public’s vocal concern over their identity as 
pacifist Germans was embodied in Mennonite’s distinctive dress. The male leadership used 
women’s bodies as a central site for nonconformity to the world, and their insistence on the 
bonnet had implicit patriarchal control. 
The women wearing hats outside of the loosely permitted work environment illustrate 
how women in a deeply patriarchal community can circumvent the apparently rigid system of 
male authority. Had the women in that era taken a more confrontational approach and removed 
their head coverings entirely it is unlikely that they would have obtained the sympathy and 
support of so many in their community, including their minister and male family members. 
Though they were fully aware of, and were not happy with, the blatantly unfair double standard 
in dress between men and women, these women were by no means helpless or willing to submit 
without having their collective viewpoint considered. While they shared their Mennonite 
community’s deeply held beliefs in yieldedness (called Gelassenheit) and submissiveness, they 
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were confident that that submission was ultimately to God and not their human male church 
leadership, as Helen Shantz articulated. 
This raises interesting considerations about the role of dress for women in religious 
institutional disputes more generally. Where women are confined within a male dominated 
culture, control of their own bodies becomes a means by which they can assert their wishes, 
grievances, and desires.390 This, in part, demonstrates the symbiotic relationships that exist 
between dress, the body, and human rights.391 Dress, in fact, as a predominantly female domain 
becomes an opportunity for female leadership within even overtly patriarchal religious 
institutions, like the Mennonite church.392 Through these means they can find ways of reworking 
the very institutions that restrict them. For example, their dependence on their husbands for 
social approval gave women at Stirling the freedom to sit with men at church. Despite the 
numerous prescriptions and restrictions concerning how women were expected to dress at the 
beginning of the 20th century, it is clear that many women were prepared to challenge the 
expectations of their church leadership. Their dress strategies reflected the gendered nature of 
their worship- and domestic-spaces, but it also represented their adaptation to these spaces based 
on their collective belief-based experiences.393  
These Mennonite women, while working to change their community, were not seeking to 
leave or drastically overhaul it. They were as deeply committed to the Mennonite church and its 
non-conformity as their male antagonists. Though while they were seeking a communal shift in 
understanding, these women affirmed their right within their community to practice their religion 
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as in a manner true to their understanding. The messages of their headcoverings are coded with 
symbolic meanings; the manner in which the bonnet literally embodied Mennonite identity 
demonstrates that one cannot fully study dress without knowing something about religion, and — 
as I argue in this dissertation — vice versa.394 The headcovering manifested the religious and 
social environments, as well as political and gender performance in Ontario in the 1910s and 
‘20s. 
This case provides an important counterpoint to the next two cases which come after the 
adoption of a national human rights narrative. It is an example of how much human rights 
discourse shifted over the course of a century from a British Common Law community approach 
to a liberal democracy declaration of individual rights. As such, markers of membership were 
essential for Mennonites in proving their distinction, and thereby demonstrating that an 
individual deserved the group’s right to military exemption. While for men this centred around 
baptism, women carried the heaviest burden of Mennonite identity boundaries with the bonnet.   
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Fig. 2. Stirling Avenue Mennonite Church, 1910. CA MAO Hist.Mss. 10.28-DH-324, 
Mennonite Archives of Ontario.  
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Fig. 3. Left, Stateser Bonnet. Right, contemporary hat. 1916. CA MAO 1990-1 25, Mabel Groh 
Collection, Mennonite Archives of Ontario. 
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Fig. 4. Gordon Eby with his parents at a family gathering to wish him well after he joined the 
overseas 118th Battalion in 1915. His family are all in plain dress. Left to right: Isabella Eby 
(sister), Catherine (Clemens) Eby, Gordon Christian Eby and Christian Eby. CA MAO 
Hist.Mss.1.66.4.1-008, Mennonite Archives of Ontario.  
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Fig. 5. 1910: Family of Judith Weber Krempien Shirk. L-R: Selina Shirk Shantz, Norman 
Krempien, Lovina Krempien Hinburg, Mary Krempien Snider, Judith Weber Krempien Shirk. 
Judith was first married to Charles Krempien (d. 1892), then to Peter Shirk (1839-1919). The 
grandmother is in plain dress and prayer covering while the rest of the family is wearing 
fashionable contemporary styles. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Baltej Singh Dhillon and Sikh Turbans in the RCMP, 1974-1990 
 
 
In 1990 Baltej Singh Dhillon became the first officer in the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) to wear a Sikh turban as part of his uniform. One day as a cadet he had an 
especially difficult session of training. His mother, Jaswant Kaur Dhillon, told him, “This is no 
longer about you getting a job. You are representing the Sikh community in Canada. That is 
what’s on your shoulders. So step up, get over yourself, and get the job done.”395 Dhillon did not 
set out to represent Canadian Sikhs, however. He applied to the RCMP in 1989 without a great 
deal of consideration beyond wanting an honourable career. Neither he nor his local detachment 
suspected his turban would cause an issue. He was simply focused on finding a way to support 
his young family while serving the community. Dhillon’s strong sense of service and duty came 
from his father, Nachatar Singh Dhillon, a man renowned in their Malaysian homeland for his 
generosity and community engagement. His father taught him “the Sikh way of life” and, before 
his passing when Dhillon was 16, he asked his son to promise never to cut his hair or remove his 
turban.396 Keeping that promise, and not an unwavering belief in the practice, is what kept 
Dhillon committed throughout the national turmoil over a turban amongst the Mounties.397 In 
addition to his devotion to his father, Dhillon was dedicated to serving the community. Applying 
to the RCMP Dhillon did not expect the national furor his request would elicit. Underestimating 
the effectiveness of decades of intentional image promotion of the Mountie as a non-negotiable 
ideal of rugged Anglo-Canadian manhood, Dhillon unintentionally challenged the longstanding 
national popular imagination.  
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The image of the quintessential Mountie was, ironically, not that dissimilar from the 
British imaginings of the Sikh warrior in colonial India. After the British defeated the Sikh army 
in Punjab, they actively recruited their recent opponents, admiring their bravery, military skill, 
and archetypal masculinity. The Sikh warriors — the kes-dhari — acted as colonial agents 
throughout the British Asian empire, earning them the privilege of free movement within the 
British Commonwealth. However British Columbia was uninterested in Britain’s arrangements 
with its Asian subjects and did not want Indian immigrants entering its borders. The two 
countries agreed on a not-so-subtle exclusionary arrangement that directly affected Sikh 
immigrants seeking refuge in Canada aboard the infamous Komagata Maru in 1914 — a ship 
crowded with Punjabi asylum seekers barred for two months from disembarking in Vancouver, 
that the Canadian military then forcefully escorted out of Canadian waters.398 
After Canada revised its restrictive immigration policies in the 1970s, opening its doors 
to a much wider array of international migrants, tensions erupted in India between the Sikh 
community and the predominantly Hindu government over the desire for a Sikh homeland — 
Khalistan.399 Fleeing the violence many Sikhs sought refuge in Canada. This fight touched 
Canadians directly when Sikh extremists blew up Air India flight 182 en route from Toronto to 
London, England on June 23, 1985. All 329 passengers on board — the majority Canadian of 
Indian descent — were killed. Until September 11th, 2001, it was the largest terrorist attack on 
record.400 This became the RCMP’s domain and the investigation and trial of Sikh Canadian 
terrorists played out in the national media and public discourse. When Dhillon applied to the 
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RCMP four years later the Canadian public did not have a favourable association with Sikh 
turbans. 
Nine months after Dhillon applied, RCMP Commissioner Norman Inkster recommended 
to the House of Commons to make allowances for religious symbols.401 It takes an Order-in-
Council to change the RCMP uniform. For the next nine months there was fierce internal RCMP, 
political, and public debate, including 200 000 signatures on a petition to Parliament to enshrine 
the Mountie uniform, and the production and sales of tens of thousands of overtly racist anti-
turban pins, posters, and t-shirts.402 On March 16, 1990, Solicitor-General Pierre Cadieux 
accepted Inkster’s recommendation, and Dhillon entered the RCMP. Deciding that if they were 
making this change it made sense to make others at the same time, on the same day the RCMP 
allowed women to wear the same uniform as male officers (including the revered Stetson at the 
heart of the turban debate), and permitted Indigenous officers to wear their hair long and in 
braids as a symbol of their spirituality.403 
Such an inclusionary move is in line with Dhillon’s personal views around Sikhism and 
religion. He wants religious institutions to welcome people and point them toward an 
understanding of themselves as part of something larger, and to serve those around them 
accordingly.404 This strong sense of justice and service is rooted in the Sikh concept of miri piri; 
a directive to strive for the common good and combat injustice. This includes the Sikh warrior 
never abandoning the field of battle. Jaswant Kaur Dhillon’s words to her son reflect this Sikh 
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way of life. For many Sikhs, these values are embodied in the turban. For Canadians, these 
values are embodied in the Mountie’s red serge tunic and Stetson hat. This battle over competing 
visual depictions of the same alleged values demonstrates that the Stetson was not just 
representative of bravery and service, but also of an unadulterated ethnic and cultural identity, 
and the maintenance of white hegemony. 
With Mennonite headcoverings we saw that the Canadian public paid no attention to the 
bonnet, and subsequently did not receive the message the church was attempting to send to the 
wider society. Dhillon did not expect his turban to be an issue within the RCMP, let alone on the 
national stage. Canadians, however, did take sharp notice this time. The country reacted swiftly 
to the idea of the sacred Mountie in a turban — a visual embodiment of an outsider donning the 
uniform of a revered insider. Seventy years after the Mennonite bonnet debate, Canada had 
consciously reimagined itself as a multicultural nation. Dhillon’s case reveals that popular 
opinion was far from ready to fully embrace this policy, but he was able to successfully 
communicate to the government that his turban visually represented the mostly dearly held 
values of the grand Canadian narrative: good citizenship, an investment in a just society, and 
multicultural inclusivism. The government perceived, considered, digested, and finally approved 
his message. 
Baltej Singh Dhillon never set out to become a Canadian multicultural icon, or even to 
challenge established norms. His only goal was to work in law in some capacity. Reflecting on 
his choice three decades later Dhillon muses, “I [didn’t] put a lot of thought into it, other than 
that it was something that was going to put food on the table and it was something that was 
honourable.”405 Dhillon volunteered with his local RCMP to boost his resumé and work 
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experience, knowing that he planned to work in law in some way. In the process he, “fell in love 
with the work and the people.”406 He found the officers, “honourable and dedicated. Every day 
they came to work not thinking about themselves but how to better their community.”407  
This strong sense of service struck a familiar and deep chord with Dhillon. His father, 
Nachatar Singh Dhillon, was a devout Sikh and, “absolutely service oriented.”408 Growing up in 
Malaysia Dhillon’s family had very little in material terms. His father worked two jobs to 
support the family of six, but this did not dampen Nachatar Singh Dhillon’s generous spirit. “He 
would take in strays. We had someone live with us for a year and a half … just because he got 
kicked out of his home. … And when you’re already struggling to feed six mouths, taking on 
another is huge. …”409 In another incident, a young man tried to attack his father with an 
umbrella. Nachatar grabbed the umbrella and the young man ran away. Later, he handed the 
umbrella to Baltej and told him to open it up and set it outside their front door. Baltej asked why, 
and his father replied that it was going to rain soon and this man would need his umbrella.410 
Dhillon’s memories of his father, who passed away when he was sixteen, revolve around 
him as a man of faith. It was important to Nachatar Singh Dhillon to impart that faith on to his 
son and shared his daily practice with him. Sikhs generally translate the gurus’ teachings into 
three cornerstones of the faith in their daily lives: first, remembering Vahiguru (“Wonderful 
Sovereign,” the oneness of God) through the nam simran discipline (meditating on the Divine 
Name), including through congregational singing and prayer; second, working with honesty and 
integrity, free from fraud or exploitation based on Guru Nanak’s householder ideal; and third, 
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helping those in need and sharing with others.411  When Dhillon came home from school his 
father always asked him if he had done his daily prayers and practice. These were not empty 
rituals for Nachatar. “… He would leave every weekend to serve in the community and we 
wouldn’t see him until Sunday afternoon.”412 Dhillon has many memories of his father serving in 
the gurudwara long after the family went home. “He left a huge impression on me.”413 
There is a direct line between Dhillon’s connection with his father and becoming the first 
Mountie with a turban. He was baptized as a Sikh at 12, and before he died, Nachatar Singh 
Dhillon asked his son to promise to never cut his hair or remove his turban. Baltej promised, and 
despite intense social and familial pressure as a teenager in Canada he kept his promise. “[When 
I arrived in Canada] that would’ve been the time to [cut my hair]. The excuse is there. My family 
made me do it. I didn’t want to do it but my family made me. I was only 16, who would’ve 
blamed me? It would have been normalized. … Many members of my family had already cut 
their hair. My brother had … My father wasn’t around anymore to hold the stick over me …” If 
it was going to be a choice between becoming an RCMP officer and keeping his promise to his 
father, there was no contest: the turban would remain. 
While Dhillon kept his hair and turban because of his promise, Dhillon did inherit a 
personal commitment to the Sikh way of life from his father. “What he left me with is now an 
anchor in my life.”414 Reflecting on how that foundation dovetails with his work as a police 
officer, Baltej explains: 
When I served and I helped and I lent a hand to people, that absolutely lined 
up with what my dad was doing. When it took everyone else half an hour to 
walk home, it would take him an hour and half because he kept stopping 
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along the way to help people. There would be one guy with a tire out so he 
would stop and help him. And a lady who hadn’t eaten anything so he’d buy 
her some food… To be paid to be able to do that? What more can you ask 
for?415 
 
Volunteering with the RCMP Dhillon found this pattern of community service repeating 
itself. When a call involved the Southeast Asian community in the lower mainland of British 
Columbia, the individuals would walk straight to Dhillon — even though he was not an officer 
— and start speaking to him in Punjabi. They were more comfortable interacting with Dhillon 
than the white officers he was with. Dhillon considered it a privilege: “I was able to help them at 
their moment of greatest need.”416 For their part the RCMP officers made great use of Dhillon’s 
language skills and cultural understanding. “The days I was working as a volunteer I would 
literally get passed around from car to car.”417 It was these officers who encouraged Dhillon to 
pursue a career with the RCMP. His supervisor told him he had the personality and skills that 
would make him a strong police officer. It was that encouragement, and the way the officers 
themselves behaved, that ultimately convinced Dhillon to apply. In considering his decision 
Dhillon notes, “We come from Malaysia and not from India, and we see police very differently 
in Malaysia than in India. They are honourable, and it is a career. [It is a way to] serve the people 
around you.”418 
Not only did Dhillon not set out to become a cultural icon as the first turbaned Mountie, 
he did not even consider that it might cause tension. “Did I ever have a hint that it was going to 
be an issue? It was never a question that came up …” Even his RCMP supervisor had 
overlooked it as a potential issue. When it became a contentious national concern his supervisor 
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asked him if he had been wearing the turban the day he applied. Dhillon replied, “Have you ever 
seen me without it?” His supervisor had to acknowledge that Dhillon must have been wearing it, 
but that he had simply stopped “seeing” it and only saw Dhillon as a strong candidate.419 With 
his family the extent of the conversation was whether they had ever seen a Canadian police 
officer in a  turban. Their answer was, “No I don’t think so. But in Malaysia we saw police 
officers every day wearing turbans, so to us it wasn’t a big deal.”420  
The Canadian — and indeed the international — imagination around “our Mounties” was 
somewhat more set. In the 1930s the RCMP commissioned artist Arnold Friberg to create a 
series of promotional materials. His Mounties were idealized archetypes of Victorian masculinity 
who seldom varied in appearance over the thirty years he worked for the RCMP. They always 
appeared in Stetson hats, red serge tunics, riding breeches with a yellow stripe, and riding boots. 
They appeared in rugged, remote, and barren landscapes, often with their dog or horse by their 
side. As historian Bonnie Reilly Schmidt explains, “A Friberg Mountie was Caucasian and 
square-jawed, with a broad forehead, straight nose, and chiseled facial features that were 
constructed at perfect forty-five degree angles to each other.”421 Friberg’s illustrations were more 
than a successful advertising campaign; they solidified the heroic Mountie shaped by books, 
Hollywood, and the RCMP itself, in the popular imagination of North Americans. He became a 
“non-negotiable ideal of Canadian manhood, [and] an exemplar of the Anglo-Canadian race 
…”422 Long before Dhillon applied to join the force, the Mountie was firmly entrenched as the 
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embodiment of white masculinity, taming the boundless frontier as a paragon of protection for 
Canadians. Nelson Eddy’s portrayal of Sergeant Bruce in the 1936 hit film Rose Marie helped 
entrench the rugged duty-bound and captivating Mountie ideal.423 Canada’s tourism industry 
actively participated in and promoted this mythic image of the white-male Mountie as a national 
symbol. In the1950s the RCMP sent their taller officers to Jasper and Banff because tourists 
liked to take their picture. Reilly Schmidt observes, “The RCMP’s desire to accommodate the 
tourism industry by posting [specific] Mounties to tourist destinations is a reflection of the 
RCMP’s interest in promoting its strong, virile, and manly officers as symbols of Canada.”424 If 
these were the bodies deemed appropriate to represent state authority to visitors it left little room 
for a Southeast Asian man in a turban and a beard. 
However, the image of the turbaned kes-dhari had a long history within the British 
empire. The centennial RCMP officer’s presentation was rooted in an imperial fervour dating to 
the nineteenth century, “when the scarlet-clad Mountie on horseback represented deference, 
loyalty, and adventure within Queen Victoria’s empire.”425 During Queen Victoria’s diamond 
jubilee a group of Northwest Mounted Police officers left a strong impression on the London 
crowds with their handsome horses, Stetson hats, red serge tunics, white gauntlets, and riding 
boots.426 Reilly Schmidt observes, “The Mounties embodied the romance of the Queen’s empire 
…”427 Meanwhile, as historian Tony Ballantyne explains, on the other side of the empire “the 
Sikh soldier became one of the most potent imperial symbols.”428 Due to their prominence in the 
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administration of the British empire, the turbaned kes-dhari Sikh was a dominant “signifier of 
imperial power throughout Asia.”429 While the British intentionally distanced themselves from 
the distinctive dress of their colonial subjects, they were drawn to the image of the Sikh warrior. 
In order to reign in this popular fascination, the East India Company officially banned any of its 
employees from wearing Indian dress in public functions in 1830.430 But the allure did not 
disappear and the British military itself was not immune.  
It was in designing the dress uniforms for the officers and men that the 
British exercised their fantasy of what an “oriental” warrior should [look] 
like. … By the end of the nineteenth century, the dress uniform of the 
British officers of the calvary had become fully “orientalized;” it included a 
knee-length tunic in bright color, breeches and high boots, and a fully 
wrapped colorful turban.431 
 
In an imperial full circle, this uniform is strikingly similar to the one Baltej Singh Dhillon 
would wear as a turbaned RCMP officer a century later. A Malaysian-born Sikh immigrant was 
fighting for the right to wear essentially the same uniform the British calvary officers had worn 
in his people’s homeland, against detractors arguing such a uniform would be “unCanadian,” 
rallying instead around a uniform almost entirely British in origin, except for the American 
Stetson at the heart of the debate. 
Jennifer Craik’s work, Uniforms Exposed: From Conformity to Transgression, which 
looks at the relationship between the overt and covert lives of uniforms, offers helpful insights 
into their function in dressed bodily practice.432 Craik argues that “uniforms are all about control 
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not only of the social self but also of the inner self and its formation,” shaping who a person is, 
how they perform their identities, and shape our way of seeing in the process.433 They are full of 
subliminal messages and ambivalent connotations, signifying conformity, discipline, order, and 
moral rectitude.434 These meanings include “rules of wearing and not wearing that are often 
unstated or only partially stated,” and sometimes arbitrarily applied.435 She argues that wearing a 
uniform “properly” carries more social importance than the uniform itself, and that enforcing 
“correct” uniform practice “is central to the social life of the uniform.”436 This involves both 
rewards (such as social status and authority), and punishment for transgression (loss of status, 
public censure, etc.) While Dhillon has certainly experienced the former as a decorated RCMP 
officer, he experienced the latter immediately by challenging the “proper” standards. Uniforms 
convey distinct structural relationships that form the frameworks for encounters with uniformed 
individuals. Craik explains that it is “essential” that both the viewer and the wearer “share a 
common code” so that the uniform “can ‘work’ as a social marker.”437 Dhillon’s transgression 
demonstrates what happens when someone seeks to modify this common code. “The uniform, 
then, is a radical form of clothing that is employed to announce a particular type of identity that 
acts both as shorthand of the kind of behaciour exhibited by the wearer and expected by the 
observer.”438 This individual and group authority then transforms into the power of 
government.439 
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Unlike most Canadians, Dhillon himself was aware that his uniform had roots in India, 
and was fully cognizant of the irony surrounding some Canadians’ staunch defence of it as it 
was.  
That perspective that others had around protecting this symbol, this Canadiana, I didn’t 
connect with that. I was having trouble because I went into the library to research the 
RCMP because I wanted to be informed. How it all came about, changes in the headgear, 
from the pill cap to the pith helmet to the Stetson to the forge cap. And I’m thinking, 
“Well, okay! We’ve had a few changes already.” And the red serge itself comes from the 
UK. … And the coca cola pants, the breeches … come from India. From the mounted 
regiments from India. … And then we adopted them from there. So the folks that were 
out there saying, “Hey, this is Canada” didn’t realize part of Canada came from India 
already.440 
 
Dhillon was correct that the uniform underwent several changes, including the almost sacred 
Stetson. For much of its early history the Mounted police used a variety of hats. In 1894, seeking 
to create some uniformity amongst his command at Fort McLeod, Superintendent S.B. Steele 
ordered four dozen “cowboy hats” from the United States. These were likely the “Boss of the 
Plains” pattern of Stetson, developed by John Batterson Stetson during his travels through the 
West in the 1860s and produced in the 1870s. The model had a stiff brim 3 to 4 inches wide, a 4 
to 4.5 inch crown, shaped into a “Montana peak” — shaped to a peak and creased on four sides. 
By 1902 it was still not regulation, so on March 12 Commissioner Perry pressured the 
comptroller to see to its formal adoption. As with Dhillon’s turban, such a move required an 
Order-in-Council, which formalized the regulation pattern Stetson on June 22, 1904.441 
Like the Mounties in the northwest of Canada, Sikh officers acted as colonial agents for 
the British empire in Asia. This history is directly linked to Dhillon’s own; when Perak (a state in 
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the northwest of peninsular Malaysia) became part of Britain’s colonial holdings, the first Sikhs 
arrived to serve as policemen in the newly formed Armed Perak Police in 1881.442 After that, 
Punjabis regularly migrated throughout Malaya (later Malaysia) and other Asian colonies.443 
Ballantyne describes how, “Encounters with Sikh policemen, soldiers, and doormen became a 
typical set piece in imperial travel accounts of Singapore, Penang, Hong Kong, and Shanghai, 
while the turbaned kes-dhari ‘Sikh policeman’ became a popular staple in imperial ephemera, 
especially on postcards and … cigarette cards.”444 
The Sikhs played a disproportionate role in affecting the image of the British Indian 
empire. While they only made up 1% of the Indian population, and were almost entirely 
geographically limited to the Punjab, Sikhs made up 20% of the British military in India. 
Anthropologist and scholar of British colonialism in India Bernard S. Cohn explains this 
situation: 
Unlike many of their conquered subjects, who struck the British as superstitious and 
effeminate, the Sikhs were considered manly and brave. … Captain R.W. Falcon, author 
of a handbook for British officers in the Indian army, described the Sikh as ‘manly in his 
warlike creed, in his love of sports … a buffalo, not quick in understanding, but brave, 
strong and true.’ In short the Sikhs … were to become perfect recruits for the Indian 
army.445 
 
The East India Company’s army actively recruited Sikhs within months of their defeat. 
The officers who had so recently fought the Sikhs now insisted on their recruits being from 
among the Khesadhari - the Khalsa Sikhs.446 “Only those Sikhs who looked like Sikhs—wearing 
those badges of wildness, the beard and unshorn hair— were to be enrolled. It was also official 
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policy to provide every means for the Sikhs to preserve intact the distinctive characteristics of 
their race and peculiar conventions and social customs.”447 Swarn Singh Kahlon, author of Sikhs 
in Latin America, agrees. “The British decided not to decimate the Sikh army, but instead to 
utilize them. In order to build loyalty to the Empire they insisted on loyalty to Sikhism. The army 
mandated no cutting hair. When a soldier came back from the village they checked to see, and if 
he had cut any hair he would be sent to detention.”448 
The RCMP — a century and a world away — shared many of the paramilitary methods 
and trappings of its British empire counterparts in India. The RCMP’s commanding officers 
viewed,   
… recruits and their bodies as resources to be managed and disciplined. The hierarchical 
structure of the RCMP demanded conformity, right down to the undergarments worn by 
recruits. Individualism was dissolved in an effort to train recruits to unquestioningly obey 
the power and authority of senior officers not only at the academy, but also once they 
were in the field.449 
 
In a former colony predominantly populated with Western Europeans and their descendants, the 
Canadian RCMP handled ethnic diversity in their ranks differently than the British in India. “The 
RCMP identified itself as a force of white, adult males with imposing physical characteristics, a 
branding that transcended simple understandings of a masculine ideal. A robust physique was 
equated with high levels of manly aggression and suggested to the general public that Mounties 
were more than capable of responding to physical violence with force if necessary.”450 
Supporting this was a general “unquestioned belief in white, male privilege and power as 
normative in Canadian law enforcement.”451 Reilly Schmidt expands on this: 
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Throughout much of its history, the RCMP has been white, Anglo, 
Protestant, and male, illustrating how socially constructed identities 
intersected to uphold the power enjoyed by this hegemonic group within 
society. The whiteness of RCMP officers was an indication that race and 
ethnicity mattered to the RCMP, a state institution in which differences 
were seldom accommodated but rather deployed to reinforce unequal 
power.452  
 
What then would a brown-skinned, turban wearing officer convey to the general public? While it 
was never overtly discussed on the record, I argue that opposition to the turban in the RCMP was 
at least in part rooted in a belief that a brown man in a turban was a threat to the almost-
instinctual belief in the strong white man as the embodiment of a reassuring presence. In his 
images, Friberg’s Mounties comforted and encouraged the Canadian population — namely white 
women and the occasional layman. In the early narratives of the Mounties, brown men only 
appeared as Native men being tamed or restrained. In 1975 the first uniformed Indigenous 
special constable troop graduated from the training academy and began serving on reserves, 
marking the beginning of a slow shift in the racialized hiring practices of the RCMP.453 When 
Dhillon applied to the force in the late 1980s, its diverse hiring policies were still in their 
infancy. In addition, Canadians did not share the British experience of seeing Sikhs as warriors 
and or as a potential pool of effective law enforcement.  
Being embedded in the colonial military recruitment networks gave Sikh soldiers 
mobility within the Commonwealth. This important connection between colonialism and 
mobility explains how the imperial framework of the Sikhs’ past resulted in disproportionate 
numbers of Sikh Punjabis in early migration from India to Canada’s west coast.454 Sikhs enjoyed 
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a privileged position within the British empire and, at the very least expected equal treatment in 
Canada as members of the Commonwealth. These British subjects posed a particular problem for 
the Canadian government. As scholars Doris Jakobsh and Margaret Walton Roberts explain:  
The stability of British colonial rule in India depended upon a certain level of 
acquiescence on the part of Indians in exchange for a sense of Imperial benefit. 
Delimiting the value of this colonial membership by constraining the Indian subject’s 
mobility was dangerous during this early period of the 1900s; British ability to maintain 
colonial control in India rested heavily on Sikh regiments recruited in Punjab.455  
 
British Columbia however, “had little interest in prioritizing the Home Office’s geopolitical 
concerns over their own desire to prevent increased numbers of migrants from Asia entering 
Canada.”456 
Sensitive to the British demand that Canada not explicitly discriminate against Indians 
(thereby not inflaming nationalist interests in India), the federal government developed the 1908 
Order-in-Council, which banned any immigrants who did not arrive in Canada by way of a 
continuous journey. “The only scheduled continuous journey from India to Canada was via 
Canada Pacific Railway company steamship lines, and on March 26, 1908 (two months after the 
Order-in-Council was passed), the CPR – under instruction from the Government – issued a 
directive to its India offices disallowing further sales of through-tickets from India to Canada.”457 
While there is not space here to address it adequately, it is worth noting that this legislation led to 
the infamous case of the Komagata Maru where approximately 400 immigrants (all Punjabi and 
predominantly Sikh) attempted to land in British Columbia, but were denied entry. The Sikhs 
stayed in the Vancouver harbour for two months in the summer of 1914, believing they would 
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ultimately be allowed in. Gurdit Singh Sirhali, a wealthy Sikh who had chartered the ship and 
acted as spokesperson for the passengers, was certain “the spirit of fair play he believed was 
evident in the British legal framework would prevail.”458 The city authorities denied them access 
to food or water and refused to allow any off the ship. Indians in the Vancouver area brought 
them food and water until two Canadian naval ships escorted the Komagata Maru out of 
Canadian waters on July 23, 1914. A British gun boat stopped the ship when it arrived in India 
and officers attempted to arrest 20 men they considered Punjabi nationalist leaders. When the 
men resisted arrest the gun boat opened fire and 19 passengers were killed. Several passengers 
escaped in the chaos, and the rest were imprisoned for the duration of World War I.459  
Sixty years later, Canada changed its racially exclusionary immigration laws in 1976, 
opening its doors to migrants from around the world. Shortly after, in the early 1980s, violence 
erupted across the Punjab. In 1984, fundamentalist and nationalist leader Sant Jarnail Singh 
Bhindranwale and his followers entrenched themselves in the Darbar Sahib (Golden Temple, 
Sikhism’s holiest place) in Amritsar, Punjab, leading Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to instruct 
the Indian army to storm the Temple. Sikhs around the world were enraged at the violation of 
their sacred site and the death of thousands of civilians.460 Four months later two of her body 
guards, Beant Singh and Satwant Singh (with accomplice Kehar Singh — all Sikhs) assassinated 
Indira Gandhi. In revenge for her assassination at least 3000 Sikh civilians were murdered in a 
state-sanctioned anti-Sikh massacre that spread across India, but centred in New Delhi.461 
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Fleeing this escalating brutality, over 2800 Sikhs applied for asylum in Canada between 1981 
and 1984 under Canada’s new Immigration Act. Under the advice of the Refugee Status 
Advisory Committee, the Immigration Minister denied these applicants refugee status. A 
collection of private Sikh citizens, the Canadian Council of Churches, and the Federation of Sikh 
Societies successfully appealed the case to the Supreme Court as Singh vs. Minister of 
Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.462 Two months later the fight for a Sikh 
homeland (Khalistan) exploded in the lives of Canadians with the bombing of Air India Flight 
182 en route from Toronto to London, England, in which all 392 people on board — most of 
them Canadians with Indian ancestry — were killed. Sikh homeland extremist Inderjit Singh 
Reyat was convicted three times for the mass murder, while two other appellants — Ripudaman 
Singh Malik and Ajaib Singh Bagri — were acquitted.463  
The 1980s saw Sikhs become a more visibly present part of Canada, particularly in the 
West, but “While other diasporic communities enhanced their status through official engagement 
with the state … Sikhs in Canada struggled to inhabit the model minority image, with only some 
managing to achieve it by shunning the outward symbols of Sikhism.”464 Sound bytes about Sikh 
nationalism and images of the bearded and turbaned Singh Reyat in the media fuelled and 
exacerbated Canadian discomfort with visibly embodied Sikhism. Baltej Singh Dhillon recalls 
the situation: 
After the Air India bombing the “Freedom Fighters” became terrorists. And the 
people that took innocent lives are absolutely terrorists. … No question about it 
and the faith doesn’t support it. … But it’s very difficult to have deep 
conversations with 26 million people. You’re dealing with sound bytes at the 
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very best. And then you’re left with people’s personal opinions fuelled by 
filters that already exist. “They bring all this violence with them. They, they, 
they.” And the singular contributions, the sincerity of the faith, the commitment 
of the people that are here to be full fledged contributing Canadian citizens is 
lost. … There were many who raised their voice against what was going on in 
India and they were labeled as … terrorists …465 
 
Dhillon was not on any federal black lists but he did embody the visual representation of a Sikh 
extremist — at least in the popular Canadian imagination. 
But what message were the Canadian kes-dhari communicating with their turbans that 
most Canadians were not receiving? Also called the dastar or the pagri, the turban is a symbol of 
Sikh (traditionally male) identity and values.466 When a young man or woman feels they are 
ready to live up to these standards they are baptized into the Khalsa (the body of believers). The 
five symbols initiated Sikhs wear all begin with the letter k and are therefore called the Five K’s 
of Khalsa. These include kesh (uncut hair), kangha (comb), kachh (short breeches), kara (steel 
bracelet), and kirpan (dagger).467 For the purposes of this study, kesh is the most significant. Sikh 
scholar Doris Jakobsh explains: 
Kesh has been understood as a symbol of holiness and strength. Devout 
Sikhs believe hair is a gift from God that must be left in its natural state. 
Wearing the hair uncut also makes Sikhs highly visible as a group. Hair 
must remain uncut from any part of the body, although many Sikh women 
pluck their eyebrows and many Sikh men trim their hair and beards while 
still upholding the basic injunction of keeping their hair long. The khanga 
symbolizes restraint and self-control and is used to keep the uncut hair tidy 
and in place. This represents bodily and spiritual purity.468 
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Although not itself a requirement, the turban has sacred significance in its role binding 
the uncut hair. Sikh boys may wear a patcha to cover their hair until a maternal uncle ties their 
first turban in the Dastar Bandi ceremony at a gurudwara.469 Turbans are made from a length of 
fabric ranging from five to eight meters, usually made of light cotton in a variety of colours, 
textures, and qualities. A Sikh turban is wound in a distinctive fashion with a final front twist 
generally passing from right to left. The final style is a matter of personal preference, whether it’s 
tight or relaxed, high or low, close to the head or prominent. Many wear a decorative cloth band 
under the turban, called a fifthy, that goes across the forehead where it is visible. When Dhillon 
was issued the first RCMP uniform turbans he received two: one was dark blue with a yellow 
fifthy that aligned with the forage cap for duty dress, and the other was brown with a darker 
brown fifthy, approximately the same browns as the Stetson and its leather hat band for Review 
Order. The Officer in Charge of the Material Management Branch in Ottawa met with a member 
of the Sikh Community in May 1990 to discuss design. The RCMP followed regulations from 
the Canadian Military regarding turbans, while consulting Dhillon in a November 1990 meeting, 
until it developed its own later that year. The new RCMP regulations required the turban to be 
worn “in the low Sikh conventional manner,” tightly wound, “with the final winding right over 
left neatly on the forehead to conceal the hair.”470 They developed an issue badge with a brooch 
pin, which Sikh officers must wear centred on the front of the blue turban, “with the bottom edge 
1.2 cm above the lower edge of the crossing point of the final winding of the material.”471 
In Roots of Love, a documentary about the tensions around maintaining the turban 
tradition and young men cutting their hair, two separate interviewees use the word “murder” to 
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describe cutting a Sikh’s hair.472 The traditionalist elders in the film insist that if a Sikh so much 
as trims his beard he is no longer a Sikh. A young man, who like many others cut his hair to be 
more “stylish,” sits quietly as his parents explain that his choice broke their hearts and that until 
he “returns to Sikhism” he is not truly their son. His father explains, “From head to toe, he who 
clips his hair, even if he only clips one hair, he is no longer a Sikh. Guru Gobind Singh has 
taught us cutting hair is a sin for which one must present himself at the Akal Takht, readopt 
Sikhism, apologize for his mistake, and promise never to do it again.”473 Another mother, whose 
son (Jagvir) is only 14, agrees. She describes how, if her son chooses to go against her wishes, 
namely by cutting his hair or marrying for love, he will be “kicked out” of their house and they 
will have no son. “If he wants to disobey us and dishonour Sikhism then he can go his own 
way.”474 For now, Jagvir is happy to comply and the family is preparing for his Dastar Bandi.475 
An elder explains, “[We teach kids] you are crowned. And after today you must live up to this 
responsibility.”476 Jagvir’s mother explains, “You could say … the turban is like a crown that we 
wear on our heads. Guru Gobind Singh instated the turbaned Sikh. And he told us that we need 
no other crown. ‘Singh’ refers to a lion, and … the Sikhs are a race of lions.”477  
Baltej Singh Dhillon, like most Canadian Sikhs, does not agree with such a strident view 
of who is “in” and who is “out.” In discussing the isolation of today’s Sikh youth he is specific 
on this topic: 
If I go to the gurudwara … I want skills, and I want tools, and I want to be held. 
What I don’t want is to be institutionalized in that particular religion or have that 
religion shoved down my throat and told if you don’t do this then you’re a bad 
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person … [or] you’ll go to hell. I don’t subscribe to any of that. My creator is a 
creator of love and care and compassion. Not one of fear and distance and one that 
judges you because this morning you didn’t do all of your prayers … It’s the 
holistic process. It’s what did you do between then and going to bed. Did you treat 
people right? Did you cause anybody injury? Did you cheat, lie? Did you defraud? 
… If you did then you’ve … offended the creator. And it doesn’t matter how 
many prayers you do it isn’t going to change anything.478 
 
Dhillon holds a broad view on Sikhism, but his commitment to Sikh values is evident 
throughout his choices and actions surrounding the RCMP turban debate. Walton Roberts and 
Jakobsh argue that in the Khalsa, “these ideals were brought to their highest expression in the 
ritualized creation of a society motivated by both spiritual and temporal ideals, the sant-sipahi 
…”479 The sant is the ideal Sikh, “one who possesses humility and piousness, yet who is also 
imbued with the martial qualities of the sipahi, the soldier, ‘ever courageous and bravely 
prepared to fight gallantly for justice …’”480 When describing the violence that broke out on the 
Komagata Maru, Gurdit Singh later stated, “I preferred death with my friends as no Sikh once he 
has been baptized and made a ‘Singh’ should abandon the field. That is the permanent command 
of Guru Gobind Singh.”481 Like Gurdit Singh almost eighty years before him Dhillon’s actions 
demonstrate that he was devoted to miri piri — “the idea that the spiritual and political cannot be 
separated in the fight for justice.”482 Put differently, miri piri is, “the Sikh demand that justice be 
sought and righteously achieved.”483 Throughout the 20th century, Sikhs in Canada have used 
their commitment to miri piri to challenge exclusionary policies and practices. These ideals of 
striving for the common good while combatting injustice, refusing to leave the field of battle 
(metaphorical or otherwise) while embodying humility and piousness are clearly at the heart of 
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both Baltej Singh Dhillon’s initial attraction to the RCMP, and his commitment to seeing the 
uniform challenge through. Dhillon explains: 
[People would say to me] “it’s just taking off your turban, it’s just cutting 
your hair.” And I would say, that’s where you’re wrong. What you’re asking 
me to do is give up on 23 years of what I have now become. So if I can take 
my turban off and cut my hair for a $50,000 a year job, then you need to be 
worried about who you’re hiring. Because when organized crime comes 
along and offers me $500,000 then I will absolutely … sell myself to that 
group. … Because if I don’t bring values with me you are not going to teach 
me values. … There’s no law or written word that’s going to take the place 
of the values you’re bringing in. When I came in to the RCMP all of my 
values and principles matched up word for word.484 
 
Very few Canadians were familiar with the tenets and values of Sikhism that led Dhillon to insist 
on retaining his turban and hair. Instead, the Air India bombing, the conflicts in India, and a 
general Canadian ignorance around Sikhism drowned out his embodied message of the turban as 
a visible signifier of his devotion to these values. 
In 1989-90, as Dhillon’s case worked its way through bureaucracy and public opinion, 
Brian Mulroney was Prime Minister and leader of the Progressive Conservative (PC) party.485 
Canada operates under a multi-party parliamentary system. Canadians vote for a local Member 
of Parliament (MP) to represent their interests in the federal government. This MP represents a 
party, and the party that wins the most number of seats in the election forms government with the 
party leader serving as Prime Minister. The party that wins the second highest number of seats 
forms the official opposition. Other official parties then hold seats and often form alliances to 
sway votes. The three most powerful parties are generally (from right to left) the Conservatives, 
the Liberals, and the New Democratic Party (NDP). To understand the political context of 
Dhillon’s and Ishaq’s cases it is necessary to be familiar with Canada’s major parties. While 
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Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservatives formed government during the RCMP turban 
debate, the Liberal Party was the official opposition under the leadership first of John Turner and 
then Herb Gray (later-Prime-Minister-Jean Chrétien succeeded Gray shortly after Dhillon’s 
turban case was settled). Colloquially known as the Grits, the Liberal Party is Canada’s oldest 
party, espouses political liberalism, and generally sits in the centre of Canada’s political 
landscape. The NDP, under Audrey McLaughlin, held official party status in Parliament. The 
NDP espouses social democracy and sits to the left of Canadian politics. They are often Canada’s 
third largest party, at times forming an alliance with the Liberal Party, such as under Pierre 
Trudeau’s minority government from 1972-1974. 
For the sake of these case studies it is helpful to be aware of three of Canada’s other 
parties. The Green Party, formed in 1983, focuses on ecological issues, social justice, non-
violence, and grassroots democracy. The Bloc Québécois formed in 1991 to promote Quebec’s 
interests and sovereignty in the House of Commons. The Reform Party of Canada was officially 
formed in 1987 under the leadership of Preston Manning. More conservative than the PC Party, 
the Reform Party held a platform of reducing federal government, including cuts to bilingualism 
and multiculturalism. Throughout the 1990s, the Reform Party and the Bloc gutted Progressive 
Conservative seats in Parliament. Though Manning worked to portray the party as a national 
voice, it never moved far beyond its role as a representative for the West, and the counterpoint to 
the Bloc. It ran its last election in 1997, and its remains became the Canadian Alliance Party in 
2000. In 2002, Stephen Harper (later Prime Minister during Ishaq’s case) became the new leader 
of the Alliance, and under his leadership it merged with the PC Party to become the Conservative 
Party of Canada in 2003. 
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In 1984, before there was a Bloc or a Reform Party, Mulroney took power with the 
largest sweep of Parliamentary seats in Canadian history. Mulroney successfully brought 
together Québecois and Westerners (a historically momentous feat) and managed to keep the 
notoriously fractious Progressive Conservative party united. By the early 1990s, however, after 
several constitutional failures and lingering resentment over the Government Sales Tax (GST) 
his popularity had run its course and in 1993 he handed over the office of Prime Minister to 
fellow PC Kim Campbell. During his time in office Mulroney considered himself a centrist 
conservative, and took an active interest in social and environmental issues.486 During the turban 
debate he largely kept his distance, preferring to allow RCMP Commissioner Norman Inkster 
and Solicitor General Pierre Cadieux (who both serve at the Prime Minister’s pleasure) to make 
their own rulings.  
Mulroney’s western MPs and their opposition counterparts did not share this reservation. 
In a 1989 article for The Globe and Mail, journalist Peter Moon reported, “Barbara Sparrow, a 
Tory MP from Calgary and chairman of the western caucus, said she has received thousands of 
letters and more than 103,000 signatures on petitions from people who want ‘the preservation of 
the distinctive heritage and tradition of the RCMP by retaining the uniformity of the dress 
code.’”487 In March 1990, Conservative MP Louise Feltham of Alberta told The Globe and Mail, 
“I have talked to hundreds of Sikhs … and they all tell me the same thing: it is not a religious 
item.”488 She added that residents of her Calgary-area riding of Wild Rose, “generally just feel it 
is not a religious item,” and neither did she.489 Feltham argued that it was “not good enough” to 
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let the RCMP Commissioner judge that it was in fact religious, “and she hinted that the policy 
might be challenged in the courts.”490 Late in December of the same year, in an interview with 
CBC’s The Journal, Reform Party Leader Preston Manning told the country that, “nothing has 
done a greater disservice to the Sikh community than the squabble over the turban …”491 He 
argued that the controversy divided the country and went on to explain his party’s platform, “of 
abandoning the cultural mosaic and striving instead for a Canada that becomes more of a melting 
pot in the same manner as the United States.”492 On the other side of the aisle, The Globe and 
Mail reported that, “[New Democrat MP John Brewin] said the exemption for turbans was 
required by law and was not a matter of changing rules merely to suit cultural conventions. He 
praised Sikhs for their interest in joining the RCMP.”493 Conservative MPs from Western 
provinces speaking on behalf of many of their constituents maintained that the scarlet tunic, 
boots, and Stetson hat together, “constituted a cherished symbol of the nation, part of an 
honourable and internationally recognized Canadian tradition that should not be jeopardized by 
minority demands.”494 Liberal and NDP MPs, on the other hand, wanted the RCMP to reflect 
Canada’s religiously and ethnically diverse population. Moreover, they argued that Canadian 
traditions did not exist in static monuments but in the practice of pluralism and acceptance.495  
This stance was deeply unpopular in the west. Considering a Mountie in a turban an 
anathema, three sisters in Calgary called themselves “Defenders of RCMP Tradition” and 
gathered 210,000 signatures for a petition they delivered to Parliament opposing the change. An 
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“MP from Calgary” unsuccessfully attempted to introduce a private member’s bill enshrining the 
RCMP uniform as an official symbol of Canada’s sovereignty.496 Journalist Ross Howard 
reported that, “Some Conservative MPs, including Calgary backbencher Barbara Sparrow and 
[Louise] Feltham, endorsed the opposition to turbans.”497 Herman Bittner was a 43 year old 
welder from Langdon, Alberta who sold $6 calendars mocking the idea of a Sikh Mountie in a 
turban. In an interview with the CBC Bittner acknowledged that he had never met a Sikh but 
argued, “You have to be a little bit provocative to get people's attention. Am I really being racist, 
or am I standing up to save something that will be lost forever?”498 Others developed posters, t-
shirts, and lapel pins. Over 10,000 posters were sold depicting a black-face Sikh caricature 
named “Sargeant Kamell Dung,” and below the officer a quote that read: “Is this Canadian? Or 
does this make you sikh?” The pins included similarly overtly racist visual messages. One was 
similar to the poster with the same epitaph, except the turbaned Mountie had a strike through his 
neck. Another depicted a weak white man surrounded by caricatures of an African man with a 
spear, an Asian man in “traditional” dress, and a brown skinned man in a turban. The caricatures 
loomed menacingly over the white man and the inscription read, “Who is the minority in 
Canada?” A third had a traditional blonde white male RCMP officer in red serge and Stetson. On 
his left is an Indigenous man’s head with braids in a circle with a strike through it, and on his 
right a Sikh man’s head with a turban, also in a circle with a strike through it, accompanied by 
the words, “Don’t mess with the dress.” In another, a blonde white Mountie in red serge and 
Stetson crosses his arms behind his back and smiles affably with the Canadian flag behind him. 
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Above him are the words, “Preserve our heritage.” In the bottom left corner of the pin a circle 
sticks out with a white turban inside against a dark blue backdrop and an X through the turban. 
Below it says “Ban the turban.”499 Dhillon was aware of these campaigns and told The Toronto 
Star, “I, at this point, cannot change those feelings. That acceptance has to come from within.”500 
His wife Suroy also weighed in saying that, “the anti-turban campaign was typical of the 
hostility Sikhs still face in Canada.”501  
At no point does it seem to have occurred to the pin wearers that they were enacting the 
very offence they were accusing Dhillon of — belittling the uniform by presenting it in an 
alternate way. These individuals literally wore these pins with caricatures of the Mountie 
uniforms in order to protest an official alteration done to uniform code. The federal government 
considered criminal charges but decided not to pursue them.502 Intellectual property laws scholar 
Rosemary J. Coombe explains that, “What government didn’t do, but could have done, was to 
evoke its powers under the Trade Marks Act to prevent distribution of this merchandise. Under 
the act, no one can commercially use any pictorial representation of an RCMP officer without the 
consent of the public authority.”503 In November of 1989, Liberal justice critic and former 
solicitor-general Robert Kaplan, who supported Sikh Mounties wearing turbans, told The Globe 
and Mail that he had been “inundated with hate letters.” “My God, some of it has just been 
awful. Most of it comes from Alberta, and they call me a traitor.”504 Kaplan formally complained 
to Alberta’s Attorney-General Ken Rostad about “a Calgary businessman” selling the offensive 
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pins. The article does not specify who the businessman was, but it is reasonable to presume it 
was Bittner. Kaplan wrote replies to the people who sent him the hate mail, saying the pins were 
“hurtful and insulting to Sikhs,” and that Canada needed to keep its national institutions “in tune 
with our reality as a nation.”505 
It was likely the overtly racist and exclusionary nature of the paraphernalia that forced 
Brian Mulroney to speak out. In March of 1990, just a few days before Cadieux gave final 
approval for Sikh Mounties to wear turbans, Mulroney finally weighed in and told a Toronto 
crowd that the, “racist depictions of turban-clad Mounties were ‘odious and reprehensible.’”506 
News outlets as far away as Australia took notice. On March 17, The Sydney Morning Herald 
reported, “The Prime Minister, Mr Brian Mulroney, joined the fray last week and signalled the 
Government's intentions on how to resolve the dispute by likening those who opposed turban-
wearing Mounties to Ku Klux Klan members. … ‘They [the pins] are a little more elegant and 
less visible than the white hoods people used to wear.’”507 
While opponents to the turban regularly cited the importance of uniformity for the dress 
uniform, there was no parallel opposition to female officers having a different uniform when 
they were admitted to the force in 1974, or when they consistently campaigned for the next 
sixteen years to be issued the same uniforms as their male colleagues. In fact, it was on the same 
day the RCMP announced the turban would be permitted that it finally allowed female officers to 
wear the Stetson and riding pants. Until then female officers wore flat heeled shoes, pantyhose, a 
navy skirt, a female cut red tunic, and a pillbox hat. A hat which no one — except the women 
themselves — opposed. These officers shared the same beliefs about embodying the image of the 
                                                   
505 Moon, “Turbans, the RCMP - and Politics.” 
506 Howard, "Cadieux Gives Sikh Mounties Right."  
507 Associated Press, “Sikh Mounties Get Their Turban,” The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney: Australia), March  
17, 1990.  
  151 
Mountie that the men did and they were enthusiastic about donning the traditional riding boots, 
red serge, and Stetson. However, as historian Bonnie Reilly Schmidt explains, “A feminized 
uniform was viewed as one way to manage the smooth transition of women into policing ranks, 
while generating the positive publicity the RCMP was desirous of cultivating.”508 The women 
were disappointed with the “feminine” uniform and resented the difference in power it 
represented. They disliked the pillbox hat especially. “… It was impractical, it was unflattering, 
and it established the women as different from male Mounties.”509 Former officer Louise 
Ferguson remembered the hat as, “the main difference from the male uniform …”510 Another 
former Mountie Kate Morton felt the women’s uniform, “set me up as being different, especially 
the hat.”511 Morton felt that, “she was considered less than equal as an RCMP officer based on 
the different hat she wore.”512 Knowing how strongly she felt, a male colleague found her a 
man’s forage cap to wear while on patrol with the condition that she would not let her 
commanding officer see her wearing it. 
These female officers did not only resent the pillbox hat for reasons of aesthetics and 
messaging, but for its impracticality. It regularly fell off while they were getting in and out of 
vehicles, or blew off in the wind. There was a chin strap intended to keep it on, but it proved 
inconvenient when the Mounties were taking it on and off several times throughout a shift.513 
The impracticality of the female uniform was not limited to their hats. Attempting to chase a 
criminal in heels and a skirt was not an ideal situation. In an effort to ensure that female police 
bodies remained “feminine,” female officers were issued purses in which to keep their guns 
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instead of the holsters men wore. Not only was repeatedly putting on and taking off the purse 
impractical, keeping a gun in it was dangerous — both for the female officer herself and her 
male colleagues. It was awkward to access and simple for a perpetrator to grab. Even the male 
Mounties complained about this part of the uniform, arguing they needed their partners in the 
field to be able to back them up.514 Reilly Schmidt explains this nonviable adaptation: “The 
female police body was to convey both authority and femininity, a fusion difficult to achieve in a 
society that viewed these concepts as dichotomous. As a result, practicality was often sacrificed 
for the sake of reinforcing notions of femininity and appropriate female attire.”515 At no point 
was there a public outcry over the difference in women’s hats or the impracticality of their 
uniform. If the resistance to Dhillon’s turban was in fact about preserving the image of the 
Mountie, why was there no similar opposition to the women’s uniform, which was different in 
more significant ways than Dhillon’s? 
While there was no public outcry over the impracticality of women’s uniforms, 
opponents of the turban used “practicality” as another justification. Tom Harpur, a Canadian 
theologian, ordained Anglican priest, religion editor at The Toronto Star, and author (most 
famous for his position on the “Christ myth”) expressed his views in an editorial for The Globe 
and Mail in August, 1990. A self-declared liberal and progressive regularly involved in interfaith 
work, Harpur opposed the RCMP adopting the turban. His combination of “practicality” and 
religious diversity opposition lends an interesting angle to the discussion. He states that he has 
“the greatest respect and admiration for Sikhs and for their religious beliefs” and cites examples 
of his support of the Canadian Sikh community516 In spite of this, he disagrees with the 
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government’s position arguing that they had, “opened a huge Pandora's box” and put themselves 
on the slippery slope of unrelenting accommodation.517  He continues, “To see the issue clearly 
… you have to know something about other religions — and care about them as well.”518 He 
discusses Mennonites and Quakers, and how their pacifism is clearly incompatible with an armed 
police force, apparently missing that such a theological stance is inherently a different matter of 
accommodation than a modification to a uniform hat. He wonders if Hasidic Jews’ side curls and 
beards are not likewise beyond permissibility. After acknowledging that, “[t]here are many 
thousands of Jains in Canada today and very fine people they are, too” he argues that “we 
[cannot] imagine RCMP officers garbed in this fashion.”519 
Harpur then turns to another group: “What about Muslims who are required by their faith 
to pray, facing toward Mecca and in an attitude of complete submission to Allah, five times a 
day?”520 He once again asserts his friendly disposition to this religions minority — “This is a 
discipline which I personally admire very much …,” but he questions its practical application as 
an RCMP officer: “But is it totally compatible with service on a police force which may require 
hours of guard duty or of stakeouts of criminals or the vigilance and waiting involved in a 
hostage-taking?” Needless to say, there are countless Muslims on police forces throughout 
Canada, and indeed the world. Does Harpur imagine that Muslim majority nations do not have 
police forces? Or only employ non-practicing Muslims? He argues that, “[i]f the Sikh ruling is 
applied fairly, however, there is no reason in the world why the RCMP shouldn't be able to 
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change its modus operandi to suit the prayer life of dedicated Muslims.”521 His conclusion is the 
crux of his argument: 
The point, however, is obvious, once you begin to get this wider kind of 
perspective. To be really fair, tolerant and impartial on this kind of issue you 
would be forced to end up with such an assortment of special privileges and 
special outfits that any semblance of a normal police force would vanish 
entirely. Oddly enough, by requiring all RCMP members to wear the same 
uniform, one can come closer to justice and equity for all who would like to 
apply than in any other way. At least you avoid giving special status to some 
which you allow to nobody else. It's not the opponent of turbans who are the 
discriminators, it's the well-meaning but misguided proponents instead.522  
 
As with the Stetson, authority is often conveyed through symbolism and, “a significant 
part of police authority is derived from the wearing of a uniform that must carry a ‘clear 
message’ to the public about a police officer’s status and powers.”523 If, for the past century, the 
Mounties communicated this “clear message” through square-jawed, broad shouldered, 
caucasian men in red serge and Stetson (at least in the popular imagination), then what would a 
brown-skinned, black-bearded, turbaned officer embody? Would citizens understand the turban 
to convey authority? Like the women who joined the force before him, Dhillon did encounter 
citizens who did not initially read his presentation as authoritative. At his first posting in 
Quesnel, British Columbia, Dhillon spoke with a woman on the phone about a break-and-enter. 
He told her he would like to come examine the broken window and she agreed. When he arrived 
at her house, as he stepped out of his squad car, she ran out of the house and down the driveway 
yelling, “Not you! Not you! I want Constable Dhillon!” He explained that he was Const. Dhillon 
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and that she could speak with him or no one. When she realized this was the same officer she had 
spoken with on the phone, “her eyes got as large as saucers. She didn’t think I could speak 
English.”524 Dhillon “in the flesh” did not meet her expectations of the reassuring officer with 
whom she had spoken. This woman also demonstrated, however, that what Canadians expected 
could adjust. Once she overcame her surprise she welcomed Dhillon into her home and served 
him tea and cookies.  
In another case Dhillon was ticketing a parked truck in violation. The truck’s owner 
quickly emerged from a bar, hurling profanities and racial slurs at Dhillon. Once the man 
realized it was a minor infraction easily remedied he calmed down and left. Five hours later 
Dhillon entered the bar with his corporal. The same man approached them and asked to speak 
with the corporal privately. Dhillon waited outside, assuming the man was making a complaint. 
His corporal came out a moment later, chuckling. The man wanted to know how many Sikh 
officers there were in Quesnel, because one had spoken to him earlier, then he saw one on traffic 
duty, then saw another one driving by, then saw another one attending to an accident, and now 
another one had just walked in. Dhillon was the only Sikh officer in the town, but this man was 
repeatedly unable to identify him as the same person, even after speaking with him face to face 
twice.525 These citizens were unable to read authority or protection in Dhillon’s uniform, but 
South Asian Canadians had the opposite experience. Before Dhillon was even a member of the 
Force, when he rode along as a volunteer, these individuals assumed he was an officer and 
walked past the actual Mounties to address him. Dhillon understood that they found comfort in 
his presence and saw protection and authority embodied in him. 
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These Canadians likely saw something that most other Canadians could not — the 
meaning in his turban. As previously discussed, few Canadians understood the Khalsa or why 
Dhillon wore a turban. There is an important parallel between the serge and the turban, however.  
When a Sikh adopts the turban there are associated behavioural expectations. To wear a turban is 
to publicly declare that you will live up to a higher moral standard, rooted in service and justice 
(miri piri). Likewise, when an RCMP officer dons the red serge Canadians and fellow officers 
hold this person to a higher standard. A Dress and Deportment regulation from 1988 stipulates, 
“Appearance in both dress and behaviour has become synonymous with the position as a 
member of the Force, and primarily, the basis on which he/she is judged and accepted by the 
public.”526 Dhillon took his responsibilities represented in both items of dress very seriously. He 
was aware that he was more closely scrutinized than other officers, and that he was now a role 
model for young Sikhs who would choose to be officers:527 
We’re passing this on to those who are coming after. This is not about you. 
Don’t walk around like a peacock. This is about you serving. This is about 
you being given this huge responsibility to make sure that while you’re in 
that uniform and while you’re in that turban that you leave behind a legacy 
and a character that the next person is going to be able to look up to. Then 
you will have honoured our legacy and all of our hard work.528 
 
Through decades of intentional legend formation and service in practice, Canadians and 
their Mounties shared and exchanged an understanding around what the uniform communicates. 
Likewise, through a similar though longer process, Sikhs hold a communal understanding around 
the standards they associate with wearing a turban. Ironically, it was these very shared values 
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that led to some’s opposition of the turban in the RCMP. A Lethbridge, Alberta, group of veteran 
RCMP officers objected to the uniform change, believing that the Charter of Rights “dictates a 
uniform which reflects the RCMP tradition of a non-sectarian, impartial justice system.”529 The 
Charter does not in fact, but the point is the retired officers believed so deeply in the uniform as 
the embodiment of non-sectarian, impartial justice.  
Thirty years after Dhillon became the first turbaned Mountie, the Canadian popular 
imagination has embraced him as an icon of a more recent national sacred value: 
multiculturalism. Any Google Image search for “Canadian multiculturalism” will instantly yield 
images of Dhillon in his uniform and turban. When asked how he feels about the shift from being  
considered a threat to enshrined Canadiana to becoming a source of Canadian nationalist pride, 
Dhillon responds, “I think it’s our maturing. As a country, as citizens, as a nation … and getting 
better as a country … And … when Harjit Sajjan became the Defense Minister of Canada [I felt] 
Okay. We’re good! We are here and we are part and we are contributing and we are accepted 
..”530 Dhillon is devoted to the idea of Canada as an inclusive nation and was pleased when the 
RCMP announced in 2016 that it would permit hijabs as part of the uniform. “I am so excited 
about it … if we take care of each other’s needs for being safe, comfortable, not being judged, 
not having to defend our beliefs and values, and having a capacity to honour each other’s beliefs 
and values, then we give that person freedom … to become creative, and not … protective. And 
that’s where I see we’re going.”531 
Dhillon’s admission to the RCMP had effects beyond the Force and those invested in it. 
In 1991, Joan McDonald, president of McDonald Communications Consultants in Etobicoke, 
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Ontario, told The Financial Post that she had, “yet to run a workshop where they don’t bring up 
the Mounties and the Sikh turbans.”532 She explained that the RCMP’s decision, “forced many 
Canadians to realize how much this country’s workforce has changed.”533 Dhillon personified the 
hybrid Canadian body: a Sikh Mountie.534 Dhillon considered this to be a hallmark of Canada. 
He told The Sydney Morning Herald in March of 1990 that, “If I can serve Canada by joining the 
RCMP and at the same time practise my religion, that is what Canada is all about.”535 In 2016 he 
expressed a similar, though more nuanced, opinion: “I find a lot of confidence and comfort in 
that we live in Canada, and Canada is a sort of super democracy … Here’s … a place where you 
can be free, truly free, to practice and follow the tenets of the way of life that you’ve chosen.”536 
Dhillon does not consider this a passive reality that Canadians can simply enjoy, but that each 
individual has a stake in:  
[Consider] the contract that we all as citizens have signed, figuratively, which is 
we’re going to honour each other, serve each other, protect each other, and ensure 
that we are not getting in the way of each other’s success, safety, and ability to 
become the best that we can [be] as Canadians … This is something that is going 
to make us stronger and better as a country. I’m not having you worry that I will 
strip you of your identity, and strip you of your history and who you are. And then 
hope that you will contribute. … When we say this is good, we accept — not 
tolerate, accept — the people are ours. Brother and sister … Then, and only then 
… our ears are open to hear … the jewels and diamonds and great thinking that 
comes from that perspective, because we never had that perspective before.537 
 
Dhillon considers this “contract” a mutually beneficial, and mutually responsible, arrangement. 
He feels strongly about minorities contributing to Canadian society — both that they have a great 
deal to offer and that they have a responsibility to do so.  
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Dhillon embodies the combination of Sikh narratives, the Canadian diversity model, and 
the RCMP’s understanding of duty. In discussing gurudwaras he explains that, “I’ve stopped 
saying that I have a religion many years ago. Because when I say [that] it absolutely restricts me 
from experiencing and participating and taking part and honouring other ways of life. So I have a 
way of life, not a religion.”538 This is, according to Sikh scholar Doris Jakobsh, a very Sikh way 
of speaking.539 His understanding of sacred sites — “a place that honours the creator, that 
honours this universal creative energy that we might call God, Allah … whatever you want to 
call it” — parallels and shapes the way he wears his turban and RCMP uniform: “When we stand 
at a place that honours that … there’s something greater than myself that’s at work here, then you 
gotta be ready to perform at that level. … And doing something greater than yourself is all about 
community service …”540  
 
Conclusion 
 Dhillon’s story reveals a great deal about Canadians’ attachment to an item of dress they 
consider sacred, even if they would not phrase it in such overtly religious terms. Canadians 
generally consider grasping a venerated manner of dress as inviolable to be a practice of 
religiously conservative immigrant minorities. Yet when the Mountie uniform — revered for 
decades after conscious masculine identity construction — was modified with an overtly 
religious (non-Western) item many Canadians considered it a violation on par with blasphemy.  
 It is important to remember that when women joined the Force there was no similar 
outcry, not so much as a public word in fact, even though their uniform was significantly 
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different from the traditional garb — especially the hat. This is rooted in both gender and racial 
norms. The RCMP was insistent on keeping its female officers “feminine,” so a clearly different 
(ie. un-masculine) uniform was, in their view, critical. Likewise, a feminine uniform modeled on 
western cuts — including a very British hat — did not register on the ethnic protectionists’ radar 
as a threat. It might be the most significant change to the Mountie uniform in its history, but it 
was a change that was aesthetically familiar to Canadians, and it did not challenge the men’s 
uniform. The turban, however, atop a brown face and a black beard, while objectively a smaller 
change to the uniform than the women’s, was an overt threat to traditional Canadiana. This is 
directly tied to the function of uniforms as the embodiment of social expectations for the 
behavior of the wearer and the observer. Police uniforms convey symbols of authority, status, 
and power, controlling both the social and inner self. In Jennifer Craik’s words, “do people wear 
uniforms or do uniforms wear people?”541 Either way, wearing a uniform is a central body 
technique in the actualization of identity.542 
 Despite the backlash, many Canadians, at both the public and political level, welcomed 
the diversification of Canada’s most iconic institution as a reflection of the country they believed 
in — one that is constantly shifting to reflect its varied people. While there are still those who 
would prefer the turban was never allowed, Canada three decades after Inspector Dhillon became 
an officer gleefully flaunts its embodied paragon of Canadian virtues: a Sikh Mountie. In a truly 
Canadian turn of events, a Mountie in a turban is now iconic Canadiana. 
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Fig. 6. Arnold Friberg, 1953. Springtime in the North. 
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Fig. 7. Arnold Friberg, 1963. Untitled (Maintain the Right). Duluth, MN: Tweed Museum of Art. 
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Fig. 8. British Officers of the Indian Cavalry — 5th Cavalry, 23rd Cavalry FF, 17th Cavalry, 26th 
KGO Light Cavalry, 11th KEO Lancers (Probyn’s Horse), Daffadar 4th Cavalry, Jemadar 
16th Cavalry. Illustration by Major A C Lovett in The Armies of India (Adam & Charles 
Black Publ.: London, 1911). 
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Fig. 9. Sikh Officers of the Indian Army. Punjabi Regiments — 24th Punjabis, 67th 
Punjabis,29th Punjabis, 21st Punjabis, 25th Punjabis, 28th Punjabis, 93rd Burma 
Infantry, 74th Punjabis, 87th Punjabis, 76th Punjabis.  
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Fig. 10. Anti-Turban pin collection. These pins are still available on eBay as collectors’ items. 
They are also housed at the Sikh Heritage Museum of Canada in Mississauga, Ontario. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Zunera Ishaq and Muslim Niqabs in Citizenship Ceremonies, 2010-2015 
 
Wanting to experience a day in the shoes of my Saudi friend I asked her to dress me 
appropriately and bring me along in all she did for a day, including praying at the mosque and 
eating in a restaurant. Noha Abdul Ghaffar was happy to oblige. We lived in the moderately 
sized Ontario city of Waterloo, a community with a disproportionately large percentage of 
immigrants, two mosques, and three universities. In other words, it is a fairly liberal and fairly 
diverse community. Despite this, Noha warned me that I would encounter prejudice, particularly 
because I would be wearing the niqab. She insisted I not wear a black hijab because, as she 
explained, being dressed from head to toe in black would be “too much” for Canadians.   
The day was interesting and educational, and is easily summarized in one anecdote. I 
needed to buy some clothes for my daughter and so we went to a children’s store at which I 
regularly shopped. I changed nothing about my behaviour. I perused the way I always did, but 
for the first time one of the clerks constantly watched me. It was not a look of idle curiosity or of 
seeing if I needed assistance. Her gaze was hostile and suspicious. When I made my selections I 
went to the counter. I usually chat with cashiers, so I greeted this one. First I noticed that in a 
store that was always friendly and outgoing — a children’s store, after all — the cashier said 
nothing to me as I approached. Before (and after) I was always met with a friendly greeting at 
the counter. When I spoke she was visibly surprised I spoke English without an accent. She kept 
her words curt and to a bare minimum. When she counted out my change, before I could finish 
saying, “thank you,” she tossed the money on the counter and turned her back on me. Her 
rudeness shocked me. Every other time (and every time after) the cashier placed the money 
directly in my hand with a smile and a cheerful farewell. Nothing was different about me. I 
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spoke and behaved the same way. But this time I was veiled and apparently that made it 
appropriate to treat me with suspicion and discourtesy.  
While one anecdote is hardly foundational research, it is clear that no item of clothing 
today stirs such visceral reactions and public controversy as the Muslim woman’s niqab. The 
face veil is several inches of fabric, but it is just as much a concept as it is a material item.543 
Wearing clothes activates them, and nowhere is this more evident than with the niqab.544 On its 
own it is merely an unremarkable swath of chiffon. Covering a woman’s face it comes alive in 
the public imagination as the embodiment of women’s oppression. The depth of unease niqabi 
women evoke through this embodied marker of religion is extraordinary.545 Dinah Zeiger, in her 
article That (Afghan) Girl, argues, “… veiled women today signify tyranny, and lifting the veil 
has become a metaphor for freedom and democracy.”546  
Hijab literally means, “to veil” and is both a verb (as practice), and a noun (as a dress 
item). The international Muslim community is as diverse as it is possible for nearly one billion 
people to be. Many Muslim women do not veil at all, and those who do often eschew the 
niqab.547 The scope of this chapter does not allow for a comprehensive answer to why, or how, 
women practice veiling. Clearly it depends on social, geographic, religious, and political 
positions (once again demonstrating Entwistle’s thesis that dress is necessarily situated bodily 
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practice).548 Studies of women in many circumstances reveal that it is almost never a one-
dimensional symbol. It has different meanings for different people living in Muslim majority 
contexts, and different meanings again for those living in Western societies. Therefore, this 
material practice symbolizes simultaneously overlapping and opposing characteristics.549 
Sociocultural anthropologist Homa Hoodfar acknowledges that the veil has certainly served 
oppression, but argues women use the same practice, “to free themselves from the bonds of 
patriarchy.”550 She maintains that,  
Muslim women like all other women are social actors, employing, reforming, and 
changing existing social institutions, often creatively, to their own ends. The static 
colonial image of the oppressed veiled Muslim woman thus often contrasts 
sharply with women's lived experience of veiling.551  
 
Ignoring this dismisses Muslim women’s socially located agency, and serves to bolster 
institutionalized unequal agentic capacities.552 The niqab, therefore, as a lived dress practice is 
neither solely representative of an oppressive social force nor a woman’s agency.553 
Zunera Ishaq is a Pakistani immigrant to Canada who exhibits a strong capacity for 
personal power. In 2015 she successfully challenged the Federal Government, led by Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, in court on its ban on wearing the niqab during the oath swearing at 
citizenship ceremonies. Her case ignited the most heated debated of the 2015 federal election and 
contributed to the success of Justin Trudeau’s Liberals — and to the defeat of the Conservatives 
and the New Democratic Party. The public discussion became so impassioned in large part due 
to latent anti-Muslim sentiment and general anxieties over what a woman in niqab seems to 
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represent. This opposition generally falls into five categories: belief that the niqabi woman must 
be oppressed; fear over national security and terrorism; questions about the identification of the 
individual under the veil; an impression that the niqab makes it difficult to communicate, and 
that it is simply rude in Canadian society; and a conviction that it represents an unwillingness 
among Muslims to integrate. While these misgivings generally arise from a lack of personal 
relationship to any niqabi woman, and a general unease with the ways Canada is moving away 
from that which is familiar and valued, these objections are fundamentally rooted in colonial 
tropes of Muslims in general and Muslim women in particular, namely that they require 
“saving.” This fixation on liberating these women can cause tension with feminists, negating the 
feminism and agency of the Muslim women themselves.  
  
Zunera Ishaq: The Woman Behind a Federal Controversy 
Zunera Ishaq moved from Pakistan to Canada in 2008 with her husband Muhammad and 
their infant son. They had lived a privileged life in Pakistan — he was a chemical engineer and 
she was a high school teacher. She told a reporter in 2015 that they knew they had chosen the 
right country when the Canadian border officials had no problem accommodating her niqab.554 In 
Canada they moved in with her in-laws in Mississauga, but could not find work in their fields. 
Muhammad eventually took a job teaching in an Islamic school, and Zunera had two more sons, 
although she was unsatisfied with being a stay-at-home mom. “I never wanted to simply be a 
homemaker, babysitting all the time.”555 So she devoted herself to volunteering: visiting hospice 
residents, raising money for the Credit Valley Hospital, and helping in women’s shelters, food 
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banks, and schools. Ishaq is wholeheartedly devoted to her Islamic faith. She describes how, 
“God forgives her mistakes,” that she is, “bound only to Him,” and that, “no other power 
controls her.”556 She considers her volunteer work irrevocably linked to God, seeing it as “His 
work.”557 This is not incidental. Volunteering, or Tatawo’o, is an important part of Islam. 
Like Baltej Singh Dhillon, Ishaq’s devotion to supporting her community originated with 
her parents. One of her earliest memories is being five years old and going with her mother door 
to door to collect donations for victims of the war in Afghanistan.558 There is an irony here, that 
as an adult fighting for the right to wear her niqab, opponents accused her of promoting Taliban-
esque ideology if not outright colluding with them. Ishaq was the youngest of nine children, 
growing up in a large house on half an acre in a city of 4.5 million people with several domestic 
servants. Her father, Naeem Chisbi, came from a wealthy land-owning family and was an 
economics professor at Bahaudiin Zakariya University. As a child Ishaq was “energetic” and 
“playful.”559 She “preferred cricket and soccer” to more traditional female games, and her school 
teachers regularly disciplined her for playing pranks.560 
Like most upper class Pakistani families, Ishaq’s was observant but not conservative. 
None of the women in her family wore the hijab or niqab. In Pakistan the practice is generally 
associated with rural and lower class women, “a status marker often associated with 
unenlightened, uneducated women under the control of their husbands and fathers.”561 However, 
when Ishaq was 15 she took an English language course from a niqabi woman. She was intrigued 
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by her teacher, whom she found “mysterious and beautiful.”562 The teacher was outspoken and 
well-educated — not what Ishaq expected, only having, “a vague notion of what the niqab meant 
in Islam.”563 She was a an audacious teenager who “wanted to be different — to stand out by 
hiding away.”564 She told her father she wanted to wear the niqab and he advised her to 
genuinely research it, to “really think about what it meant.”565 
She explored scholarly texts, spoke with imams, and asked niqabi women she 
encountered about their reasons for wearing it. Her research only served to confirm the negative 
stereotypes. One woman told her, “her father forced her to wear it because he didn’t want anyone 
to recognize her on campus.”566 Not satisfied, Ishaq continued her research for another year, 
occasionally experimenting with wearing a niqab herself. She gave a lot of thought to what she 
believed Islam required of women regarding modesty and dress, and ultimately concluded the 
niqab’s purpose was protection. She found it offensive that, “her appearance could supersede her 
actions and her intellect.”567 The niqab makes how she looks, “a private matter.”568 Like many 
niqabi women, Ishaq enjoys fashion and makeup, but she wants the power to decide who sees 
that side of her. She prefers to, “craft her own identity.”  
When she chose to wear the niqab full time at the age of 15, Ishaq’s parents supported 
her, but her extended family strongly opposed. Her cousins were embarrassed to be in public 
with her, and one of her uncles refused to visit their house.569 When her older sister also adopted 
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the niqab her fiancé’s parents ended their engagement, feeling that the Ishaqs, “were projecting 
an image of poverty.”570 Perhaps, like Dhillon’s experiences as a teenager facing opposition to 
his turban, these incidents helped prepare Ishaq for her fight with the Canadian government. By 
the time she began university she “was used to nasty comments and dirty looks.”571 Several of 
her professors regularly mocked her for her niqab. When she did her first in-class presentation 
her professor taunted, “Let’s see how the voice will come out from behind the curtain.”572 Ishaq 
was humiliated when her classmates laughed, but was determined to demonstrate her capacities. 
“I wanted to show everybody just how strong the voice behind the veil could be!” She gave an 
excellent presentation and when she was done the class was silent. They did not tease her 
again.573 The next time a professor ridiculed her niqab, she “told him to mind his own 
business.”574 
As is customary in her culture and family, in her late teens her parents decided it was time 
for her to marry. She received three proposals, and her father consulted her on each one. One 
cousin offered to propose if she “downgraded to a hijab.”575 She was furious and refused him for 
making the suggestion.576 She chose Muhammad but unconventionally refused to meet him or 
see his photo before the marriage. Ishaq “didn’t want to be judged on her appearance and refused 
to do it to her husband.”577 They married when she was 20.  
One time on campus they ran into the professor who had mocked her “curtain.” He 
stopped the couple and said to Muhammad, “You have a strong woman, so be careful,” 
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acknowledging that Ishaq had changed his opinion on the face veil.578 Muhammad agreed that 
his wife was strong, and affirms that strength in Canada. During the federal election media flurry 
around Ishaq, Muhammad — a man who is “shy and quiet” — preferred for his wife to be in the 
spotlight. She describes him as “supportive but reserved,” and that, “he lives in her orbit.”579 It is 
not necessary to know Ishaq personally to see that she does not fit common assumptions 
surrounding niqabi women. 
By 2012 Canada felt like home, so the Ishaqs decided to apply for citizenship. Ishaq 
knew that the previous year the federal government banned women from wearing the niqab 
during citizenship ceremonies, and she was apprehensive. While she and Muhammad were 
studying their citizenship booklet they read that each Canadian has a “fundamental right to 
religious freedom.”580 Ishaq recalls, “I told him to stop reading. I said, ‘These are the rights that 
we have as Canadian citizens?’”581 She began to wonder, “if religious freedom was such a tenet 
of Canadian society,” then why was she not able to practise her religion at the moment she 
became a citizen?582 Ishaq consulted a law student acquaintance, who agreed the ban was a 
violation of Ishaq’s Charter rights and spoke with her professor about the feasibility of 
challenging it. Initially, Ishaq looked forward to the opportunity, but soon realized the full weight 
of what she was proposing: confronting the federal government, with no guarantee of success.  
She passed her citizenship exam in November 2013, but was still unsure of whether or 
not to go to court. In December, the government invited her to take her citizenship oath. She 
explained her situation but there was no movement on the niqab. They would allow her to stand 
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amidst a group of women, but she must be unveiled.583 Ishaq was “furious” at the minimal 
attempt at accommodation. She also realized that, if she won, any niqabi woman after her would 
have the choice to remain veiled. Considering how it would help future niqabi women convinced 
her to challenge the government, so she contacted Lorne Waldman, a Toronto lawyer specializing 
in immigration law. The next day, Waldman filed an official challenge against the federal 
government.584  
 
Two Court Cases 
 Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party formed the federal government Ishaq was 
challenging. Recall from the earlier discussion on Canada’s political party system that the 
Conservative party is the dominant voice of the country’s right-of-centre politics, and that 
Stephen Harper was initially the leader of the further-right Canadian Alliance that he successfully 
united with the Progressive Conservative party to create the Conservative Party of Canada in 
2003. As discussed earlier, the political right was largely fractured and weak throughout the 
1990s. When Harper, as leader of the Alliance, united the right he made an early name for 
himself and breathed new life into the beleaguered Canadian right-wing after over a decade of 
Liberal Party rule. In the next federal election of 2005, the Conservatives, under Harper’s 
leadership, defeated the Liberals and were still in power when Ishaq took the federal government 
to court in 2015. 
Then-Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Jason Kenney precipitated Ishaq’s 
situation when, in late 2011, he stated that taking the Oath of Citizenship,  
                                                   
583 McKeon, “Zunera’s War.” 
584 McKeon, “Zunera’s War.” 
  175 
… is a public act of testimony in front of your fellow citizens, it’s a legal 
requirement, and it’s ridiculous that you should be doing so with your face 
covered. … You’re standing up in front of your fellow citizens making a 
solemn commitment to respect Canada’s laws, to be loyal to the country, and 
I just think it’s not possible to do that with your face covered.585  
 
Kenney was referencing Sections 19 and 20 of the Citizenship Regulation, which explains that 
new Canadians generally take the Oath of Citizenship before a judge appointed by the Governor-
in-Council in a public citizenship ceremony in accordance with the Citizenship Act, section 26.586  
Kenney’s comments came as he introduced Operation Bulletin 359 which stated 
citizenship candidates, “will need to remove their face covering during the taking of the Oath. 
Failure to do so will result in the candidates not receiving their Canadian citizenship on that 
day.”587 These changes to the Citizenship and Immigration Policy Manual prohibited anyone 
who would not remove face coverings from receiving the certificate of citizenship, necessary to 
meet the section 3 requirement of the Citizenship Act.588 These additions to the Manual were as 
follows: 
6.5.2. Witnessing the oath 
It is the responsibility of the presiding official and the clerk of the ceremony 
to ensure that all candidates are seen taking the Oath of Citizenship.  
To facilitate the witnessing of the oath taking by CIC officials, all 
candidates for citizenship are to be seated together, as close to the presiding 
official as possible. 
- For larger ceremonies (50 or more candidates), additional CIC officials 
will be required to assist in the witnessing of the oath. The CIC officials will 
need to observe the taking of the oath by walking the aisles. 
Candidates wearing face coverings are required to remove their face 
coverings for the oath taking portion of the ceremony. 
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6.5.2. Candidates not seen taking the oath 
In some circumstances, it is difficult to ascertain whether candidates are 
taking the oath (sometimes due to a face covering). When a candidate is not 
seen taking the oath by a presiding official or CIC official(s), the clerk of the 
ceremony must be notified immediately following the oath taking portion. 
- The candidate’s certificate is to be removed from the pile. 
- The candidate’s name is NOT to be called and the certificate is NOT to be 
presented.589  
 
The oath at the heart of this furor is a simple one:  
 
I swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Canada, Her Heirs and 
Successors, and that I will faithfully observe the laws of Canada and fulfill 
my duties as a Canadian citizen.590 
 
Canadian courts consider evaluating religious requirements futile. The Supreme Court of 
Canada developed a test of personal religious belief in which an individual’s sincerely held belief 
is given precedence over religious community norms or expectations.591 Many of those who 
opposed Ishaq’s bid to wear her niqab during the citizenship ceremony argued that Muslim 
women are not required to do so. However, under Canadian Charter law no one has the authority 
to decide what religions or their adherents should or should not believe (including authority 
figures within a tradition). Many of these opposing voices came from within the Canadian 
Muslim community, and this highlights an important aspect of conflicting views around the 
exercise of agency and social coercion, which will be discussed more later. However, what a 
Muslim woman may or may not be “required” to do is irrelevant in Canadian courts. It only 
matters what she herself feels compelled to do. This prevents courts and public organizations 
having to determine the “reasonableness” of practices connected to beliefs, such as the 
possibility of prophets, revelation, atonement, etc. The onus is on the party limiting the religious 
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freedom to prove it is necessary. It is important to know that where meeting a request for an 
accommodation based on religious belief causes harm, is based on hatred, or impacts others, the 
law sets down tests to determine how and to what extent the right to accommodation may need to 
be limited.592 It is important to remember that in this case, however, the sincerity of Ishaq’s belief 
was not on trial. 
In October, 2014, Ishaq v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 156, was 
heard in Federal Court Trial Division. Lorne Waldman argued that the new policy violated 
Ishaq’s Charter right to religious freedom [sections 2(a) and 2(b)], forcing her to sacrifice her 
sincerely held beliefs in order to become a citizen. The government countered that Ishaq’s 
challenge was premature. Because Kenney put the restriction in the Manual it was not law, only a 
guideline. It was for the citizenship judges to enforce or not, at their discretion. Ultimately, this 
argument was the government’s own undoing. It was demonstrably untrue that the government 
did not wish to make the face veil removal mandatory. Emails from within the Immigration 
department, in addition to public statements from Minister Kenney and Prime Minister Harper, 
clearly indicated a mandatory intention. One of the emails included the following: 
In looking over the hand written comments from the Minister, it is pretty 
clear that he would like the changes to the procedure to “require” citizenship 
candidates to show their face and that these changes be made as soon as 
possible … My interpretation is that the Minister would like this done, 
regardless of whether there is a legislative base and that he will use his 
prerogative to make policy changes.593 
 
However, only the Governor-in-Council can create compulsory law for the oath of 
citizenship, according to section 27(1)(h) of the Citizenship Act.594 Justice Keith Boswell spent 
four months deliberating. In February 2015 he made his ruling, declaring the policy unlawful. He 
                                                   
592 Morlock, “Religion is a Human Right” 
593 Cited in 2015 FC 156 at para 46. Quoted in Fluker, “The Niqab, The Oath.”  
594 Fluker, “The Niqab, The Oath.”  
  178 
rejected the argument that it was not intended to be compulsory and declared, “Any requirement 
that a candidate for citizenship actually be seen taking the oath would make it impossible not just 
for a niqab-wearing woman to obtain citizenship, but also for a mute person or a silent monk.”595 
The provisions in the manual fell under the realm of law, and not just policy (as the government 
argued), because they were publicly available and established an identifiable obligation for 
general application.596 Boswell also found the policy, “directly contradicted regulations calling 
for ‘the greatest possible freedom in the religious solemnization’ of citizenship.”597 
The Government appealed in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Ishaq, 2015 FCA 
194, heard on September 15, 2015 in the Federal Court of Appeal. While preparations for the 
appeal would take months, Prime Minister Harper’s Conservative government introduced a bill 
to Parliament modifying the regulations on June 19. If Parliament passed the bill it would give 
the policy to ban niqabs during citizenship ceremonies the force of law.598 However, before that 
could happen Prime Minister Harper asked Governor General David Johnston to dissolve 
Parliament on August 2, initiating an unusually long eleven week campaign for the federal 
election on October 19.599  
In a rare move the bench in Canada v. Ishaq issued its ruling the same day, immediately 
after hearing testimony. In a six paragraph decision, the three judges — Justices Johanne Trudel, 
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Wyman Webb, and Mary Gleason (all appointed by Prime Minister Harper) — unanimously 
agreed with Justice Boswell’s findings.600 Journalist Ryan Remiorz described it as “the sort of 
thing judges do when they believe the arguments they’ve heard aren’t even worth sleeping 
on.”601 It was a month before election day and the judges intended to give Ishaq enough time to 
take her oath so she could vote.602 The next day the government served notice that it intended to 
appeal to the Supreme Court. On September 18 the government sought a stay of application, 
which would have the appeal court choose not to implement its ruling. The court denied the 
stay.603  
 
A Federal Election 
The niqab, a topic that had been simmering in Canadian politics for months, instantly 
became the most fiercely debated issue of the election. In Quebec, where opposition to the 
religious dress in general and the niqab in particular is strongest, Harper’s Quebec lieutenant 
Denis Lebel told voters that the Conservatives would reintroduce a bill on veils and citizenship 
oaths within 100 days if they were re-elected.604 The Bloc Québécois ran animated television 
ads, displaying a drop of oil from a pipeline turning into a veiled woman.605 Beneath the image 
was the caption, “La goutte de trop” (a drop too much).606 On September 22, the Conservative 
                                                   
600 Fluker, “The Niqab, The Oath.” 
601 Remiorz, “A Single Niqab Eclipses All,” 30. 
602 McKeon, “Zunera’s War.” 
603 Remiorz, “A Single Niqab Eclipses All,” 30. 
604 Angelica Montgomery, “What you need to know about Quebec's religious neutrality legislation: 
Bill 62 bans all public workers and all those receiving any government service from wearing a niqab or 
burka,” CBC News: Montreal, October 17, 2017. 
605 Remiorz, “A Single Niqab Eclipses All,” 31. 
606 John Barber, “Veil Debate Becomes Big Issue in Canada Election, Putting Conservatives Into Lead,” The  
Guardian (Canada edition), October 21, 2015. 
  180 
Party released French language TV ads stating they shared Quebecers’ values, including the 
belief that a woman’s face should be uncovered while taking the Citizenship Oath.607  
These followed Prime Minister Harper’s remarks in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 
March 10, 2015, when he stated, “And why would Canadians, contrary to our own values, 
embrace a practice at that time that is not transparent, that is not open and, frankly, is rooted in a 
culture that is anti-women?”608 New Democratic Party leader Tom Mulcair rejected Harper’s 
stance: “When he talks about a culture of 1.8 billion human beings as being anti-woman … [it’s] 
very divisive and it's irresponsible, and it's undignified from a Canadian Prime Minister.”609 
Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau described it as, “doubling down on the politics of fear,” and “the 
crassest kind of politics.”610 Many Canadians responded to Harper’s comments through social 
media with a mocking hashtag: #DressCodePM. Sarah M tweeted, “Sorry, @PMHarper, the cure 
for ‘anti-women culture’ is not to tell women what they can and cannot wear. Nice try, 
#dresscodePM.”611 Rob Nickerson tweeted, “Need clarification. Does PM Harper need to 
approve my wife’s clothing or can any man do it? #DresscodePM.”612 Others posted images of 
themselves and their outfits for the day, asking @PMHarper if their outfits were acceptable.613 
This Twitter campaign exerted the same manner of social control that the Conservative Party was 
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employing, namely using dress to illustrate where the boundaries of socially acceptable 
behaviours lay (albeit in the opposite direction).614 
Elizabeth May, leader of the Green Party, was unambiguous in her opinion: “We have to 
renounce politics of fear and division in this country … It’s 2015; there are real challenges that 
face Canada. But a woman being entitled to wear a niqab in a citizenship ceremony is an issue? 
Excuse me, this is not an issue. This is a cynical manipulation.”615 Trudeau challenged the Prime 
Minister in the House of Commons, demanding Harper explain, “to Canada's half a million 
Muslim women why he said their chosen faith is anti-women.”616 Harper countered that he had 
said no such thing — in fact he had said the niqab practice was “anti-woman,” not the Muslim 
faith — and read comments from Muslim organizations supporting his position that wearing a 
niqab while taking the Oath of Citizenship was offensive. He argued that, “These are not the 
views only of the overwhelming majority of Canadians, they are the views of the overwhelming 
majority of moderate Muslims … It is up to the leader of the Liberal party to explain why he is 
so far outside that mainframe.”617  
Harper had the numbers to support his position. A Leger poll showed 82 per cent of 
Canadians believed the niqab should be banned during citizenship ceremonies. Quebec’s 
opposition was highest at 93 per cent, while British Columbia’s was lowest at 72 per cent.618 
Trudeau replied that apparently Harper “[believes] that the majority should dictate the religious 
rights of minorities … just as he did as a Reform MP 25 years ago when he opposed allowing 
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Sikh RCMP officers to wear turbans.”619 Beyond the political discussion of majority versus 
minority “greatest good,” this is a statistical example of how the social body manages and 
censures bodies that do not conform to cultural standards of appropriate dress.620 
Like May and Trudeau, Mulcair was clear in his support of a Muslim woman’s right to 
wear a niqab at any time and urged Canadians not to, “give in to the politics of fear, division and 
exclusion.”621 But unlike May and Trudeau, Mulcair — who was leading in the polls — faced a 
heavy adverse reaction for his position. When the judges issued their verdict on September 15, 
the NDP party’s campaign director Anne McGrath started hearing about the court’s decision 
within minutes. Candidates and riding organizations in Quebec sent her “frantic messages”: 
“We’re going to lose the election over this.”622 They were not wrong. “The backlash against NDP 
candidates was immediate. … On Sept. 20, NDP candidates’ signs across Montreal were 
defaced. On some, vandals scrawled the word ‘Islam.’ Female candidates had niqabs painted 
over the photos of their faces.”623 Political journalist Douglas Todd declared, “… debate over 
Zunera Ishaq’s niqab helped kill the best chances the New Democratic Party ever had to form the 
national government.”624 After the election, when his party went from 95 seats to 44 and from 
lead in the pre-election polls to third, Mulcair stood by his choice. In his first interview after the 
election he told the Canadian Press,  
These were defining moments for me in my political career and in the 
campaign. And could a different result have been achieved? Perhaps. But I 
wasn’t going to do something that I had never done in my career. … I’d 
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always been a person who stood up for his convictions. … I wasn’t going to 
be a part of [divisive and fear mongering rhetoric]. I just found it 
undignified.625 
 
The Conservatives, who were lagging in the polls, initially benefited from the niqab 
debate. In Modest Fashion: Styling Bodies, Mediating Faith, Reina Lewis argues that when a 
government takes the step to legislate Muslim women’s dress it represents the place of religio-
ethnic identity within the country’s nationalism.626 Amplifying the issue demonstrated that the 
party understood the role of this value in igniting their base. Discussing this matter, EKOS 
Research Associates president Frank Graves told Maclean’s magazine, “Emotions are what 
determine who wins elections.”627 On the same day Ishaq told The Guardian, “This is not an 
issue … this is a trivial thing.” Graves, however, told that paper, “It’s a huge issue. It’s sorting 
the electorate right now. It has really invigorated the Conservatives and moved them into a clear 
lead.”628 The party then saw a leap from third to first place, with a 10 percent jump in the polls, 
when they announced that they would appeal their second defeat in court to the Supreme 
Court.629 Legal experts agreed the government had almost no chance of succeeding where they 
had failed with the Federal Courts. In fact, given that the Federal Appeal Court’s decision was 
unanimous, it was probable the Supreme Court would dismiss the case without hearing it.630 
According to University of Toronto law professor Denise Réaume, “There couldn’t be a clearer 
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case of government ministers just whipping up the population when they haven’t got a legal leg 
to stand on.”631  
When the Conservatives rose in the polls, the NDP plummeted.632 Mulcair’s stance was, 
not surprisingly, most unpopular in Quebec. In the previous election, the party had seen its 
largest support in that province in its history, making forming a federal government the most 
probable it had ever been. But as Quebec voters abandoned the party over the niqab issue, left-
leaning English Canada began to lose confidence in the NDP’s ability to defeat the Conservatives 
and predominantly switched their support to the Liberal party and Justin Trudeau.633  
For the Conservatives, the niqab became the most prominent of a series of tactics to 
muster votes through wedge issues. The party hired controversial Australian campaign consultant 
Lynton Crosby, who was largely responsible for David Cameron’s win in the United Kingdom 
earlier in the year, and Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s re-election campaign where 
mistrust of refugees figured prominently. Howard turned away a vessel of 440 asylum seekers, 
the MV Tampa, and then ran a newspaper ad stating, “We decide who comes into this 
country.”634 When Crosby became an advisor, Harper increased his rhetoric around rigorously 
vetting refugees from the “terrorist war zone.”635 Historian and public policy analyst Gerald 
Caplan (who is also connected with the NDP), wrote in The Globe and Mail, “Quite simply, the 
Conservatives have decided that [Ishaq] is a useful weapon in their re-election campaign. By 
scapegoating her while introducing their much-criticized new anti-terrorism bill, they hope to 
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convince frightened voters that the Conservatives are their best hope against dangers of all 
kinds.”636 Critics of the anti-terrorism bill (Bill C-51) felt it lacked sufficient oversight, created 
two tiers of citizens, and was too broad in its scope. The party attempted to use their bill and 
Ishaq’s niqab to convince Canadians that, unlike their Liberal and NDP counterparts, the 
Conservatives were the country’s best hope to keep terrorism at bay. The Liberal party supported 
the bill, despite opposition from their base, in order to avoid accusations of being “soft” on 
terrorism.637  
Unlike in Australia and the UK, however, the Conservatives miscalculated the public 
response. Political journalist Remiorz editorialized that, “Over the heads of some Harper advisers 
… light bulbs started to blink. Hey: If a wary stance toward Syrian refugees was a good idea, and 
a strong stand against veiled citizenship oaths had impaled the NDP on the horns of a dilemma, 
then maybe a lot more of this stuff would be even better!”638 There was some internal confusion, 
however, on message delivery. Federal Conservative MPs were insistent that a niqab ban would 
only apply to citizenship ceremonies and not in other spheres of public life, including the public 
service. However, when gallery reporters asked the politicians to explain why, if it is not a 
problem to wear the niqab in other areas, how it is “contrary to Canadian values,” and “rooted in 
a culture that is anti-women,” they struggled to do so. Treasury Board President Tony Clement 
(who was responsible for the federal civil service) replied, “That is what the prime minister said 
and that is a point of view that one can hold.”639 The MPs followed Conservative party talking 
points emphasizing Justin Trudeau being “out of step” with the broad public support for banning 
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the niqab during citizenship ceremonies.640 The points, circulated that day, end with: “Unlike 
Justin Trudeau, we are not afraid to call the growing threat of jihadi terrorism exactly that — 
jihadi terrorism.”641   
Many Canadians became increasingly uncomfortable with this emphasis. Remiorz 
explains, “Some MPs, candidates, and campaign staffers started to send urgent messages up the 
line: Enough of this, already. For the love of Pete, let’s get off the scary-foreigners thing.”642 
Harper and his immediate advisors heeded the warning, but not everyone in the Party did. On 
Friday, October 2, while Harper took a private day in Montreal to prepare for the fifth and final 
leaders’ debate, Chris Alexander, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and Kellie Leitch, 
Minister for the Status of Women, made an announcement in Ajax, Ontario (where Alexander 
faced a tight race for re-election). Alexander and Leitch notified the electorate that they would 
heighten the Zero Tolerance For Barbaric Cultural Practices Act (which targeted concerns such 
as forced marriage, “honour” killings, and female genital mutilation) with a new RCMP tip line. 
Canadians could call the number if they felt their neighbours were engaging in such “barbaric 
cultural practices.” Leitch declared, “The Conservative government is not afraid to defend 
Canadian values,” and Alexander added, “We need to stand up for our values.”643  
Harper had not approved the move, but someone in the party had — “who knew who? 
The damned campaign had taken on a life of its own.”644  Senior campaign staffers were 
surprised by the announcement and one of Harper’s personal staffers described it as a, “Terrible 
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day on the campaign trail. Terrible. Jumped the shark.”645 Like the NDP before them, the 
Conservatives immediately felt the backlash. “#Barbaricculturalpractices” quickly became 
another mocking hashtag on social media, even more popular than #DressCodePM. Canadians 
took to Twitter and Facebook asking the Prime Minister to comment on their behaviours to 
ascertain if they fit the “barbaric cultural practices” definition, and listing issues they considered 
to fit the bill. For example, Peter Scowen tweeted, “Capri pants on men. 
#Barbaricculturalpractices.”646 Siusaidh Chaimbeul tweeted, in reference to a photo of high 
heels, “Does wearing these torture devices come under the heading of 
#barbaricculturalpractices?”647 And “twoey for real” tweeted, “Leaving like a centimeter of milk 
in the bag because you’re too lazy to change it. #Barbaricculturalpractices.”648  
Ishaq’s niqab was not the only face veil making a public appearance in the tensions 
surrounding the election. Though there were no new changes to any regulations, some candidates 
and other Canadians began publicly opposing an Elections Canada policy that allows a woman to 
wear a niqab while casting her ballot. At first glance many believed this was an unreasonable 
acquiescence to religious accommodation. Elections Canada, however, responded to these 
concerns by explaining that a niqab-wearing woman must present two items of identification – 
the same requirement for early and mail-in voters, who obviously could not show their faces 
through the post.649  
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Protesting what they considered an over-emphasis on niqabs during the election, several 
voters appeared at polling stations wearing “creative face coverings,” including a wrestling mask 
and a real pumpkin. Mike Kendrick, a resident of Edmonton who wore a mask, wrote on 
Facebook:  
This campaign has been plagued with fearmongering [sic.] and jingoism, 
making a farce of real issues. I’ve chosen to respond to Harper’s ridiculous 
tactics by ridiculing the very issue he’s forced on Canadians for weeks. The 
right to cover your head does not threaten the democratic process, whether 
you're wearing a niqab, a khustka, or a luchador mask. Citizens should have 
the right to peaceful expression and belief without fear of government 
interference.650  
 
Ultimately, the Liberal Party won the election on October 19, 2015, with Justin Trudeau 
at the helm. An aversion to nationalist protectionism played an important role in this result, 
though economic factors and a general desire for “change” after a decade of Conservative 
government were also significant factors. Ishaq herself voted for the Liberal Party, and when 
Trudeau won she wrote him an open letter of congratulation in The Toronto Star. She told him, 
“It has been blissful to see your remarkable victory.”651 During the midst of the trial and public 
furor Trudeau phoned her to find out why she wore the niqab, and why she was fighting for it in 
court. In this letter she extended, “a heartfelt thank you” for calling her when she was, “broken 
and scared. I was touched to hear from you at the most crucial time of my life. Thank you Mr. 
Trudeau for your kind support, which comforted me to stand firm on my beliefs. It wouldn’t 
have been possible without the mercy of God and support of valued leaders like you. It is a great 
privilege to become part of multicultural and diverse Canada.”652 She ended her letter with the 
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thought, “We, as Canadian Muslims, have faith in you that you will work tirelessly [to] be honest 
and sincere to serve all public interests.”653 The following spring Governor General David 
Johnston told prominent journalist Peter Mansbridge in a televised CBC interview, regarding the 
election and the niqab, “I think Canada showed its strength that that should not sidetrack us from 
who we really are. I continue to worry about any initiatives that would cause us to be small-
minded and to lose that sense of inclusiveness, fairness, [and] equality of opportunity …”654  
  
Muslims in Canada 
Johnston’s comments reflect a common Canadian self-perception, that Canada, with its 
conscious development as a multicultural nation, will reject “fear based,” “xenophobic,” or “anti-
immigrant” policies and politics.655 Yet the Quebec Human Rights Commission conducted a 
survey in 2015 that found attitudes in that province toward religious minorities — particularly 
Muslims — were far from amiable. The results are based on 25-minute interviews with 1500 
people across the province:  
“… 43 per cent of respondents said you should be suspicious of anyone who 
openly expresses their religion, 45 per cent said they had a negative view of 
religion and 48.9 per cent … said it bothered them to be attended to by a 
woman wearing a hijab. (That's compared to 5.5 per cent who said they 
were bothered by someone wearing a cross, 25 per cent by someone wearing 
a Jewish kippa, and 30.5 per cent who were bothered by someone providing 
services while wearing a turban.)”656  
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In June 2015, the Quebec government, under Liberal Premiere Philippe Couillard, 
made a second attempt to introduce legislation that would prohibit women from providing or 
accessing government services while their faces are covered. Prime Minister Harper stated, “I 
believe the Quebec government has been handling this very controversial issue in a very 
responsible manner, and we will do exactly the same thing in Ottawa.”657 The legislation was 
couched in “religious neutrality” terminology, but overtly targeted niqabi Muslim women. 
“Neutrality” here, as in many Canadian secular contexts, means absence of visible religion. 
However, when religious observance is irrevocably tied to a believer’s embodied materiality, 
such as with a niqab, in practice “neutrality” only serves to block visible religious minorities 
from the public sphere while glossing over the already entrenched manifestations of dominant 
religion(s). 
These attitudes are not limited to Quebec, and throughout the country Muslim Canadians 
report feeling a sense of not-quite-belonging. Sajidah Kutty, in her Toronto Star article, This 
Election is Not About Muslims, describes how the women in her family, “… were recently called 
‘terrorist’ on separate occasions, in public. For my mother, it was jarring because the initial 
prejudice she’d faced had faded and, now, as a senior, she’s grown accustomed to the peace of a 
truly multicultural society. Now, she doesn’t feel so good.”658 Kutty lives in an upscale suburban 
neighbourhood, and the name-calling occurred when her mother was visiting her. “Not surprising 
– my street is peppered with blue signs, the predominant colour here.”659 Blue is the colour of 
Harper’s Conservative Party of Canada. Moustapha Kori Mbami is a mining engineer in 
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Timmins, a northern Ontario town, and a member of the Timmins Islamic Centre. He told the 
The Timmins Daily Press that most of the local women do not wear the niqab, but some do. “My 
friend's wife was walking around Gillies Lake, and one person tried to hit her with a cane. If she 
gets hurt, it is because of the misunderstandings in the community.”660 He said that, “the message 
local Muslims get time and time again from people in Timmins is simple: ‘You don't belong.’661 
When the Islamic Centre publicly celebrated Eid-al-Adha they were “deeply disturbed” by the 
hostile online response. The Centre explains that many Muslims come to Timmins and leave 
soon after. Ahmad Farrag, a medical doctor in the community, says, “I have a lot of friends who 
are physicians who have been offered permanent positions at the hospital, but they refused.”662 
Farrag also explains, however, that the anti-Islamic sentiment is not the only part of their 
experience in Timmins. “Just because some people act in a bad way … we do not judge the 
entire city to be bad. … I’m happy in my work and so are [many of] my friends. We want to stay 
here and have a good life. We just want less turbulence around Islam.”663  
As Ishaq’s niqab case became the public flashpoint for the conflicting values inscribed 
onto religious dress, there was a quantifiable increase in public hostility, physical, and verbal 
attacks against visibly Muslim individuals and mosques. “By framing the niqab unilaterally as a 
symbol of subjugation, the Harper government also positioned it as a threat to the Western way 
of life …”664 Mosques began offering self-defence courses for women and girls. Women who 
had always worn the hijab without concern became “hyper-aware of people noticing it.”665  
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Here the significance of embodied materiality becomes clearly evident. In her article, On 
the Road: Travels with My Hijab, Maliha Masood explains this: “[In America] people have a 
hard time believing that I’m a Muslim just because I don’t cover. They can tell by my funny 
sounding, hard-to-pronounce name that I must be a ‘foreigner,’ but that’s about it. The emphasis 
on image is so strong that if you don’t look like a caricatured Muslim, you simply cannot be 
one.”666 As S. Brent Plate argues, even in a society so focused on ideas, it is still not possible to 
sense in abstraction. We need sense-able objects on which to cast our projections.667 A Muslim 
woman without a veil — despite being part of the vast majority of Muslim women in North 
America — does not embody the general perception of who, and what, a Muslim woman “is.” A 
woman in a hijab, however — or even more so, a niqab — can embody all the negative 
associations with Islam. In the words of Plate, “Such is the paradox of religious experience: the 
most ordinary things can become extraordinary.”668 A few inches of chiffon comes to incarnate 
ideology most Canadians find repugnant. Noha Abdul Ghaffar expresses this experience: “When 
I go to the airport, and people see me in my niqab and abaya, and [my husband] Zuhair with his 
beard, oh my God! We’re Osama Bin Laden!”669 When Yvonne Ridley converted to Islam she 
began wearing the hijab, and noticed the results immediately. “… The repercussions were 
enormous. All I did was cover my head and hair — but I instantly became a second-class 
citizen.”670 Lauren McKeon explains, “The veil has come to symbolize everything Westerners 
project onto Islam—a kind of us-versus-them mentality that positions North America as an 
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enlightened society and the Middle East as an archaic backwater.”671 Natasha Bakht, a law 
professor at the University of Ottawa believes that, “Niqab-wearing women appear to provoke a 
repugnance in many people such that they are unable to move beyond this visceral reaction.”672 
Zunera Ishaq lived this reality. When the court announced its decision in her favour, hate 
mail filled her Facebook page and her lawyer’s inbox. A woman from Fort McMurray, Alberta, 
wrote to Waldman saying, “You have the gaul [sic] to tell me on national television that I have to 
live in ‘harmony’ with individuals who have lived here for five years but who will only become 
citizens on their own terms.”673 Many told Ishaq to, predictably, “go back where you came 
from.”674 When a niqabi woman was attacked in Flemingdon Park, Toronto, Ishaq received an 
anonymous message warning her she “was next.” Ishaq describes that time as, “the worst days of 
my life.”675  
 
Opposition to the Niqab 
Objection to the niqab is multifaceted, but generally falls into five categories: 1) belief 
that the niqab is a symbol of women’s oppression; 2) fear of terrorism and national security; 3) 
concern that a niqabi woman cannot be identified; 4) an assumption that a visible face is 
necessary for clear communication; and 5) unease that the niqab is a sign that Muslims will not 
fully integrate.676 The idea that niqabs are a sign of Muslim women’s oppression, and that niqabi 
women cover at the demand of an intimidating man in their lives is the most commonly 
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expressed opposition.677 University of British Columbia political scientist emeritus Philip 
Resnick argues, “The niqab offends Canadian sensibilities in a way that the head scarf does not. 
It reminds us there are countries where women cannot show their faces in public. It represents 
the most backward-looking and repressive feature of Salafist ideology.”678 There are two 
problems with this line of thinking; the first is its focus on the men in their lives without 
considering the women’s own choices and agency. While women’s (like everyone’s) agency is 
socially located, and therefore behavior-directing and meaning-defining with some pressure to 
exercise certain practices, it certainly exists and it is important to center the conversation about 
women’s choices on the women making the choices.679 
The focus on the men in Muslim women’s lives is rooted in older colonial attitudes that 
are still evident. In That (Afghan)Girl!, Zeiger asserts, “Veiled women—swathed from head to 
foot or behind the barred windows of the harem—have been the subject of photographs and 
paintings since Westerners began exploring and claiming the ‘exotic’ East.”680 In line with 
Rudyard Kipling’s infamous poem The White Man’s Burden, European men not only brought 
civilization to the “inferior” Middle Eastern others as colonizers, they “protected” local women 
from the oppression and degradation of local men.681 Columbia University Indian scholar 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak infamously coined the phrase, “white men saving brown women 
from brown men.”682 Harvard University Islamic feminist scholar Leila Ahmed expands on this 
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idea, explaining, “… The visually arresting sign of the veil became a symbol both of Islam’s 
degradation of women and of the religion’s fundamental inferiority.”683 University of Toronto 
post-colonial feminist scholar Sherene Razack argues that, “the regulation of the conduct of 
Muslim migrant communities, justified in the name of gender equality, resorts to culturalist 
arguments that Muslims are inherently patriarchal and uncivilized.”684 These attitudes are as 
prevalent today as in the mid-19th century. Montreal Canadian Muslim blogger MGH, author of 
The Middle Eastern Feminist, posted the following: 
Being a student of political science and philosophy in the west, I’ve been 
recently exposed to so much white saviourism … regarding the Middle East 
that it’s wild. In political science and feminist theory, so many of my class’s 
discussion has revolved around women who veil and last week a question 
was brought up about whether their [sic.] should be laws that ban it to 
‘protect’ women who veil, because apparently you can’t willingly consent to 
it yourself. This discussion was mostly dominated by white people saying 
that this would protect Middle Eastern women even though bans are more 
likely to humiliate than protect.685 
 
In her contribution to Lori Beaman’s Reasonable Accommodation, Natasha Bakht contends, “… 
Muslim girls and women are perpetually perceived as imperilled and in need of protection from 
their family members, dangerous Muslim men.” It is then “through the rescue efforts” of 
“civilized” Canadians — in this case the federal government — “that the girls will be saved.”686 
The ambiguity of Muslim femaleness with regard to social categories sits at the centre of this 
public denate, bound to what Sherry Ortner called “the purity/pollution idiom.”687 This is of 
course not limited to Muslim or Arab women, as we saw in the case of Mennonite women. In the 
Western paradigm, women were first dangerous, but are now (usually) in danger, “justifying male 
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protection … Before they were polluting, and this had to be defended against, but now they are 
said to be pure, and need to be defended.”688 Both the Mennonite bonnet and Muslim niqab cases 
demonstrate that women often occupy both simultaneously. 
Of course what is missing in this framework is the voices of the Muslim women 
themselves. There is not yet comprehensive research into the opinions of niqabi women in 
Canada, but in 2012 the Canadian Council of Muslim Women released a study called, Women in 
Niqab Speak. They interviewed 81 niqabi women in Quebec and Ontario, and most were like 
Ishaq: well-educated, married, foreign-born, and in their 20s or early 30s.689 While there are a 
myriad of reasons women choose the face veil, preliminary findings remain consistent: the 
women do choose it for themselves, often over the objections of their families. Like Baltej Singh 
Dhillon, Ishaq’s relatives asked her to remove her niqab (including the uncle who stopped 
visiting). She told each of her family members, “I prefer to think for myself.”690  She explains, 
“It’s precisely because I won’t listen to how other people want me to live my life that I wear a 
niqab.”691 Ishaq acknowledges that there are contexts where men force women to veil, but does 
not feel that is grounds to deny her the right to make the choice for herself. “I do not disagree 
[that] some women [wear the niqab] out of pressure from their husbands or someone. But the 
niqab is a symbol of liberation for me. I chose it for myself.”692 Ishaq’s choice is certainly 
located within a larger personal context, including both internal and external limitations and 
pressures related to her social and religious beliefs. As we have already discussed, Elizabeth 
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Wilson challenges the very idea of “choice” when it comes to how we dress ourselves as one of 
the foundational myths of consumer culture.693  
While Ishaq’s dress practice is certainly socially located, there is no overtly tyrannical 
man of the public imagination pressing it on her. This matter of Ishaq’s decision to veil is central 
to both the court case and the public discussion surrounding it. The courts protect her right, as a 
free citizen with a sincerely held belief, to wear her niqab. If it was someone else’s belief (such 
as her husband’s) then the right is not protected. This, of course, is different from saying that she, 
or anyone, can make a choice entirely void of any social pressures beyond one’s control. Making 
such a claim or deliberation is beyond the prerogative (or possibility) of legal courts. Here, 
though, we see the convergence of dress, as situated bodily practice, articulating personal 
identity in the midst of social expectations and pressures.694 Many Muslim women are actively 
engaged in reimagining Islam in a back-and-forth between tradition(s) and experience(s). For 
Ishaq, her dress became her avenue of engagement.695 Yet, despite being located somewhere 
between external social forces and personal agency (as all people are), public opinion closely 
scrutinizes Muslim women’s decisions to veil in a way that is not equally applied to other  
women’s dress choices.696 This reality exists despite a great deal of research on how (secular) 
public spaces and institutions impose their own structures onto women’s bodies and dress 
practice.697  
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The second problem with focusing on the niqab as an assumed symbol of Muslim 
women’s oppression is well summarized by Amira Elghawaby, Azeezah Kanji, Natasha Bakht, et 
al. in Islamophobic “Feminism” Hurts Women: “The critics who are so incensed by the 
subjugation of Muslim women tend to be conspicuously silent when the agents of violence are 
non-Muslims …”698 If the matter is a deep concern for women’s welfare such that individuals 
feel a necessity to publicly engage, then how are scholars to understand the parallel silence on 
undisputed examples of violence against women and women’s inequality in this country? 
Women in Canada are eleven times more likely than men to be victims of sexual violence, and 
Indigenous women are three times more likely than non-Indigenous women to be so.699 Canadian 
women make, on average, 73 cents to their male colleague’s dollar despite having surpassed men 
in education levels.700 In 2011, there were a staggering 97 500 reported cases of domestic 
abuse.701 Approximately every six days in Canada a woman is murdered by her intimate partner, 
and the country’s domestic abuse laws remain painfully inadequate to address the problem.702 
Yet there is nothing like the public outcry that exists over niqabs for these documented instances 
of abuse against women in Canadian communities. If, as Entwistle argued previously, social 
parameters around what dress is publicly appropriate articulate a culture’s internal anxieties, and 
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the niqab logically highlights concerns over security and women’s equality, what does a 
simultaneous silence about conclusive women’s rights issues say?703 
Some opponents believe the niqab represents intolerance, and while there are certainly 
instances of this within Canada and abroad (as there are for many ideological dress items), there 
is no evidence that Ishaq, the embodied centre of the controvery, is herself intolerant. At no point 
in the debate did she denigrate others’ beliefs, or promote her practices as necessary for others. 
In fact, she did the opposite, explaining, “I do not feel that Muslim women who do not wear the 
niqab are lesser than me. What I’ve done is my choice, another opinion.”704 Yet in his article in 
which he quotes Ishaq, journalist Douglas Todd suggests she is a hypocrite, indicating that her 
ideology is more in line with the far-right stances of Conservative MP Kelli Leitch. However, 
this is not a completely accurate reflection of what Ishaq says: “… Being a Muslim, it's my view 
that homosexuality is not the right thing. But I have to tolerate it, without discrimination and 
without hatred. I have no issues with people who are homosexual.”705 While she is certainly not 
an LGBT+ advocate, she frames her opposition in terms of what she considers her obligatory 
beliefs and her message is one of mutual tolerance. Todd points to her support of gender 
segregation and different roles for men and women (particularly regarding women not being 
Imams) as evidence of her anti-Canadian beliefs.706 However, in an open letter to new Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau she states, “Finally we have a leader who appointed a cabinet that 
demonstrated gender equality and was comprised of people that represent the face of Canada.”707 
This hardly sounds like a woman who disputes the Canadian value of gender equity. In her 
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interview with Todd she also says she has high respect for Stephen Harper and that she believes 
he was only acting on his own beliefs, as she was, and that “has to be honoured.”708 In so doing 
she extends the value of respecting another’s right to different opinions to her most public 
opponent. The issue at hand is not these matters of public policy, but the reality of Ishaq’s beliefs 
in comparison to how they are presented in light of her wearing a niqab. These examples 
demonstrate the ways projecting societal anxieties onto dress choice can result in hearing a 
distorted message from the individual in the dress. 
Likewise, when Todd asked her about abortion rights she replied, “According to Islam, 
I’m not given the choice to an abortion. But I respect all the different opinions and give them the 
same status. I do not feel anything bad for [women who have abortions]. Living in Canada, the 
most important thing to understand is that we are free in our choices.”709 Proponents of the 
Canadian diversity model may take issue with “tolerance” being the measure of integration and 
harmony, but Ishaq — the most publicly niqabi woman in Canada — is hardly articulating the 
intolerance many in her wider social context expect to hear from one embodying her dress 
practice. She is demonstrably not the figure of the public imagination, actively working for 
women’s rights, posing no threat to national security, is easily identifiable, communicates quite 
clearly with her face covered, and is committed to integrating into Canadian society while 
honouring her personal identity. 
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National Security and Identity 
Letters to the editor during the Ishaq controversy demonstrate a general public unease at a 
covered face. Walter Stowe of Windsor, Ontario, wrote:  
The Star showed in the paper this week two pictures showing, it said, 
Zunera Ishaq, wearing the niqab. But all we could see was a pair of eyes. 
How does anyone know it was really her? Could she have been sent here to 
stir up trouble in Canada? That’s the question. … I say, unless you can see 
the face to prove who you are, then don’t bother coming to Canada for 
citizenship.710  
 
In 2015, Conservative MP Costa Menegakis, then-Parliamentary Secretary to the Citizenship and 
Immigration Minister, justified the citizenship niqab ban by saying, “We need to know who they 
are.”711 Independent scholar, curator, and activist Jennifer Heath states, “… [The West] is 
obsessed with penetrating the veil and obfuscating the lines between public and private 
spaces.”712 This includes both personal space and religious space. Those who wish women to 
remove their veils want these women to blur the line they have drawn for themselves between 
their private bodies and the public space they occupy. At the same time, some proponents of 
secularism delegate the veil (as a religious marker) to the private sphere. Yet, as a social object, 
society wants to know, as Stowe indicated, “who’s under there.”713 
Of course these attitudes have more to do with societal fears than with security concerns. 
Niqabi women regularly comply with security measures, including removing their veils for 
identification purposes at border crossings, banks, etc., and agree to be scanned and have their 
belongings examined, like other Canadians.714 However, as Bakht argues, the “uncomplicated 
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nexus” drawn between a niqabi woman and honour killings, ISIS beheadings, and terrorist plots, 
“suggests that in the public’s imagination Muslims are inherently dangerous and therefore 
legitimately seen as security risks.”715 Ultimately, Bakht argues, these views, “reveal less about 
Muslim women than they do about the objectors.”716  
Like the concern over Muslim women’s gender equity, any non-Muslim Canadians who 
are concerned about the risk of terrorism should understand the importance of working with 
Muslim Canadians and not typecasting them as fundamentally dangerous. In his article, Harper’s 
Niqab Ban Plays Dangerous Politics, Gerald Caplan argues: 
CSIS and the Mounties badly need the co-operation of the Muslim 
community to provide information about security risks among them. Yet 
even moderate Muslims – the large majority – are outraged by the way the 
government has, among other things, been picking on this one harmless 
Muslim woman, and in the process mocking the right of all Muslims to 
follow their religion in the way they want. Out of sheer political 
opportunism, Stephen Harper is undermining that community’s trust in 
official Canada while very likely estranging and radicalizing some Muslims, 
perhaps dangerously.717 
 
Zunera Ishaq’s niqab, an unremarkable length of fabric in and of itself, created such national 
public tension that it affected the relationship between parts of the Canadian Muslim community 
and the federal government – a relationship that is instrumental in national counter-terrorism. In 
the Harper government’s choice to focus on the niqab as a banner for their opposition to 
extremism, they in fact hampered an important part of counter-terrorism work. 
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Communication and Social Conventions 
Others argue that the niqab is a barrier to communication. Homa Wilson, an assistant 
solicitor specializing in employment and discrimination law, disagrees: “… we are very 
experienced in non face-to-face communication; for example, when we speak over the phone or 
communicate via the internet we can’t rely on a person’s body language or facial expressions. Yet 
we don’t have a problem in understanding what is being communicated.”718 Yvonne Ridley, the 
woman who felt like a second-class citizen when she adopted the hijab, expresses a similar 
sentiment:  
I didn’t know whether to scream or laugh when Italy’s [former Prime 
Minister Romano] Prodi joined the debate last week by declaring that it is 
‘common sense’ not to wear the nikab because it makes social relations 
‘more difficult.’ Nonsense. If this is the case, then why are cellphones, 
landlines, e-mail, text messaging and fax machines in daily use? And no one 
switches off the radio because they can’t see the presenter’s face.”719  
 
Others argue that the niqab is simply rude in a Western context. In her article, Veiled 
Insult, Ann Applebaum argues, “… it [is] considered rude, in a Western country, to hide one’s 
face. We wear masks when we want to frighten, when we are in mourning or when we want to 
conceal our identities. … Thieves and actors hide their faces in the West; honest people look you 
straight in the eye.”720 Some Canadian Muslim women share this idea. Pakistani-born Muslim 
women’s rights activist Raheel Raza wrote, “Our face is our identity and common sense requires 
for it be uncovered.”721 This is a clear illustration of how, as Entwistle explained earlier, breaking 
dress codes of conduct bring such conventions to the fore, and how the bodies that break these 
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social rules risk exclusion and scorn. Social groups expect “common sense” to manage 
individuals’ dress choices within these boundaries.722 
University of Ottawa religious studies scholar Lori Beaman argues, however, that “The 
assumption underlying common sense is that we all share similar experiences and have ready 
access to the knowledge offered by them.”723 She explains that “common sense” is a cultural 
system, socially and historically constructed, and by no means universal.724 The opponents’ 
arguments imply that veiled Muslim women, regardless of where they were born, will always be 
foreigners and outsiders. They promote a power system where “Western hosts” act as 
gatekeepers for “non-Western guests,” and affirm the idea that niqabi women are inherently 
frightening.725 Natasha Bakht expands on this: “The moral limits of public behaviour are neatly 
subsumed in the language of politeness. Through the supposedly neutral idiom of courtesy, 
certain cultural, racial, and gendered attributes and modes of behaviour are furthered as 
appropriate while others are deemed unacceptable, even excessive.”726 This polarity requires no 
justification because it represents and privileges the dominant culture’s perspective, “which sees 
itself as gracious.”727 Opponents view the niqab as a, “hostile rejection of our open Western 
societies that one day welcomed those people as guests.”728 They perceive it as a symbol of 
confrontation, or as a challenge to Western codes of dress and behaviour.729 Harper’s “anti-
women” and “Canadian values” comments are an example of how the niqab is understood “as 
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plainly offensive to the values we cherish.”730 Sevgi Kilic argues this makes niqabi women come 
across as ungrateful for not imitating their hosts.731 Beaman summarizes this situation succinctly: 
“In the absence of analyses that critically reflect on these … biases, debates can be structured so 
that dominant group norms appear to be universal and superior while minority group norms 
appear to be self-focused and inferior.”732 John D. Marvin, a resident of Peterborough, Ontario, 
expressed this sentiment in his letter to the editor: “I was absolutely astounded that this woman 
thinks she has the right to have the rules and regulations of this country altered to accommodate 
her customs …”733 In this environment, it is others’ reaction that justifies banning the niqab.734 It 
is important to note here how the oppositions based on manners are in tension with the 
oppositions based on oppression. Taken together, a niqabi woman is meek and oppressed while 
simultaneously being confrontational and selfishly aggressive. 
 
Integration 
Lastly, many Canadians believe the niqab represents an unwillingness to integrate into 
mainstream society. The item of cloth seems to embody a stubborn obstinacy to “foreign ways,” 
despite many niqabi women demonstrating an eagerness to be actively involved in Canadian 
society.735 Zunera Ishaq publicly states that she can best serve Canada through activism. In 
addition to her many volunteer activities, she is now actively involved in the cause of Syrian 
refugees. Many who met her in the midst of her legal battle, including her lawyers Lorne 
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Waldman and Naseem Mithoowani, and then-Liberal candidate Justin Trudeau, described her as 
a “model Canadian.”736 This is certainly, at least in part, intentional public messaging to 
convince Canadians of Ishaq’s “acceptability.” Yet, as discussed earlier, Ishaq’s dedication to 
volunteerism is not incidental, nor is it that she merely happens to share these Canadian values. 
Ishaq’s service work is deeply rooted in her Islamic faith, represented in her niqab. Both are 
situated embodied practices expressing her religious beliefs. 
Raheel Raza believes the niqab “ghettoizes” the Muslim Canadian community, and that 
they are then choosing to be “the other.” “… If we don’t get with the plan and work towards 
being the mainstream … [i]f we insist that we can’t change, then we’re entirely to blame when 
we remain on the fringes of society.”737 However, Gauri van Gulik, a global advocate in the 
Women’s Rights Division of Human Rights Watch, wrote in a report on hijabs, “… banning the 
headscarf is the worst possible policy response to the need to bring people into mainstream 
society. Our research showed that the ban serves to exclude, rather than include.”738 If Canadians 
wish veiled Muslim women to integrate then public spaces must feel welcoming to them. Van 
Gulik explains, “Many women we talked to felt alienated by the bans, even though some had 
lived in [the country] for decades or even their entire lives.”739 Communicating to women that 
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their embodied beliefs are socially unacceptable only serves to ostracize them from the 
mainstream. “Gender equality and peaceful integration should be prime objectives for anyone 
concerned with public policy. These objectives are not met by excluding women who make a 
choice to cover their hair.”740 Bakht argues that such critics will never accept niqabi women in 
the mainstream because, “… we need the niqab-wearing woman in order to create a self-portrait 
that is flattering — one that is virtuous while she is aberrant, innocent in contrast to her guilt, and 
powerful as she is weak.”741 This exclusion centres on the veil. “The integration of Muslim 
women in society is articulated as a problem, but its cause is located not in society with its 
systemic barriers to inclusion that we benefit from and perpetuate but in Muslim women’s choice 
to veil.”742 Muslim women who, like Raheel Raza, “get with the plan and work towards being 
mainstream,” are not considered a threat, “… because they are ‘like us’ – that is, like 
Christians.”743 It does not seem possible, however, for niqabi women to be, “incorporated into 
the identity of the nation-state,”744 because their veil personifies that which is simply too “other.” 
 
Feminism and Muslim Women’s Agency 
Lori Beaman contends that, “People from minority communities are more likely to have 
their capacity for agency scrutinized than members of the dominant mainstream culture.”745 
Richard Moon makes the same point in Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada, as does Saba 
Mahmood in Politics of Piety.746 In her now famous article, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, 
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Susan Moller Okin poses the question, “… what should be done when the claims of minority 
cultures or religions clash with the norm of gender equality that is … formally endorsed by 
liberal states …?”747 She argues that, “from a feminist point of view,” minority group rights are 
by no means “part of the solution,” and “may well exacerbate the problem.” She goes so far as to 
claim that these women, “might be much better off if the culture into which they were born were 
either to become extinct (so that its members would become integrated into the less sexist 
surrounding culture), or, preferably, to be encouraged to alter itself so as to reinforce the equality 
of women …”748 She argues that the founding myth of many religions, including Islam, justifies 
the control and subordination of women.749 As with the case of Mennonite women’s 
headcoverings, patriarchy and subservience are certainly part of this, but acting as though it is 
the whole story itself silences and represses women’s voices and experiences. In her response to 
Okin, Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?, Azizah Y. Al-
Hibri appreciates that Okin’s position, “has more integrity than one which views the … ‘alien 
immigrants’ condescendingly and argues, under the guise of Western liberalism, that ‘those 
people’ should be allowed to live in accordance with their own lower standards of human 
rights.”750 But she takes issue with the assumed all-inclusivity of Okin’s arguments. “If she is 
right about the universality of her principles, then … why should women wait for salvation, 
when the West can readily defend their right by use of force if necessary?”751 Al-Hibri notes that 
                                                   
Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton: Princeton University Press,  
2005). 
747 Susan Moller Okin, “Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?” in Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ed. Susan  
Moller Okin, Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 9. 
748 Moller Okin, 22-23. 
749 Moller Okin, 13. 
750 Azizah Y. Al-Hibri, “Is Western Patriarchal Feminism Good for Third World/Minority Women?” in Is  
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ed. Susan Moller Okin, Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard, and Martha C. 
Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 41. 
751 Al-Hibri, 41. 
  209 
Okin’s fatal flaw is exclusively using sources from outside these cultures, and I would add, 
lacking any sort of religious studies scholarship when applying christocentric secular standards 
to an un-nuanced pan-Islam.  
Okin is far from alone in her views. In her National Post article, The Attacks in Cologne 
Reveal the Ugly Truth: Cultural Relativism is Harmful to Women, Tasha Kheiriddin claims that 
the introduction of intersectionality to feminism is counter productive to gender equality. “… 
The ugly truth [is] cultural relativism is harmful to women. And feminists who refuse to call out 
sexism because they fear being called racist are doing women no favours.”752 Kheiriddin goes on 
to say:  
In the debate over the place of women in Islam and Islam’s place in the 
women’s movement, feminists have been trying to have it both ways. … 
They point to women within the Islamic community who defend these 
practices, such as Zunera Ishaq … After all, it was her choice to cover her 
face. … One wonders what the millions of women who did not have that 
choice would say. This includes Canadian women like young Aqsa Parvez, 
who was killed by her father for refusing to show respect by donning a 
hijab. … Aqsa’s own mother even blamed the victim for not listening to her 
father. … That’s not choice. That’s indoctrination …753 
 
As in the case of the Western saviour complex, there is an uncomplicated straight line drawn 
from the niqab (and hijab) to criminal behaviour. 
Latham Hunter, a former McMaster University professor of communications and cultural 
studies who self-identifies as, “a white Canadian atheist feminist” states her opinion succinctly: 
“In an age when hundreds of thousands are desperate to find refuge in the western world, we 
cannot lose ground in the fight for gender equality by ignoring the fact that the hijab and niqab 
                                                   
752 Tasha Kheiriddin, “The Attacks in Cologne Reveal the Ugly Truth: Cultural Relativism is Harmful to Women,”  
National Post (Toronto, ON), January 13, 2016. 
753 Kheiriddin, “The Attacks in Cologne.” 
  210 
are tools of oppression as well as expressions of religion.”754 She argues that, “we should 
[grapple] with complexity, not [gloss] it over. Otherwise, we’re merely multicultural pretenders 
rather than multicultural exemplars.”755 This comment quickly and easily positions Canadian 
identity as one of multicultural excellence in practice, but rooted in a specific view of gender 
equality that “glosses over” the very complexity Hunter seeks to engage. Hunter argues that, 
“[Ishaq says] it was ‘just a piece of cloth’ that was a personal issue of her own. Again, I think 
this oversimplifies a very complex issue; this ‘piece of cloth’ is, after all, favoured by ISIS.”756 
Hunter is correct that, in essence, as a symbol the niqab matters (though ironically she 
oversimplifies the issue to the other extreme). It has significance beyond its weft and weave. 
However, her implication is that Ishaq lacks her own agency, rather than examining the location 
of this agentic act. Like Hunter and many others, Douglas Todd questioned Ishaq’s, “…’choice’ 
to cover her face …”757 Okin, Kheiriddin, Hunter, and Todd all make the same mistake: reducing 
a variety of cultures, circumstances, practices, and beliefs into one homogeneous reprehensible 
phenomenon, embodied in a face veil.  
To have a discussion on the niqab (or hijab) based on lived realities, rather than 
sensationalized stereotypes, it is imperative to include these women’s voices. Hijabi Yvonne 
Ridley explains that, “by veiling, women register their role as central in the public expression of 
Muslim cultural difference … It is a personal statement: My dress tells you that I am a Muslim 
and that I expect to be treated respectfully, much as a Wall Street banker would say that a 
business suit defines him as an executive to be taken seriously.”758 Like the Mennonite women in 
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Chapter Three, Muslim women disproportionately carry (and embody) the symbolism of their 
community. Both, to varying degrees, wish to be “other” than the mainstream, but whereas 
Mennonite women represented a community that actively sought to non-conform, women like 
Zunera Ishaq wish to actively participate in the dominant Canadian culture, but with 
compromises that leave their primary identity intact.  
Natasha Bakht describes how embodied materiality communicates for the wearer; “Many 
Muslim women literally wear their religious convictions, for all to see … The headscarf can 
express an active interest in Islamic scripture, as a gesture to reaffirm a commitment to Islamic 
morality and identity within a modern social context, rather than manifesting a passive 
submission to the Islamic community.”759 These convictions include a rejection of the hyper-
sexualization, and subsequent female objectification, of Western society. But because “Muslim 
women are deemed incapable of making these emancipatory choices,” this symbol of dissent, “is 
necessarily categorized as the subordination of women rather than as a reaction by a minority of 
young women who are repulsed by the ubiquitous image of femininity offered in most Western 
nations.”760  
Catherine MacKinnon made waves as a feminist for arguing that, despite what they may 
believe, women cannot actually choose to wear the hijab (and presumably the niqab). Believing 
that they can is a “false consciousness” because their culture (and religion?) irrevocably and 
perniciously instil their self-perception and social location.761 MacKinnon is a renowned and 
brilliant feminist scholar and lawyer, who focuses most of her work on the damage pornography 
does to women, and sexual inequality between men and women. Her long-time collaborator 
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Andrea Dworkin originated a now-well-known idea that MacKinnon further developed: that a 
woman cannot fully consent to heterosexual sexual relations because of the inherent inequality 
between men and women.762 MacKinnon explains that their theory, “problematises any 
[heterosexual acts] that take place under conditions of sex inequality,” which, “in a certain 
structural sense,” is all of them.763 Their argument highlighted an important, but often 
overlooked, dynamic in heterosexual relationships, but their work on heterosexual consent has 
been largely dismissed as too radical by feminist scholars and lawmakers alike. It is not easy to 
dismiss Dworkin’s carefully constructed arguments when read attentively, but the large number 
of heterosexuals in these groups, no doubt, affected its reception. Asymmetric positions of social 
power affect the perceived dynamics of relationship and encounter.764 “We” know that this 
supposition is “absurd” and does not reflect the nature of “our” relationships. Yet, the idea that a 
Muslim woman cannot truly choose to veil is not dismissed in the same way by the same 
individuals and groups who reject the heterosexual theory. The majority recognizes the diversity 
within its own experiences, but denies it for a minority whom they read as vulnerable or 
inherently oppressed. 
This idea not only strips Muslim women of their agency, it reveals the same problematic 
“universal” assumptions — positioned (often subtly) as “We” and “They” — as evident in 
Okin’s writings. As discussed in Chapter Two, there are certainly important arguments to be 
made about an individual’s — any individual’s — ability to make choices completely removed 
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from any sort of structural or social pressure (or “sacred canopy”)765 The point, however, is not 
whether Dworkin is correct or to what extent Ishaq’s choice is socially constructed and externally 
influenced. Rather, the point is the general credence given to questioning a Muslim woman’s 
ability to choose to veil while simultaneously dismissing a parallel line of reasoning about an 
“us” issue. There is a presumed “reason” to intense focus on Muslim women’s headcoverings  
without anything like the same scrutiny given to parallel ideas around women’s sexual consent, 
or why women “choose” to shave body hair, wear chemical-laden makeup, or wear 
physiologically damaging high heels. All of these dress practices are socially located, as is 
overtly religious dress, but since the dressed body is the outcome of situated bodily practices, 
and those (secular mainstream) shaved bodies in heels and carcinogenic makeup are situated in 
dominant positions of power, they embody other narratives whose destructive qualities are 
largely unquestioned.766 This reveals an underlying tension about Islam specifically. Once again, 
the social body articulates its internal anxieties with items of dress – in this case the niqab. 
Executive director of the women’s rights division at Human Rights Watch told Al Jazeera, “I 
think we have to look at the disproportionate focus on the veil and the hijab [being] because it is 
from Islam.”767 
There is a prevalent false dichotomy between multiculturalism and feminism, as though 
the two are inherently at odds. Yet Yvonne Ridley argues that, “Muslim feminists are more 
radical than their secular counterparts.”768 Besides the obvious overlooking of Muslim feminists, 
including notable figures such as Leila Ahmed, Mona Eltahawy, Linda Sarsour, Nawal El 
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Sadaawi, and Malalai Joya, such a binary structure necessarily forces niqabi women into the 
category of victim. However, the veil is itself an inherently feminist issue. As Jennifer Heath 
notes, “… The veil is commonly associated with females and seems to have a kind of feminine 
pulse.”769 Dinah Zeiger asks, “What is it about a veil that poses such a threat to Western 
women?”770 In her article, On the Road: Travels with My Hijab, Maliha Masood contends that,  
One of the most contentious debates in some analytical circles underlies the 
assumption that feminists oppose the veil and antifeminists don’t. That is to 
say, a covered Muslim woman cannot possibly have a mind of her own, that 
in order to improve her status and move forward, she has to reject Islamic 
traditions and adopt Western ways.771  
 
She rejects the emphasis on, “the wearing or not wearing of the veil as the sole determinant of 
Muslim women’s freedom and mobility or lack thereof.”772 Leila Ahmed contrasts this with how 
the bra became a contentious issue in the women’s lib movement, but never eclipsed the 
discourse on gender justice.773 
Masood also notes a power within the niqab. “As a physical barrier, the veil denies men 
their usual privilege of discerning whomever they desire. By default, the women are in 
command. The female scrutinizes the male. Her gaze from behind the anonymity of her face veil 
or niqab is a kind of surveillance that casts her in the dominant position.”774 This strength is 
routinely overlooked, overshadowed by the oppressed victim narrative.775 Spaces impose 
different ways of being on men and women, whether it is a masjid or an office. Entwistle 
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explains that “women may have to think more carefully about how they appear in public than 
men, … and the way they experience public spaces … is likely to be different to the way men 
experience such spaces.”776 As a result, women employ strategies of dress to manage their bodies 
in public. A professional woman, for example, may wear a pantsuit to minimize her feminine 
form in the workplace. Or a woman who puts on a short skirt to wear at a nightclub, and who 
feels perfectly comfortable dressed that way within the club, puts on a long coat to navigate the 
streets between her home and the club.777  
While most women employ such strategies (often unconsciously) a large amount of the 
time, the focus on Muslim women’s supposed structural oppression is, in part, due to Canadian 
concepts of idealized femininity, which are problematic in relation to the niqab. Women should 
not be too submissive, but they also cannot be too defiant. When one adds the elements of 
minority ethnicity and religion, the woman experiences greater scrutiny. “There appears to be a 
shifting line between oppressed Muslim women and Muslim women’s independent behaviour 
that is deemed excessive or unreasonable. When their actions reveal too much agency, Muslim 
women’s conduct must be curtailed in order to successfully operate within the frameworks we 
have created for them.”778 This is a modification of Reina Lewis’ “modesty double standard” in 
practice, and Entwistle’s concern for modesty’s potentially disruptive nature.779 
 This fixation on Muslim women’s bodies displays an underlying acceptance that women 
are the symbols of their communities. There is no equivalent opposition when men wear 
Muslim-coded dress.780 It is not incidental that the government justified military engagement in 
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Afghanistan on the basis of protecting “ourselves” and liberating Afghan women. In the public 
letter to the Ottawa Citizen discussed earlier (Islamophobic ‘Feminism’ Hurts Women), the 
female Islamic leaders voiced their frustrations with these ongoing tropes, and it seems 
appropriate to give them the last word: 
We are fighting the struggles that need to be fought on several fronts: 
against sexism, against racism, against Islamophobia. We do not need to be 
told what to wear on our faces and on our heads and on our bodies, or where 
to sit when we pray. And we definitely do not need to be “saved” by 
ideologues who are only interested in Islam to prove its supposed 
inferiority, or as a proxy for attacking a political party. It is an insult to 
Muslim women’s agency and intelligence to be rendered silent puppets in a 
stale supremacist script.781 
 
Conclusion: Niqabs, Embodied Communication 
This chapter examines the ways niqab-wearing women in Canada incarnate certain 
messages about women, ethnicity, and Islam, illustrated in the case of Zunera Ishaq. In addition 
to stereotyped ideas about Islam and Muslims, there are the messages of empowerment, 
liberation from the male gaze, tolerance for the other, and personified religious belief in situated 
bodily dress practice from the women themselves. Ishaq took a very public stand in an attempt to 
communicate some of these messages. She was successful in court, and earned the right to wear 
her niqab during her citizenship oath. However, she was unsuccessful in her attempt to deliver 
this message to the Conservative government and many Canadians. They were only able to hear 
the narrative that fit their understanding of the niqab within their microsocial order.782 This is the 
story of the niqab as an unchangeable symbol of subjugation and violent oppression. These 
individuals read the niqab as a barrier to communication and as a symbol of an unwillingness to 
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integrate into Canadian society. Wearing this object in this social context is at best rude, and at 
worst a threat to national security. When the federal government refused to hear Ishaq’s meaning 
it took another branch of government, the federal court, to enact change. The Conservative 
Party’s willingness to use the issue for political gain in part contributed to a turn in sentiment 
against them in the election. Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party’s equally political tactic to 
emphasize diversity as a Canadian strength played better to an electorate generally 
uncomfortable with blatant wedge politics. 
Yet, despite such a positive reception to a diversity model, visible religion in the public 
sphere continues to be perceived as dangerous. This is particularly true when it comes in the 
form of dark fabric swathed over a Muslim woman’s body. Whether they are concerns about 
social niceties or Muslim women’s agentic capacities, it is clear that these objections are rooted 
more in a visceral mistrust of overt Islam, and a disproportionate focus on women’s embodied 
religious practices, than in factually grounded matters. According to this line of thought it is the 
responsibility of those concerned with gender equality — whether they are politicians or 
feminists — to “save” the Muslim woman from her maltreatment (whether she wishes to be or 
not). In this scenario, the veil acts as the barrier between the woman’s imprisonment in backward 
Islamic rituals, and liberation through more progressive “Western” practices. Yet gender equality 
and religious freedom are not only not antithetical, they are both essential for the proper 
functioning of this contemporary liberal democracy. These ideas miss the many varied 
experiences of Muslim women in Canada. Their embodied behaviour is far from a unified 
Islamic position, and these women’s own narratives dissolve the rigid boundaries of 
subordination and victimhood constructed around their dress.783 
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Fig. 11. Zunera Ishaq takes the oath of citizenship, October 5, 2015. 
http://www.cbc.ca/gfx/topvideo/2015/ishaq2-citizenship-oath-100915.jpg. 
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Fig. 12. Justin Trudeau, leader of the Liberal Party, Stephen Harper, leader of the Conservative 
Party, and Tom Mulcair, leader of the New Democratic Party at the National Leader’s Debate, 
August 6, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/09/30/vote-splitting-mulcair-trudeau-
harper_n_8220820.html  
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CONCLUSION: As Canadian As Possible 
 
 
“Vain trifles as they seem, clothes have, they say,  
more important offices than merely to keep us warm.  
They change our view of the world  
and the world’s view of us.” 
-   Virginia Woolf, Orlando 
 
 Anna Wall grew up in the Old Colony church in Mexico, a small conservative 
Mennonite group often mistaken for Hutterites or Amish. She moved to Canada in 1993 when 
she married at sixteen, and left the marriage and the church when she was nineteen. Alone for the 
first time, Anna declined her family’s suggestion to return to Mexico and instead worked hard to 
build a new life for herself in a strange country with a completely foreign culture. Leaving the 
self-isolating church community meant that she had to make her way in a culture that she had 
always been taught was unsafe and immoral. Unable to read, and speaking very little English 
(Old Colony Mennonites speak a dialect of low German and mistrust “book learning”), Anna got 
herself an apartment and a job, eventually putting herself through school. Discerning her 
individual identity removed from her communal colony has been a decades long process of trial 
and error. Leaving the church and the community did not mean completely wiping the slate 
clean, but rather meant (and means) an ongoing assessment of each opinion, practice, habit, and 
thought one by one.  
 Three years after leaving, Anna had significantly transformed her life, but her plain 
clothes were one of the last practices to go. While she did not judge the “English” (non-
Mennonite) women for how they dressed, adopting contemporary styles felt wrong. Even though 
she was no longer a church member and had not been for some time, her plain dress was deeply 
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entrenched in her sense of self and how she interacted with the world.784 However, never one to 
shy away from change, Anna decided that if she was going to be “in the world” then it was time 
that she looked the part. Having no frame of reference, and really not knowing anything about 
Canadian women’s fashions, she went to the local thrift store to buy herself a new wardrobe. At 
the store she found a beautiful purple satin dress, fringed with lace. Having worn dresses her 
whole life Anna could not quite bring herself to wear pants yet, but this one could not be much 
further from the Old Colony style. The straps were too small and the neckline was too low for 
her comfort, but she decided she could wear a sweater over it. She bought the dress for herself 
and took it home. Not ready to go out in her new clothes, Anna wore the purple dress around her 
house until she felt more at ease.785 
 Wearing her new dress Anna felt both emboldened and homesick. “… Every time I 
missed my family … I would make some kind of food that reminded me of them. When I [ate] 
the food that I used to share with them it made me feel like I was still part of it all.”786 That day 
she was craving borscht — an archetypical Russian Mennonite soup — but she did not have the 
ingredients so instead made zwiebach. These are buns that have a small round ball sitting on top 
of a larger round base. One could not eat more stereotypically Russian Mennonite food than 
borscht or zwiebach.  
 In the midst of baking her zwiebach, Anna’s neighbour and friend George stopped in for 
a visit. When she opened the door he gave her an odd look but did not say anything. Anna 
realized this was the first time he had seen her in anything other than plain dress, and invited him 
in while explaining about her shopping trip. Sitting at her table, while Anna moved around her 
                                                   
784 Personal conversation with Anna Wall, Waterloo, ON, June 23, 2017. 
785 Personal conversation with Anna Wall, Waterloo, ON, June 23, 2017. 
786 Personal conversation with Anna Wall, Elmira, ON, August 16, 2017. 
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kitchen, George seemed to have trouble looking at her and refused to make eye contact. Finally 
he told Anna that before she went out he thought she should know that her new dress was in fact 
a nightgown. And a rather sexually provocative one at that. 
 Twenty years later, and with a striking sense of style, Anna uses this story to 
demonstrate how “clueless” she was as a new arrival in mainstream Canadian society. I would 
argue this story reveals something else. Clothing is critical and formative to our sense of self, and 
is the physical embodiment of our social location and identity. Although it may seem otherwise 
because we have been surrounded by it since birth, the meaning of what clothes, in and of 
themselves, are and say to others is neither obvious nor universal. We ascribe meaning to dress. 
Therefore, when people come to Canada from different cultures with different understandings of 
what clothes “mean,” they bring diverse readings of what clothes communicate.  
 If you run into Anna today you are most likely to find her in a long flowing bright skirt, 
a fitted top, her red hair wrapped in a large top bun, bold eye makeup, statement earrings and 
turquoise jewellery. If you are familiar with the Mennonite “look” then you can see it in her 
features, but otherwise you would never guess her background. Yet it is there, and she 
communicates it through her more mainstream choices. Though she does wear pants, she is most 
comfortable in skirts. The bold ones she chooses are far from the Old Colony plain dress, but the 
length is a nod to that cut, and her overall presentation — especially the bold skirts and turquoise 
jewellery — are reminiscent of her birth country. She has created a style that reflects her person: 
a fusion of Mexican, Canadian, and Mennonite. 
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Findings  
This dissertation demonstrates that there are limits to religious freedom, which is well 
established, and that those limits are in fact negotiated over time. They are not “set in stone,” nor 
is there an abstract means of determining them. As Canadian society progresses, it defines and 
then redefines these limits. Religious minority groups are the most likely to challenge society’s 
boundaries simply because they are not part of the mainstream (which exists well within those 
borders). Residing at the edge of social norms they are more likely to push the limits of the 
boundaries. For example, while Christians, Jews, and Indigenous people have long used family 
arbitration services, when a Muslim group in Ontario started such services it became a public 
controversy.787 A Muslim immigrant is more likely to push new boundaries because “it” 
(whatever “it” may be) is more likely to be something “we have not done before.” Tracing the 
arc of this study we can see the ways the human rights and accommodation narratives have 
changed. These case studies provide examples of concrete and specific changes to the limits of 
accommodation that occur when minorities challenge the mainstream. 
The Mennonite case examines how this group used the prayer bonnet as a means to 
express membership in and conformity to their church. The bonnet served to maintain boundaries 
and gender norms while simultaneously communicating non-conformity to the larger society. 
The prayer bonnet reinforced cultural and religious systems in order to communicate 
Mennonites’ separateness from the world around them, demonstrating how some minority groups 
actively seek for other Canadians to see them as “different.” The male church leadership used 
women’s bodies as the site of their non-conformist identity, while the women used the dispute to 
                                                   
787 For more on this case, see Anna C. Korteweg and Jennifer Selby, eds. Debating Sharia: Islam, Gender Politics,  
and Family Law Arbitration. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2012). 
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define for themselves fidelity to their faith (though they would not have viewed it in this way).788 
Since the exercise of the group rights depends on clear membership within that group, strong 
identity markers and boundaries, such as the bonnet, took on great significance for the 
community at a time when it felt under assault. This case provides an important foregrounding 
for the next two cases which come after Canada adopted a culture of individual human rights, 
multiculturalism, and secularism. It reveals how much human rights discourse shifted over the 
course of a century from the British- Common-Law approach to a liberal democratic declaration 
of individual rights. 
 Seventy years after the bonnet controversy, many Canadians reacted swiftly to Baltej 
Singh Dhillon’s desire to serve as a Mountie in a turban — a visual embodiment of an outsider 
donning the uniform of a revered insider. Canadians had now consciously reimagined themselves 
as a multicultural nation, but Dhillon’s case reveals that popular opinion was far from fully ready 
to embrace this policy. He was, however, able to communicate to the government that his turban 
visually represented the mostly dearly held values of the Canadian narrative of good citizenship, 
an investment in a just society, and multicultural inclusivism. The government perceived, 
considered, and finally approved his message. This story reveals a great deal about many 
Canadians’ attachment to a venerated item of dress. While some consider strictly adhering to a 
revered manner of dress a practice of religiously conservative immigrant minorities, when the 
Mountie uniform was modified with an overtly religious (non-Western) item many Canadians 
considered it irreverent and offensive.  
Zunera Ishaq’s case examines the ways niqab-wearing women in Canada embody specific 
messages about women, ethnicity, and Islam. In addition to stereotypical ideas about Islam and 
                                                   
788 Epp, “The ‘Dress Question’ Among Ontario Mennonites” 
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Muslim women, there are messages of empowerment, liberation from the male gaze, tolerance 
for others, and personified religious belief in situated bodily dress practice from the women 
themselves. Ishaq attempted to publicly communicate some of these messages, and while she 
was successful in court and earned the right to wear her niqab during her citizenship oath, she 
was unsuccessful in delivering this message to the Conservative government and many 
Canadians. Their own understandings of the niqab drowned out Ishaq’s meanings.789 When the 
federal government refused to hear Ishaq’s message, it took another branch of government, the 
federal court, to enact change.  
Despite many Canadians’ commitment to a diversity model, visible religion in the public 
sphere – particularly when it comes in the form of dark fabric swathed over a Muslim woman’s 
body –  continues to be perceived by many as dangerous. Whether the objections are concerns 
about social behavioural norms or Muslim women’s agentic capacities, they are clearly rooted 
more in a visceral mistrust of overt Islam, and a disproportionate focus on women’s embodied 
religious practices, than in real ethical concern. It then becomes the responsibility of those 
concerned with gender equality to “save” the Muslim woman from her supposed maltreatment. 
In this scenario, the veil is seen as the barrier between the woman’s imprisonment in archaic 
Islamic rituals and liberation through more progressive “Western” practices. However, such 
stereotypes miss the many varied experiences of Muslim women in Canada (and presuppose a 
difference and division between “Islam” and “the West”). These women’s own narratives 
                                                   
789 Entwistle, Fashion and the Fleshy Body, 328. 
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invalidate the rigid boundaries of subordination and victimhood constructed around their 
dress.790 
 In this dissertation I argue that identity, whether personal or national, is not static and is 
a continually evolving site of creation and creativity built on shared understandings and symbols. 
While there are groups and nations (and indeed individuals) that shape their identity around 
entrenched and supposedly unmovable tenets, even these shift (albeit slowly), as with the case of 
the Mennonite bonnet. Many Canadians have something of an identity crisis, with journalists, 
scholars, politicians, and pundits regularly asking what it means to be Canadian. In 1972, revered 
Canadian broadcaster Peter Gzowski hosted a CBC radio show called This Country in the 
Morning. As part of the “never-ending search for Canadian identity” Gzowski held a contest to 
find a Canadian simile on par with, “As American as apple pie.”791 Hundreds of people 
submitted answers, and along with the predictable “as Canadian as maple syrup” or “as Canadian 
as hockey” the infamous winning answer was, “as Canadian as possible under the 
circumstances.”792  
Lacking a deeply ingrained sense of self, many Canadians are particularly (and 
unconsciously) attached to their symbols of identity since they are in such short supply, such as 
the Mountie Stetson. When women joined the RCMP, despite the ways their presence 
undeniably disrupted national narratives around gender and police presence, they did not trigger 
the same national division because protectionist sensibilities read their presentation as 
                                                   
790 For more on this, see Saima S. Hussain, The Muslimah Who Fell to Earth: Personal Stories by Canadian Muslim  
Women (Toronto: Mawenzi House Publ., 2016) including Zunera Ishaq’s chapter, My Journey With the  
Niqab. 
791 Preston Manning, “Being as Canadian as possible, under the circumstances,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto, ON),  
September 1, 2007, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/being-as-canadian-as-possible-under-the-
circumstances/article725129/. 
792 John Bowman, “Fill in the Blank: As Canadian as ______” CBC News: Your Community Blog, July 7, 2013,  
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aesthetically familiar. Likewise, while many Canadians may have disrespected female police 
officers as insignificant side stories to the “real” narrative, they did not experience their presence 
as threatening. This reveals more about how the larger society viewed women and racial 
minorities than it does about what supposed demands came from new Canadians, revealing how 
the Stetson was valued for its representation of deeply cherished Canadian ideals and narratives 
of the rugged frontier of a settler nation, idealized concepts of masculinity as the protector 
watching over Canadians, service to others with little thought of personal reward, and something 
that is truly “ours” in a nation where such emblems are limited.  
When an individual breeches social boundaries of dress they reveal these precepts in the 
process of breaking them.793 When women joined the force they revealed and challenged the 
gender norms on which this Canadian ideal was built. Likewise, when Dhillon requested to wear 
a turban instead of the Stetson he challenged and revealed the ethnic boundaries of what dress 
was socially acceptable. Despite fierce opposition from some, Dhillon’s request was rather 
simply accepted by RCMP Commissioner Pierre Cadieux. He had successfully communicated 
his message to those in power at a time when the RCMP was already intending to alter their 
approaches and policies to make the organization more acceptable and appealing to a more 
diverse population. When Dhillon received permission to wear a uniform issued turban as a 
Mountie, his success in renegotiating standards of masculinity made him an active agent of 
change.  
Likewise, as discussed above, when Ishaq took the federal government to court the case 
revealed the ways niqabi woman in Canada embody a complex host of meanings, both internally 
generated and externally imposed. However, former inscriptions onto the meaning of the niqab 
                                                   
793 See Entwistle, “Fashion and the Fleshy Body.” 
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were so deeply entrenched in other contexts that some individuals were unable to bridge that 
understanding with Ishaq’s stated and embodied practice. Her story became a very public 
example of how societies draw the lines of social location on a woman’s body. If, as Joanne 
Entwistle argues, dress boundaries reflect the anxieties of a society, nowhere are these fears more 
evident than in this case.794 Her case also demonstrates, however, how the same woman’s body 
can be a site of agency rather than a passive receptacle of social inscription as she sought to 
define herself as a Canadian on her own terms.795  
The Mennonite women, without wishing to overhaul their community, actively worked to 
modify it while their bodies acted as their church’s markers to outsiders of their separateness. 
Unlike Dhillon or Ishaq, the Mennonites were not trying to convince mainstream society that 
they “fit in.” Rather, they were seeking to prove that they were different. Mennonites were 
German and non-violent in the midst of a world war (similar to how Dhillon was Sikh in the 
wake of the Air India bombing, and Ishaq was Muslim in the midst of a “war on terrorism”). 
Non-conformity and separation from the world were central tenets of Mennonite theology, and 
their dress identified them as “other.” The church leadership’s insistence on the bonnet had 
implicit patriarchal control, using women’s bodies as the site for nonconformity to the world. 
While these Mennonite women lived in a deeply patriarchal structure, their resistance to change 
their embodied practice in order to be acceptable for the male leadership demonstrated their 
subtle power.  
Unlike Dhillon and Ishaq’s cases, the public was completely unconcerned with 
Mennonite bonnets, and their dress did not directly provoke wider public debate. While different, 
their dressed bodies were similar enough to dominant Canadian social boundaries to avoid 
                                                   
794 See Entwistle, “Fashion and the Fleshy Body.” 
795 Reilly Schmidt, “Women in Red Serge,” 14. 
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censure. The public was, however, very concerned with their identity as pacifist Germans, which 
was embodied in their distinctive dress. At a time when the federal government attempted to 
navigate religious minority accommodation by extending rights to groups (such as the right of 
the Catholic Church to separate schools or First Nations to land claims), and when rights were 
rooted in the British Common Law tradition of precedence and tradition, whether or not an 
individual was a member of the Mennonite church became an urgent matter determining whether 
they could personally exercise the group right of draft exemption. 
Despite their status as a “white” group, public hostilities grew to a complete Mennonite 
immigration ban from 1919 to 1922, at which point the Swiss Mennonites in the Kitchener case 
had been settled in the area for a century, and were considered peculiar but not immigrants 
(despite their intention to remain apart). In their times, Ishaq and Dhillon belonged to religious 
minorities regularly referred to as “New Canadians,” despite both groups residing in Canada for 
many generations, and actively working to conform to social constructs of being “Canadian.” 
This demonstrates, in part, the complex interplay of social locations and determinations of 
insiders, outsider, and others. 
Dress embodies these concepts and provides both points of communication and 
revelation. A bonnet acts as an opportunity for women to assert their power to interpret sacred 
text and ritual practice within a closed and patriarchal community. A turban uncovers dominant 
secular Canadian devoted allegiance to a uniform, and the gendered and racial undertones to this 
faithfulness. And a niqab reveals the holes in public protestations over women’s rights and 
threats to public safety. A gendered narrative thread passes through all of these cases, conveying 
the scripts to which individuals are expected to play (entrenched in the gendered nature of dress 
itself), and the social discomfort when they challenge these. 
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Dress mediates between the inner self and the surrounding society, such as with the 
search for boundaries within and between Mennonites and the outside community.796 It 
establishes identities in a world where these can be uncertain, and is the symbol through which 
we understand others in everyday life, however inconclusive and subjective these interpretations 
may be.797 These case studies demonstrate the ways dress and the body are entangled in power 
relationships, and how people use dress to locate themselves within a social world. Lifestyle, 
social location, and conventions all influence how individuals view themselves and others. This 
simultaneous internal and external creative tension results in dynamic expressions of dress 
performance.798 Individuals who challenge social boundaries through dress will experience the 
censure of the dominant culture. At the same time, breaking these codes of conduct draws 
attention to these often invisible or unstated protocols. Religious minorities frequently draw 
attention to these conventions in the act of breaking them, such as those surrounding women and 
modesty.  
Majority Canadian society generally pays attention to how much flesh one may 
appropriately expose in a given situation, particularly for women, but this includes a “modesty 
double standard” that reinforces hierarchies of status, ethnicity, and gender.799 It censures bodies 
that do not conform to cultural conventions of how much flesh one must show, and it therefore 
becomes “necessary” to manage dress through social regulation and moral pronouncements. The 
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dressed body then functions symbolically to articulate the values and anxieties of dominant 
Canadian culture.800 
As a result, each of these case studies demonstrate how dress has strong social and moral 
dimensions that inspire and constrain the clothing choices people make.801 Dress choice then 
becomes a complicated matter. Elizabeth Wilson critiques the very concept of choice around 
women’s dress practices — particularly regarding hijabis — arguing that “choice” is a 
foundational myth of consumer culture, affecting everyone regardless of their individual 
convictions.802 It then becomes essential to investigate the structural constraints of social location 
and gender that function as parameters around dress decisions.803 Therefore, while dress is 
socially located, individuals are also active in their engagement with it. While dress choice is 
always defined within a particular context, we adapt it to our lived experiences. The complex 
interactions of these various experiences and locations enable individuals to create and adapt to 
particular circumstances. Therefore, dress is neither solely the outcome of oppressive external 
forces nor individual agency.  
Despite a common narrative that religious adherence – particularly to an insular or 
conservative tradition – inhibits the advancement of human rights, the religious beliefs of each of 
the individuals in these case studies were central to their fight. The Mennonite women were not 
rejecting their church’s understanding of women’s roles, dress, or communion. Instead, they 
were holding the church to its own practical theology. Dhillon was committed to the faith of his 
father, and was not willing to sacrifice that in order to gain broader social acceptance. However, 
he also had faith in the RCMP and Canadian society to live up to its stated ideals. His desire to 
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be an officer grew directly from his Sikh understanding of service to his community. His identity 
as a Sikh melded with his identity as a Canadian and in the process he became a national icon. 
Ishaq wore a niqab out of a deep personal conviction, and as a new Canadian chose to put her 
faith in the country’s judicial system and its laws of religious freedom. 
While the belief may not always reflect current practice, most Canadians generally agree 
that human rights in a free and open society are core Canadian values. These examples 
demonstrate that it is often the religious minorities themselves who hold other Canadians to their 
own principles, often pushing and advancing rights for all rather than threatening them. 
Minorities hold a mirror to the larger society and force other Canadians to examine their own 
presuppositions and practices. This dissertation is the first time theories of embodied dress are 
put in conversation with human rights theory and religion to examine Canadian experiences with 
multiculturalism in order to see this mirror. 
 
 
Significance, Limitations, and Further Study 
Canadians encounter diversity on a daily basis. Most of these experiences are non-
events.804 Our different beliefs can lead to dissimilar priorities for governing our lives, and some 
of these contrasts are irreconcilable. Therefore, some common commitment and understanding is 
necessary for Canadian society to function and thrive, but this must be a narrative that allows for 
such diversity (and sameness). As cliché as it may seem, Beaman successfully demonstrates that 
what unites us truly is deeper than what divides us.805 In other words, to some degree, we are all 
                                                   
804 Lori Beaman, Deep Equality in an Era of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University  
Press, 2017), 3. 
805 See Beaman’s discussion on how “naiveté” is used as a charge to dismiss the power of non-divisive approaches  
to deep equality in Beaman, Deep Equality in an Era of Religious Diversity, 185-189. 
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“us.” As I have argued it is the differences that shape the borders of identity. By international 
cultural and legal standards Canada is one of the world’s most open and accepting societies.806 
Yet there is a significant disparity between that romantic ideal through which many Canadians 
can see themselves (including minorities, such as Raheel Raza), and the reality of numerous 
minorities’ lived experiences.  
These three case studies of headcovering debates involving religious minorities in 
Canada over the course of a century provide windows through which we can examine questions 
of identity, gender, agency, accommodation, religious practice in public, social location, and 
dressed bodies. This dissertation considers the discursive interactions of clothes, colonialism, 
human rights, and religion, bringing together a diverse and seemingly disparate collection of 
theories and methods from several disciplines. Throughout this dissertation we have frequently 
discussed embodiment, and this project is itself the embodiment of the hybridization of the 
religious studies discipline. Bringing together human rights theory, dress theory, and intercultural 
material culture studies, I encourage religious studies scholars to make better use of these 
methods and theories long employed in disciplines like anthropology and history. As I explained 
in Chapter Two, the “intellectual promiscuity” of this dissertation is a reflection of the very 
diverse Canada it studies and critiques.807 Bringing these diverse theories together allows me to 
demonstrate how religious dress, and the religious minority communities they represent, belies 
theories that overt religious practice is in decline in this country, and that those who “cling” to 
these parochial ways are inherently incompatible with Canadian ideals. 
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This dissertation breaks new ground in putting these theories in conversation with each 
other, particularly in the Canadian context. Religious dress remains a small subfield of the 
material culture’s subgenre dress studies, and none of these scholars cited in this dissertation are 
religious studies scholars. They all hold PhDs in disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, 
design, apparel, cultural studies, etc. In fact, I have yet to encounter a dress scholar trained in 
religious studies. When I first attended the Textile Society of America biennial symposium, Dr. 
Christina Lindholm, preeminent textile scholar and Dean at Virginia Commonwealth told me 
that the five of us standing together were the only ones “really doing” Muslim dress in North 
America. I was the only one there with training in religious studies. While there are currently 
many works on Muslim veiling, very few of these are written by dress scholars.808 Given the 
understanding that religious studies gives scholars into how religion operates in people’s lives, 
and given the understanding dress scholarship brings to how religious dress is a situated bodily 
practice, the marrying of the two is a long overdue pairing.  
This dissertation would fill a void and break new ground simply by combining dress 
theory and religious scholarship on these topics. However, my initial training is in the history of 
human rights, and I did not feel it was possible to sufficiently understand these case studies and 
their contexts without applying the human rights approach with a thorough grounding in human 
rights theory. Once again, human rights scholarship has limited understanding of the work that 
religious studies does (and at times can see religion as a problem, when it sees it at all), and even 
less of dress theory. I am used to knitted brows when I tell scholars at human rights conferences 
that I study human rights and dress. The two do not immediately come to mind as obvious 
bedfellows. Yet it is not difficult to explain why the niqab is a matter of human rights case law, 
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and it is a short step from there to understanding how studying the veil, as situated and embodied 
religious practice, benefits from dress, human rights, and religious studies theory. 
 In this same way, while these are the theories with which I am most familiar, I do not 
doubt that this study would benefit from other theories and disciplines of which I am ignorant. 
While, at this time, I am confident in my conclusions, I do not doubt that reexamining my 
arguments at another time, with different expertise, or from different paradigms would yield 
different results. This study relies on gazing through time and across cultures. While this distance 
can provide clarity, it can also result in obfuscation. Likewise, in combining disparate theories it 
is unlikely that each is applied as thoroughly as it would be given the whole dissertation to itself. 
The discipline of history teaches us that we bring different questions to the same topic at 
different times. What questions will scholars bring to these cases fifty years from now? Religious 
studies regularly grapples with “insider/outsider” scholarship questions. Being part of the 
Mennonite community provided me with invaluable conversations and insights into that case 
study. What different conclusions would an “outsider” draw? What did I not see? What could I 
see that they could not? How would being a Muslim, or a Sikh, or a man, or a visible minority 
have affected what I understood or concluded in Dhillon’s and Ishaq’s case? Similarly, I was 
born and raised in Canada, and am too young to recall the Dhillon case. A Mountie in a turban is 
a given for me and my generation. How might I approach these issues differently if I was from a 
different generation, or was myself new to Canada? 
 I am also well aware that these are contentious issues and many would argue with the 
idea that women have not yet achieved equity, or that minorities should not simply assimilate. 
Many feminists and Muslims believe that the niqab cannot be conflated with headcoverings and 
fall outside the realm of religious protections. Some still feel that Dhillon’s turban was not a 
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matter of race but of the necessity for a police force to be uniform. Others, including other 
scholars, believe that religion should not be a protected area of human rights law at all and that it 
is time to accept a fully secular public sphere. On these pages I have laid out my responses to 
these arguments, but I do not expect them to convince everyone. 
 Part of these questions depend on further research. There are nearly limitless possibilities 
for further exploration into the themes of this dissertation, and each of these themes have sub-
themes, and so on and so forth. Furthermore, this is not a static field. The matters of immigration, 
multiculturalism, religion in public, and accommodation are constantly shifting and 
transforming. Writing on immigrant religious dress in the current political climate it was often 
necessary to turn off all news sources so I could submit a chapter without having to modify it yet 
further with a new development. In October, 2017, Quebec passed Bill 62 banning face 
coverings when accessing public services, including city buses.809 American debates and policies 
around minorities seem to change weekly over the past year, as the timbre of discourse generally 
continues to decline. At the time of writing, Americans are debating whether President Donald 
Trump referred to “sh—hole countries” in a meeting on immigration reform, as reported by 
Democratic Senator Dick Durban. Whether he did or not, this is the current climate on 
immigration issues. 
 In other words, the field is propitious for further study. A significant study of opinions 
and practices of North American niqabi women themselves is, for example, one of the most 
obvious and pressing areas for further study. While many individuals are commenting on the 
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niqab, it is crucial that scholars collect concrete numbers on niqabis in North America, and 
present the views of these women themselves. Or, likewise, expanding this study to include other 
items of dress, or place it within the North American context (perhaps comparing and contrasting 
American and Canadian case studies and law). This would demonstrate that these are far from 
limited examples and are rather part of a much larger phenomenon. There are also many other 
topics that fall under the religious studies umbrella that would benefit from a dress theory 
analysis – and the particular insights dress study provides – such as new religious movements’ 
dress practices, school uniforms, or the priest’s collar in contemporary society. Furthermore, 
there are striking similarities in the parallels between the experiences of the women in the 
Mennonite and Muslim cases. A closer look at these corresponding experiences will show that 
the tension between internal and external debates over how a group’s women present themselves, 
particularly while occupying a position of public scrutiny, is not limited to Islam but that many 
religious minority communities face these issues. 
Social psychologist Daniel Effron pioneered the study of “moral licensing,” the idea that 
sometimes past good deeds allow individuals to feel free to engage in immoral or unethical 
behaviours that they would otherwise avoid for fear of feeling or appearing unethical. In other 
words, when we do something we deem good we then give ourselves permission to do something 
we deem bad. 810 In future study it would be interesting to apply this theory to these matters of 
religious minority accommodation. His research provides interesting questions for our 
examination of Canadian identity and the experiences of religious minorities. As individuals and 
as a society we have the potential to use these cases to prove how progressive we are, and then 
comfortably go back to the way it has always been. People can see a few high profile cases of 
                                                   
810 Daniel Effron, et al. Moral Self-Licensing. 
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religious accommodation, conclude that Canada is going “too far” in acquiescing to minorities, 
and push for retrenchment. 
 Likewise, Lori Beaman’s newest book Deep Equality in an Era of Religious Diversity 
takes issue with a general emphasis on difference, providing another important angle from which 
to analyze these cases. While not seeking to water down groups and individuals to some 
imagined lowest common denominator of “the same,” she argues that focusing on how the ways 
diverse people interact in uneventful everyday circumstances demonstrates the sameness that 
exists between them. She believes that this produces a “… potential to create an alternative 
imaginary: from one of difference and diversity as ‘challenging’ and something to be ‘managed,’ 
to a framework of negotiation of difference, often through an emphasis on similarity … that 
models deep equality.”811 This is in sharp contrast to, “us” tolerating or accommodating “them,” 
and ultimately preserving religious and cultural majority hegemonies.812  
 This dissertation should initiate conversation and debate about the space between 
rhetoric and reality regarding religious minorities, human rights, and a “religiously neutral” 
Canada. It is not just about Mennonites, Sikhs, or Muslims, but rather these cases act as a 
reflection of the variance within Canadian values and attitudes. They act as a site for the 
convergence of discourses around gender equity, freedom of religious practice, and Canadian 
identity(ies). These cases challenge the Canadian narrative of religious neutrality and a common 
presumption of irreconcilable difference between human rights and overt displays of religion in 
public spaces. Religious minorities are an integral part of Canadian society, and have been 
throughout the country’s history. Far from threatening Canadians’ public commitment to human 
                                                   
811 Beaman, Deep Equality, 8. 
812 See Introduction in Lori Beaman, Deep Equality. 
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rights and equity, it is often religious minority Canadians that repeatedly prompt other citizens to 
live up to their own stated ideals, advancing human rights for all Canadians in the process. 
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